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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the impact of defined benefit pension 
schemes on UK corporations. In doing so the analysis contributes to a number of 
existing literatures in Accounting and Finance. First the thesis contributes to the 
accounting literature by analysing the adoption of fair value pension accounting. 
Second, I contribute to the extant bterature on market efficiency and firm risk bv 
analysing whether measures of systematic risk, financial risk and operational risk reflect 
the underlying risk of the pension scheme. Finaflv, the thesis contributes to the 
literature on internal capital markets and investment decisions through analysing the 
relationship between pension contributions, capital expenditures and firm profitability. 
In analysing how fair value accounting of pensions has been implemented 1 
consider the extent to which managers exercise discretion under fair value accounting 
and the value relevance of these disclosures. My main findings can be summarised as 
follows. First, despite Ettle variation in the underlying econornic inputs, &fferences in 
stated assumptions across companies, auditors and actuaries are significant. Further, I 
find that the adoption of fair value pension accounting provides value relevant 
disclosure and so share prices reflect the value of the underlying pension scheme. 
However, managers display considerable variation in conservatism when implementing 
fair value accounting and this variation is related to scheme-specific characteristics, such 
as asset allocation and pension scheme soh, encv. Consequently, the chapter argues that 
the observed inconsistency in reporting across firms brings into question the efficacy of 
fair value accounting for assessing corporate risk. 
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The second research area considers the relationship between measures of 
systematic risk, firm distress and pension risks. My results shmv that systematic, default, 
financial and operational risks reflect the underlying risk of the pension scheme. 
Further, pension scheme asset allocation is consistent with active pension risk 
management. Managers therefore choose to undertake risk management of pension 
risks as opposed to risk-shifting through asset substitution. 
The final research area investigates the impact of pension contributions on firm 
capital expenditure and profitability. Pension contributions are shown to be a function 
of the size of the pension scheme, pension asset allocation and scheme funding. Mý 
results also suggest that firms who pay the highest contributions have lower capital 
expenditure and higher profitability. Lastly, I find that contributions are unrelated to 
the level of dividends paid or to fixed asset disposals 
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1.1 Introduction 
Pensions and the provision of incomes in retirement is one of the biggest chaflenges 
facing developed economies. The rapid fall in mortality rates that has occurred ()%-er the 
past 50-100 years is the result of much higher standards of living and rapid advances in 
medical technology. As a consequence individuals are now longer fived as maný, of the 
diseases that were previously fatal are now treated successfully. The speed of the 
medical advances and the impact that it has had on survival rates is startling. In looking 
at survivor rates for common cancers the improvement in just the past decade is huge. 
Between 1993 and 1995 the 5 year survival rate for prostate cancer in men was 59.8% 
while the 5 year surVival rate between 1999 and 2003 increased to 74.4%'. 
The rapid increase in medical advances and the successful treatment of illness 
has increased the average UK fife expectancy dramatically. In 1982 the average life 
expectancy for a male in the UK at 65 was 13 years. By 2005 however the average life 
expectancy at 65 had risen to 17 years. For women the increase is from 17 years to 20 
years. Although this increase is not as large as the improvements seem in male fife 
expectancy this is still a large increase in costs as women retire earfier. The cost of both 
state and private pension provision therefore is now considerablv higher than previouslý 
estimated. In addition, given how wrong previous estimates of pension costs have been 
the possibility of costs increasing further is a very tangible risk. Such dramatic increases 
I Cancer Sunival Rates 1993-1995 and 1999-2003, -, v\v"-. statistics. gov. uk- 
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in the costs of provision effect both the government and firms, straining the fiscal 
budgets of government and the balance sheets of corporations. 
ln. response to this the government have started to undertake reforms to ensure 
that there will be adequate retirement incomes in the future. Manv of the solutions for 
government that have been discussed, and are likely to be implemented, are based upon 
the recommendations and findings of the Turner Report (2006). The report itself was a 
rigorous and comprehensiVe analysis of the problems facing the current svstem of 
pension proVision. As well as adopting many of the recommendations of the report, the 
government also alms to change the burden of pension provision away from the state to 
the private sector. Currently, around 60% of pensions are provided by the state and 
around 40% by the private sector. It is the aim of the government to redress the 
balance so that 40% of pensions are provided by the state and 60% bý, the pri\, ate sector. 
Within industry there is a shift from the more generous defined benefit 
arrangements to defined contribution schemes. This is in part due to the shift from 
state to private pension provision; however the risks associated within defined benefit 
pension schemes are considerable. For many firms, and in particular former 
nationahsed and 'smokestack' industries the burden of the defined benefit scheme is 
huge. This is a function of the generous benefits that were put in place and the sizeable 
workforces that they employed when the company was formerly nationabsed. Coupled 
with the dramatic changes in life expectancy the pension scheme is now one of the most 
sigmficant risks in many firms. 
This thesis analyses the impact of defined benefit pension schemes on a sample 
of large UK corporations. The thesis will address and contribute to three main areas 
surrounding defined benefit pension provision. First, it contributes to the extant 
literature on pension accounting and how firms account for their pension schemes. 
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Second, it will analyse whether the risk of the pension scheme is reflected in measures 
of market and firm risk. Last, it examines the impact of the pension scheme on the 
financial resources of the firm. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as f6flows. Section 1.2 discusses the 
theoretical context of the subsequent analysis and the different incentives that affect the 
structure, investment policy and funding strategy of corporate pension plans. Section 
1.3 discusses the issues surrounding pension accountinLy and gives an ovemexv of the C? C) 
changes to pension accounting that have occurred. Section 1.4 discusses market 
efficiency and pension risks. In Section 1.5 the cost of pension provision, firm 
investment and performance is discussed. The final section 1.6 presents the structure of 
the thesis. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework and Assumptions 
The subsequent analysis in this thesis makes a number of assumptions about complete 
markets, perfect markets, informational asNýmmetnl, managerial incentives, labour 
market implications and the prevailing tax regime. One of the most important 
theoretical considerations is the role of both complete markets and perfect markets. 
In a complete market managers of a firm would simply buy insurance to hedge 
any shortfaU in pension scheme funding. This is important for both the management 
and the employees of the scheme. For employees this hedges them against anýl funding 
shortfall and any associated loss in pension benefits. Conversely, for management this 
minimises the cost of pension provision and having to provide additional finance where 
funding of the scheme is insufficient in such a situation pension plan funding is 
irrelevant (Sharpe(1976)). 
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In addition to this if perfect markets exist then scheme funding and investment 
strategy would again be irrelevant. In a Miller and Modighani (1958) perfect capital 
markets scenario, where funding shortfalls occur, the management would simply go to 
the capital markets to raise finance to fund the shortfall as internal and external finance 
are equiValent. Imphcitly, the funding of the scheme A-lfl not have any effect on 
corporate strategy as the internal resources of the firm xill remain the same. Howc%, cr, 
due to taxes, informational asymmetry and the costs associated -with raising external 
finance this is not possible. 
Underpinning the subsequent analysis I assume that markets are incomplete as 
there is no insurance for funding shortfaUs and that markets are imperfect. This has a 
number of imphcations. First, management must fund the pension scheme through 
dedicated financial assets and meet any funding shortfall. In the UK this is very much 
the case over the sample period I analyse, as there was no regulatory safety net, unlike in 
the US where the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) provides some form 
of insurance coverage. Second, markets are imperfect and so it is not possible for firms 
to simply raise additional finance in the capital markets to meet aný, deficiencies in 
scheme funding, as finance is not costless as a result of informational asymmetry, taxes 
and transaction costs. 
Bringing these two assumptions together this means that first, the management 
of the firm must fund the scheme and they must also meet anýý shortfall in funding. 
Second, the management of the firm will fund the scheme from the existing financial 
resources of the firm. As a consequence of this management are going to be concerned 
about, the level of funding in the scheme, the cost of provision, the investment strategy 
of the firm, the impact that shortfaUs have on corporate risk and the investment strategy 
of the firm. 
190 OR 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Aside from these theoretical considerations a number of other important 
assumptions underhe my analysis. One situation that is not pos ible to consider is the Is11 
different corifficts that management face when funding a scheme. The decisions that 
management make with respect to a iven scheme will be closely linked to whether ()r 91 
not their own personal pension is in the same scheme as all other employees. In this 
situation, if managers are rational utility maximising individuals, then it is in their own 
interest to fully fund the scheme. Conversely, if managers have a separate scheme from 
employees it is reasonable to assume that their behaviour x-vould be different as thev 
would not gain any personal benefit from fully funding the employees' scheme. 
In the subsequent analysis I assume that managers essentially provide the 
scheme for employees and that management are not part of the scheme. I make this 
assumption as it is not possible disentangle where management are part of the company 
scheme and where management have a separate scheme. 
Despite this conflict, management may have other incentives with regards to the 
provision of a pension scheme. One interesting factor with regards to the prw, ýIsion and 
security of a pension scheme is the impact this may have on labour markets. The 
proVision of a pension can in some respects be Viewed as deferred remuneration. As 
such, where firms provide a generous pension scheme, assuming a rational labour 
market, then this will affect both the ability of firms to attract employees and retain staff. 
In addition to this it has been shown that the pension also proNTides management 
leverage with employees and trade unions jppohto (1985). In situations where 
management are negotiating costly Nvage increases, these can be limited by promising 
additional funding to the pension scheme. The provision of such pension benefits can 
therefore benefit management in terms of attracting and retaining higher quahtý- labour 
while limiting costly,, vage increases. 
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Managers therefore have to trade off a number of incentives in deciding -what 
level of funding is optimal. Managers must weigh up the costs and benefits of fully 
funding the scheme and the subsequent benefits that they can derive from the scheme. 
Although these issues are of interest, , vithin the subsequent analysis it is not possible to 
empincally test these issues. 
Two final issues that relate to the proVision of defined benefit pension schemes 
are the regulatory environment and the tax regime. Over the sample that I consider 
pension scheme funding was subject to the Nlinimum Funding Requirement (NIFR). 
This however, proved to be an onerous burden on firms with many not being able to 
afford the deficit recovery schedules that the NtFR imposed. Managers therefore 
negotiated with the trustees of the pension scheme and the employees witli regards to 
deficit recovery plans and the rate of additional funding that xý-(-)uld be provided. The 
regulator, the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA), at this time was 
satisfied with this outcome as additional funding was being provided and so we have a 
situation where there is a regulatory expectation that deficits would be funded. 
The final issue that has to be considered is the role of taxation and pensions. In 
the UK pension contributions, capital gains and interest on fixed income securities are 
tax exempt, and so there are benefits associated with operating a pension scheme. 
Management can therefore implicitly pay employees a higher wage without having to 
bear the full cost as the contributions to the scheme are tax deductible. A secondary 
issue that affects the UK is the abohtion of dividend tax rebef on equities in 1997-8. 
One may expect therefore that this , vould push firms away from equities as the realised 
return on equities is therefore lower after tax. However, this does not seem to be the 
priman- factor at v, ork as equities are stlH the don-unant asset in UK pension portfolios. 
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In addition to this the government in the 1980's placed a cap on the ma,.,, imum 
level of funding that a scheme may have. The cap was placed at 105% to prevent firms 
from over-investing in the pension scheme to reduce the taxable profit of the firm. 
In considering tax and pensions 1 befieve that the tax costs/benefits of running 
pension schemes do not dominate management's desire to proVide pensions. Other 
considerations such as the risk of shortfaUs, uncapped liabilities and regulatorý- preSSUre 
to proVide immediate financing will play a stronger role in influencing managerial 
decision making. 
1.3 Pension Accounting 
Pension accounting is one of the biggest challenges currently facing accounting standard CDCD 
setting bodies. There are a number of issues that surround what is a very complex area. 
The biggest source of the controversy is the role of fair value accounting as opposed to 
historical cost accounting. The UK adopted a system of fair value accounting with the 
introduction of Financial Reporting Standard 17 in 2001. Subsequently the 
International Accounting Standards Board has continued along the fair value path -with 
the introduction of liaternational Accounting Standard 19. 
The use of fair value accounting is controversial for a number of reasons. The 
marking to market of the pension assets is a relatively straight fonvard process as the 
value of the assets on the balance sheet date can be taken from the prevailing market 
prices. The calculation of the liability however is based around complex assumptions 
about future rates of mortahty for different cohorts of workers, future rates of inflation 
and interest. The liability that is presented in the annual report x-vould be more 
accurately described as marked to assumption as opposed to marked to market. Here in 
lies the controversv as the choice of the appropriate discount rate, rates of inflation, 
bL 
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interest rates and future mortahty are subjective and are therefore open to a Wide r,, in, -, c 
of variation. As a result the liability that is presented may not be a true representa 'on of ti 
obbgatlon on the firm. 
One of the most crucial aspects of this is the value relevance of the accounting 
amounts that are presented in the annual reports. The goal of the financial reports is 
simply to present a true and fair view of the firm's assets and liabilities. In an efficient 
market these amounts should be impounded into the share price of the firm. Pension 
accounting is by its ven, nature complex and as a consequence the amounts presented in 
the financial accounts may be opaque as the market cannot assess them properly. 
ln tandem with this the process of marking to market potentiafly exposes the 
balance sheet and the profit and loss to a considerable amount of volatility. The average 
pension portfolio consists of 70% equity, 25% bonds, and 5% other assets (cash, 
property and insurance contracts etc). In having such a large equity exposure the assets 
of the pension scheme will fluctuate up and down with movements in the stock markets. 
As a result many firms will report high levels of scheme funding in one ýýear and 
substantial deficits in subsequent years. Underlying this problem is the fact that the 
financial reports are presenting the level of funding in the scheme today for a liability 
that may be due in 40 years. As such it may be somewhat counter intuitive to look at 
today's market prices. 
In chapter 41 therefore consider the implementation of FRS-17. I document 
the range of assumptions that are adopted across firms, auditors and actuaries. Further, 
I analyse the determinants of the assumptions that are adopted by management. Last I 
test the value relevance of the assumptions and the accounting amounts that are 
disclosed in the annual report. 
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My results are as follows. I find that the cross-sectional variation I in assumptions 
I observe across firms cannot be explained by the identity of either the auditor or 
actuary of the firm. Further, I find that the assumptions that are disclosed arc on the 
whole significantly different from expectations. I present evidence that the choice of 
assumption is a function of the asset composition of the pension portfolio and funding 
of the pension scheme. Last I show that the accounting amounts that are presented in 
the annual reports are \-alue relevant and so the introduction of fair value accounfin,,,, has 
resulted in accounting amounts that are impounded into share prices. HoNvevcr, the 
variation in assumptions that is obser%-ed shows that the discretion afforded to 
management prevents a 'true'picture of the pension scheme of the firm. 
1.4 Pensions, Risk and Market Efficiency 
One of the key factors in a well developed financial market is the efficiencý, of the stock 
market. Efficient stock markets should in theory incorporate all relevant information 
into stock prices. Under the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama (1966)) the market will 
reflect all of the underl ing fundamentals of the firm. Hovvever, in reality there are Yi 
situations where the market may not be able to do this. One such situation is with 
pensions. 
The complex way in wl-iich pensions are accounted for may prevent the market 
from seeing through to the true risks of the underling pension scheme risks Uln, Bodie 
and Merton (2006)). In such a situation measures of systematic risk may not accuratelý- 
reflect the risks associated with the pension scheme. ConsequentIv, firms be 
under/over priced and investors will not be able to appropriately assess the risk and 
return of their investments. 
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Pensions and their concomitant risks are also complex as the scheme prescnts 
many different risks. The first is the size of the babihty. Large pension habihties are 
inherently riskýý as they represent a substantial long-term burden on the firm. The level 
of funding in the scheme presents a further risk as the scheme may have a large habihtv 
relative to firm size but be fully funded. If the market is efficient the funding of the 
scheme relative to firm size should also be reflected in measures of systematic risk. 
Lower levels of funding relative to the size of the firm should be associated \N-itli higher 
measures of beta. 
Another important factor in assessing the risk of the pension scheme is the asset 
allocation strategy that the firm adopts. If equity is the dominant asset in the pension 
portfolio the funding level of the pension scheme will be subject to a higher degree of 
short-term volatifity. EssentiaBy sigmficant faUs in the stock market WIH severelv reduce 
the funding of the pension scheme thereby increasing the risk of the firm. Measures of 
market efficiency should therefore reflect this risk. 
In circumstances where all of these factors are reflected in measures of 
systematic risk the market is reasonably efficient. This is important for two reasons. 
First, the prices that are quoted in the stock market wdl reflect this risk. Second, the 
market can properly asses the information that is presented in the financial accounts of 
the firm. 
The pension however will not just affect market measures of risk but also 
measures of financial distress and operating distress. Large pension liabilities are 
associated xith higher pension costs. ConsequentIv, the magnitude of the 
liability x-,, Ifl 
contribute to increased financial distress within the firm. 
Further, the asset aHocation of the scheme may be determined by the level of 
financial distress within the firm. If equity is the dominant asset in the portfoho the 
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funding of the pension liability will be subject to higher levels of volatility. As a 
consequence of large shifts in the assets of the pension scheme the firm may be required 
to proVide large amounts of additional financing and this in turn will increase the 
financial distress of the firm. Conversely, higher investment of pension assets in bonds 
increases the duration of the pension portfolio and creates a more stable pension cost. 
In such circumstances the likelihood of large amounts of additional funding being 
required are reduced. 
As with financial distress firms are also exposed to operating distress. The 
generation of low returns on the assets of the firm may simply be a function of the 
operating environment of a given industry. However, the pension asset aRocation 
strategy should reflect this risk. As With financial leverage the level of equity held in the 
pension portfolio will subject the funding level of the scheme to greater levels of 
volatility. ln response to such shifts the firm may be cafled on to pay higher 
contributions to the scheme to shore up funding. However, due to the low margins of 
the firm such large costs Will have a detrimental effect on the firm. In response to such 
a risk managers may opt allocate a greater percentage of scheme assets into bonds as 
this will create a more stable and consistent pension cost. 
One final risk that may also be affected by the pension scheme is the probability 
of default. The pension liability in many instances is greater than the market value of 
the firm. For some companies, such as British Airways, the deficit of the pension 
scheme is close to the market capitahsation of the firm. In such circumstances where 
the pension liability dwarfs the corporation this must impact upon the probability of 
default. The size of the scheme, funding of the scheme and the additional financing 
that may be reqwred may increase the likelihood of default. Further, pension liabilities 
are now classed as debt like obligations between the firm and emploý ees consequently 
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the hability in many respects is a further debt on the firm and could therefore contribute 
towards increased probability of default in the firm. 
In chapter 51 analyse all of these different risks. The first part of my analysis 
considers systematic risk and pension risk. I extend jin, Bodie and Merton (2006) as I 
consider each of the different pension risk components separately. Further, I also 
analyse the relation between pension risks and the Fama-French (1993) size and value 
risk factors. 
I also consider the relation between pension risk and measures of operating and 
financial distress as well as the probability of default. In addition to this I test for risk- 
shifting and risk management within the pension portfolio in response to higher lcvcIs 
of operating, financial and default risk within the firm. 
My results can be summarised as follows. First, measures of systematic risk 
reflect the size of the pension liability, the level of funding in the scheme and the asset 
allocation. Further, 1 find that the size and value loading factors from the Fama-French 
(1993) 3 factor model also reflect the risks of the pension scheme. 
In looking at operating risk, financial risk and probability of default I find that 
higher measures of risk are associated with larger pension liabilities and poor levels of 
scheme funding. For my analysis of risk shifting and risk management I find evidence 
of risk management by firms that have higher levels of operating risk and financial risk. 
However, I find no evidence of risk management or risk shifting in response to 
increased default risk. 
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The funding of pension deficits through large contributions constrains the resources of 
firms. Under a Modigliand and Nfiller (1960) costless finance model the funding of the 
pension liability would be financed through external capital markets. In circumstances 
where the cost of internal and external finance is equiValent managers would simply opt 
to raise finance from the markets and maintain the level of invcstment xxithin the firm. 
However, external finance is not costless as a result of information asymmetries, taxes 
and costs of issuance (Rauh (2006)). Managers Nvill therefore opt to utibse the internal 
resources of the firm. 
For management there are a number of internal resources that could be 
exploited to proVide large contributions to the scheme. These resources would have to 
allow management a high degree of discretion over the assets as well as being substantial 
enough to make an impact in the deficit of the scheme. Three such internal resources 
are capital expenditures, diVidends and asset disposals. 
The most obvious choice of internal resource for management to exploit is 
capital expenditure as this affords them the greatest level of discretion. However, in 
choosing to reduce capital expenditure to fund the pension scheme will obviously 
decrease investment in the firm. Managers may therefore have to forgo profitable 
projects that they would otherwise have invested in. As a result the profitability of the 
firm may reduce as a consequence of having to fund the pension deficit. 
Another potential source of funds is dividends. For many firms dividends are a 
significant cash outlay. As such managers may tap into this resource. Dividends 
however act as a signal to the market (Battacharya (1979) and 'Miller and Rock (1985)). 
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In reducing dividends to fund the pension deficit this would convey negative news to 
the market and consequently the share price of the firm may fall. 
Asset disposals are also a potential source that managers may utihse to fund a 
pension deficit. Managers may opt to sell off obsolete assets or assets that have a high 
market value and can be substituted with low cost alternatives. One such case would be 
to seH some of the property owned by the firm and purchase cheaper property or c%-cn 
lease premises. This outcome is complex, however, when faced \NýItli the market 
implications of cutting dividends or the loss of potentially profitable investments this 
strategy may be the most optimal choice. There are also real Efe examples of such 
complex strategies. The Pensions Corporation fund pension deficits in exchange for the 
ownership and lease back of the IT facilities of the corporation whose deficit thcy fund. 
Profitability is also a major factor in looking at the impact of large contributions 
to fund pension deficits. As a result of pension deficits being funded from the internal 
resources of the firm, profitability may be impacted upon. There are two potential 
outcomes if this is the case. First the funding of the pension deficit may reduce 
profitability as the firm has to reduce investment. Consequently, managers are unable to 
undertake all of the profitable investments that are available to the firm. However, 
there are also potential upside benefits to having to pay large contributions to the 
pension scheme. The large contributions may reduce excessive free cash flow in the 
firm and reduce overinvestment and empire building. Potentially, large pension 
contributions may reduce agency issues and its associated costs and improve 
profitabihty in the firm through more efficient asset aEocation strategies. 
In chapter 61 analyse the relation between large pension contributions, internal 
capital markets and firm profitability. I firstly document the relationship bet--, veen 
scheme size, asset allocation and funding levels. Further, following Rauh (2006) 1 test 
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the relation between capital expenditure and large pension contributions. I extend this 
analysis by testing other potential sources of internal finance that managers maý- cxploit 
namely dividends and asset disposals. Last I analyse the relationship benxeen firm 
profitability and large pension contributions. 
My final set of results can be summarised as follovvs. First, I shov, - that the 
contributions paid to the scheme are a function of the size of the pension scheme, the 
level of funding and the asset allocation of the scheme. Further, consistent with Rauh 
(2006), capital expenditures fall in response to large pension contributions. In addition 
to this I find that the level of dividends paid and asset turnover , 6thin the firm arc 
unaffected by large contributions to the pension scheme. Finally, I find that the 
profitability of those firms that pay the largest contributions is higher. This is consistent 
with a reduction in agency costs within the firm as there is a more efficient use of firm 
assets and a reduction in over investment within the firm. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is set out as follows. Chapter 2 presents an institutional setting 
with an extensive discussion of the evolution of pension accounting in the UK from 
SSAP-24 to FRS-17. Chapter 3 proVides a detailed description of the data, the 
chaHenges that the data presents and descriptive statistics of the data that will be used in 
the subsequent analysis. Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter and analyses how firms 
account for their pensions under FRS-17 and the value relevance of the nev, standard. 
Chapter 5 is the second empirical chapter and presents my analysis of risk and pensions. 
Ions, Chapter 6 is the final empirical chapter and present mv analy sis of pension contributi 
internal capital markets and firm profitability. Chapter 
-7 
concludes ý, vith a summary of 
my main findings and contributions as , vefl as suggestions for 
further research. 
POOR 
2 
ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS PaL, e 16 
2 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed summary of the evolution of pension accounting in the 
UK. The chapter presents the historical development of pension accounting in the tllý, 
from Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 24 (SSAP-24) to Financial Reporting 
Standard-17 (FRS-17). In tandem with this 1 highhght the issues and concerns that 
emerged over time and the main features of each new standard. 
The chapter itself is expansive and covers not only the evolution of pension 
accounting from the mid-1980's but also the role of the actuary and the issues associated 
with the fair value approach that the Accounting Standards Board haN, e subsequently 
adopted. I discuss the role of the actuary and the complications surrounding pension 
calculations as they are inextricably hnked to the development of how pensions are 
accounted. One very clear result of this discussion is the complexity that underlies any 
method of pension accounting. The chapter also highlights some of the issues 
surrounding the role of fair value accounting for pensions. I finally arrive at the 
disclosure requirements of Financial Reporting Standard-17. 
The rest of chapter is set out as follows. Section 2.1 provides the background to 
SSAP-24 and some of the issues that early standards tried to address. Section 2.2 
discusses the role of the actuary in pension accounting. Section 2.3 presents how 
pensions are accounted for under SSAP-24. Section 2.4 provides the background to the 
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development of FRS-17. Section 2.5 discusses the use of market values in pension 
account and the final section 2.6 presents the accounting disclosure requirements of 
FRS-1 7. 
2.2 Background 
Since the early eighties there have been a number of significant changes to the 
accounting treatment of company pension schemes. The main objective of the 
accounting standards has been to increase disclosure and transparency as to the true 
position of company pension funds. In doing so the users of financial accounts should 
be able to compare, the current cost, scheme hability and funding level xx, hen analysing 
the annual reports of firms. However, due to the complex nature of the problem there 
are a number of issues that have arisen with each of the standards'. 
In 1983 the UK Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) introduced Exposure 
Draft 32 (ED 32) "Disclosure of Pension Information in Company Accounts". This 
was the first real move towards fuller disclosure as there was htde prior to this. The lack 
of disclosure meant that it was not possible to adequately assess the current state of a 
company's pension fund, that is to say the current habilitv or the magnitude of any 
future hablEties. However, this Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) did not 
consider the measurement methods used to arrive at the liability, and more significantly 
it did not consider the pension cost to the company. 
Further, ED 32 (iid not state how any surplus/deficit should be accounted for. 
This is one of the key issues in looking at the position of a pension fund. Consequentiv, 
after a consultative process the ASC issued ED 39 (1986). The most significant 
2This Chapter covers much of the discussion surrounding the different discussion papers and 
consultation documents that -, vere released throughout the evolution of UK, pension accounting. 
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improvement to the previous SORP was to account for the pension cost on a "regular 
and systematic basis over the service lives of emploýýees". In doing so, the costs of 
providing benefits are matched x6th the benefits received. 
Another key part of the new SORP was its differential treatment of surpluscs 
and deficits, unlike ED 32, that did not make this distinction. -At the time of ED 39 
there were many pension funds that were on payment hohdaý-s (where no contributions 
are made to the pension scheme). The payment hohdays , vere a function of past 
downsizing and high levels of return on current pension investments. This, in turn, 
translated into a false increased profit level as the cost of the pension scheme 
contributions was lower'. Hoxvever, ED 39 stated that any surplus must be spread over 
the remalmng service lives of employees. 
Another significant change was the enactment of the Finance Act 1986. This 
was a wide-ranging piece of legislation that attempted to remedy the problem of 
excessive pension fund surpluses that capped the maximum level of funding to a 
pension scheme and placed a cap on the maximum surplus a fund could have. The Act 
placed a 5% cap on scheme surplus, the assets in a scheme could therefore not be 
greater than 5% over the total liability of the fund. A number of options were provided 
on how to allocate any surplus above this level. 
A scheme could reduce the surplus to the 5% maximum alloWing for the tax 
benefits a scheme received to remain in place. The first option made available for 
allocating the surplus was that it could be refunded as a lump sum to employers; 
however, such a refund was eligible for tax as no tax had been paid upon the capital 
gains Nvhile invested in the scheme. Fex firms therefore took advantage of refunds. A 
3 In this situation profits can be inflated by taking payment holiday as this pension cost is .1 
significant portion of total payroll costs. Consequently, the contribution hohday reduces payroll 
costs and increases profits. 
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payment holiday or a period of lower contributions was also an option, although a 5- 
year maximum was placed upon this. The pension fund could increase the final beneFits 
that the scheme provided. The 1986 Act also allowed for firms to Mix all of the options. 
2.3 Pension Costs and the Profit and Loss 
The significance of pension costs to a firm is not akvays clear in company accounts and 
the implied liability is often misunderstood in the analysis of a firm's pension scheme. 
Pensions are firstly part of an employees' remuneration package. ConsequentIv, the cost 
of pension provision is a significant percentage of total payroll costs. Howeý, er, due to 
the complex and long-term nature of the pension hability, it is problematic to account 
consistently from year to year for the true cost and habilitý, facing a firm ansing from 
providing a pension scheme to employees. 
2.3.1 Dý(ferent Tjpes of Pension Schemes 
There are a number of schemes that are available to employees and these schemes offer 
different levels of pension income and pension rights to employees. The most common 
schemes are defined contribution schemes and defined benefit schemes. There are 
however ex-gratia pension schemes. These schemes are apphed on a case by case basis 
where there has been no prior formal arrangement or legal obligation on the employer 
to proVide a pension scheme to employees. 
The first common type of pension scheme is a defined contribution or moneN, 
purchase scheme. Under this arrangement contributions are paid by the employer to 
the pension scheme on an annual basis. The most important factor here is that the 
employer is under no obligation to provide a specified level of benefits on retirement. 
Consequently, the pension that is received is dependant upon the level of contributions 
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paid to the scheme and the return on the pension scheme investments (assets). The 
cost to an employer can, therefore, be measured with a high degree of certainty as it is 
simply the cash contribution. 
The second defined benefits scheme is more comphcated than a defined 
contributions scheme. Such a scheme is dependant either on the average earnings of 
employees, or more commonly, their final salary. Due to the uncertaintýT over what the 
average salary of an employee will be, or -, xhat their final salarN- NN-111 be, there is a 
signIficant and complicated problem as to how an annual cost can be calculated to meet 
the company's obligations. 
This problem is exacerbated by the uncertainty over whether or not the 
scheme's assets wifl be adequate to meet the scheme's habihties. EssentiaBy, if the 
return on investments and contributions is not sufficient to meet the scheme hablhties 
then the scheme will be in deficit. Further, the actuarial assumptions about future rates 
of mortality, interest rates, and inflation all affect the solvency of a scheme and the 
schemes abibty to meet their pension obhgations. 
To further comphcate the issue of how to account for defined benefit schemes, 
the scheme is a legal promise by employers to provide a specific level of retirement 
benefits to employees. ln this situation, if the return on the pension assets is 
insufficient to meet the pension habibty the company is legally bound to cover any short 
faH from corporate profits. 
Alternatively, if a pension scheme had a surplus (pension assets are greater than 
pension liabilities) this can benefit the company. This could result in a payments holiday, 
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reduced contributions or a rebate'. All of which are governed by accounting regulations 
and statute law. 
Pension funds can also be classified as funded or unfunded schemes. For a 
scheme to be funded it will involve contributions from an employer, and usually an 
employee, that are paid into a scheme where thev are invested in financial assets. An 
unfunded scheme is one where the benefits are paid directly by an employer. The 
accounting standard however, applies to both types of scheme as the cost of pension 
provision must be accounted for in the annual report. 
2.4 The Role of the Actuary 
In seeking to proVide useful disclosures about pension schemes it is necessary to rely on 
actuarial advice, to cost the pension scheme as well as for advice in administering a 
scheme. For a defined contribution scheme it is not necessary to use an actuatN, to 
calculate the annual cost as the scheme is simple to administer. However, in arrn, ing at 
a cost for a defined benefits scheme it is essential to apply actuarial methods and 
techniques. 
Actuarial calculations are the most appropriate method for assessing the 
position and associated costs of defined benefit schemes. Such schemes are extremely 
complicated to cost as they are sensitive to small changes in assumption as a result of 
their long-term in nature. The cost calculation can therefore be significantly affected by 
the model used and the assumptions that he behind the cost calculation. 
In performing a calculation an actuary must consider many factors that are 
extremely sensitive to -, vider economic circumstances and difficult to predict. These 
4AII of these terms are discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
MGR 
2 
ACCO['NTING, FOR PENSIONS 22 
include future rates of inflation, pay increases, pension contributions, return on 
investments, increases to the number of members in a scheme, the demographics of a 
scheme, and mortahty rates. 
'An actuaq will therefore make assumptions about all of these factors as a whole. - Iny 
assumptions are mutually compatible, in the knowledge that, if expen'ence departsfrom the asslimptions 
made, the effects of such departures may well be offsetfiý ill inrestIvoil yi . elds and , gý notably 
' the case of '- 
increases in _pnces and earnin , 
gs'. " 
Actuaries also structure funding plans for pension schemes to allow them to 
accumulate assets over time to enable the scheme to meet the pensions liability. In 
theory this accumulation will be performed in a prudent and controlled method, 
aHowing for pensions to be proVided without impacting upon a firm's cash flo,, x,. 
Underlying any funding plan is the objective that the present level, and estimated future 
levels, of contributions will be sufficient to meet the habil-ity of the scheme. 
There are a number of methods that actuaries apply in calculating the 
contribution levels of a scheme. However, one of the most common objectives is to 
achieve a level contribution rate over future pensionable senice. One example of 
assumptions that can be applied to reach a level contribution rate, using accrued 
benefits methods, is that the new entrants to scheme will not affect the average age of 
the workforce. Alternatively, the prospective henefits method only looks at the current 
workforce, and then arrives at a contribution rate that will remain stable regardless of 
changes to the workforce size and age profile. 
In both of these assumptions there are two of the key economic fundamentals 
that underpin pension provision. The first is the ratio of xorkforce to pensioners. If 
this ratio remains stable overtime then pension provision is less problematic, assuming 
-ý SSAP-24 paragraph 9. 
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that the return on investments is sufficient to meet the scheme liabflities. The second is 
the impact of increasing longevity (stochastic mortality). This is a much more 
complicated factor and requires either an increased level of contributions or later 
retirement as the scheme must provide a pension o\-er a much longer time horizon. 
Implicitly the prospective benefits method therefore will result in a higher rate of 
contributions than the accrued benefits method. 
Another key factor here is the impact of discounting and reporting present 
values in pension costs and the scheme assets and liabilities. In accounting there is no 
time value of money considerations, and accounting \, alues are predominantly reported 
at current values. Howe\ýer, the role of discounting has a serious impact upon the 
current and future cost of a pension scheme. Consequently, if there is a change to the 
prevail-ing interest rates between contributions the effect is not material and can be 
broadly ignored. However, if the changes in interest rates are expected to persist the 
situation resembles that of an unfunded scheme'. Therefore, a change to the charge 
(contribution in funded scheme) and interest on the unfunded liability will have to be 
adjusted. 
In assessing a scheme and applying a funding plan, the actuary sets out a general 
plan for the cost of providing a pension scheme. However, due to the long term nature 
of the problem then it is possible that a deficit can occur. If the deficit is not expected 
to be offset by future surpluses, or the circumstances that haA-e given rise to the deficit 
are expected to remain, then it is necessary for additional contributions to be made. It is 
also possible for firms to increase contributions at one period in time to reduce future 
paments. 
6 In an unfunded scheme the charge to the profit and loss is revie"ved, discounted and adjusted 
each year based upon the charge and interest on the unfunded liability. 
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There are a number of options open to companies for doing so. The first is to 
have a period of increased contribution levels. The second is a lump sum payment that 
will reduce future liabilities. The third is to pay lump sum contributions o%-er a period 
of time. 
Regardless of expectations about increased contribution levels or lump sum 
paý T ments to the scheme, the underIving principle of level contributions be applied 
in calculating the annual pension cost. 
2.5 Accounting for pensions under SSAP-24 1988 
The accounting objective of SSAP-24 was that; 
'From the point of rien, of the emplgee a pension may be regarded as dýlen-ed i-ewuneration; 
Plqyer it i's part of the cost i'licun-ed in obtaininýg the empleyee's SelTices. from the Point of vien, of the em .1 
,g objective 
therefore requires the emplqyer to recognise the cost ofproviding pensions on a The accounfin 
gstematic and rational basl*S over thepen'od dun*q which he den'ves beneritsfrom the emplqyees' senv'ces. 
y charged the contributions payable to a pen 'n scheme as the Alang com SIO pl panzes have until now, sim 
pension cost in each accounfin 'Od. In future, ' order to comply with this statement, it xill be ,g pen in 
necessag to consider wbether the funding plan provides a satisfactog basisfor allocating the pension cosl 
to Patti . cular accounfin , gPen 
2.5.1 Defined Contribution Scbemes under SSAP-24 
Under SSAP-24 there was no change to how defined contribution schemes are 
accounted for. This is because at any one point in time the employer's obligation is onlý- 
the amount of contributions that they must pay to the fund. The cost is, therefore, 
simply the amount of contributions payable in respect of a particular accounting period. 
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2.5.2 Defined Benefit Scbemes under SSAP-24 
1n accounting for defined benefit schemes, the standard accepted that actuarial 
valuations and assumptions are necessary to arrive at an annual cost for the proN-Ision of 
the pension scheme. The method used, however, must be one which satisfies the 
accounting objective of the standard. 1n applying a model the actuarial method must 
allow for, full provision being made over the service hfe of employees' for the expected 
cost of providing a pension in retirement, the effect of increased future earnings 
(including merit increases), up to the estimated retirement date, eark, retirement or 
death in service. 
The calculation of the cost should also be based upon the most likely scenario 
and not on outcomes that are unlikely to occur. Further, the methods that are applied 
should be consistent from year to year and should be disclosed; as should aný- change to 
the actuarial method. In circumstances where a change of method occurs this must be 
quantified to show the impact of the change. 
In calculating an annual pension cost for a company, a regular cost must be 
calculated. Essentially this Will form a large percentage of the total payroll costs based 
upon the actuarial method that is applied. This can be seen as the basis for calculating 
the repular cost in accordance with the accounting ob'ective as long as this cost will 
make fuU provision for benefits over the service hves of employees. 
However, there are a number of factors that can result in variations from the 
regular pension cost: 
1) A surplus or deficit; 
The effects on the actuarial value of accrued benefits of changes in 
assumptions or mo el; 
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3) Subsequent changes in benefits or in conditions; 
4) Increases to pensions in payment or to deferred pensions for -which 
proVision has not heen made; 
In providing defined benefit schemes for employees companies will experience 
both surpluses and deficits. This occurs as changes to the return on assets, mortality, 
earning estimates etc. All of which, impacts upon both the ultimate habihn, and value of 
assets in a scheme. To account for such changes, the current and future costs that are 
charged to the company should be adjusted either bý- increasing or decreasing the cost, 
thereby allowing the company to meet their final liabilit\,. 
The standard states that the normal period for such adjustments, for both 
surpluses and deficits, is the remaining service lives of current employees'. It is also 
permissible to spread this cost over the average sen, ice fiN-es of employces. This period 
will change from scheme to scheme and over time, and N-611 be based upon actuarial 
estimates. Where: 
For a surplus: 
Rgaular Cost - (SuýpluslA vei-que Remainiq Senice Life) 
And for a deficit: 
Rýgular Cost+ (Defuitl-A verace Remaining Sen v*ce Life) 
ln an attempt to Emit volatility in the profit and loss, there are only limited 
circumstances that allow for a surplus or deficit to be accounted for in a single year. For 
a situation to faH out with the scope of the standard, events that are not within the 
capacity of actuarial estimates must occur. 
- This will be adjusted to include expected withdrawals from the scheme. 
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First, if a company has experienced a large restructuring resulting in a much 
smaller number of employees. In this situation, anv surplus or deficit falls upon those 
who are no longer employees, to spread either the benefits or costs over those who are 
still within the scheme would not be fair. Second, under the Finance Act (1986) firms 
can reabse a refund from a surplus in the year that it is received, although full disclosure 
about the surplus is still required. 
These circumstances do not however apply to aný, periods of changes to 
contribution levels to account for a surplus or deficit. In these situations the increase or 
decrease to the level of contributions will be accounted for in the year/ycars in A, Iijcl-i 
they occur. This also applies to contribution holidavs, although such events are 
foreseeable they are to be accounted for in the period in which rheý, occur and the 
benefit cannot be accumulated into one accounting year. 
There is one final set of circumstances that allovvs for a 'material deficiency' to 
be recognised in one year. If there has been mismanagement of the funds assets then 
prudence requires the firm to realise this loss over a much shorter time period. This 
situation also falls out with the scope of actuarial assumptions. Due to the impact that 
this would have on the scheme liabilities, then it is not prudent to account for this over 
the remaining service lives of employees, as it could lead to shortfalls. 
2.5.3 Accountingfor Cbanges to ActuanalAssumptions and I aluation 
Metbods 
Changes to the assumptions and model that are used to analyse the scheme assets and 
habilities and therefore the current cost of benefit provision are treated in the same way 
as other changes. These changes are not exceptional; consequenth-, changes to the 
estimated costs and contribution rates should be spread over the remaining ser%-ice lives 
of employccs. 
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As with changes to assumptions and valuation methods, subsequent changes to 
the level of benefit provision should be accounted for over the remaining service lives 
of employees. Further, if a surplus is allocated to increase the benefit provision to 
employees, the surplus should be allocated over the remaining service lives of emploý-ccs. 
2.5.4 Increases to Pensions in Pqylllelil and Defirred Pensions 
Limits to increases in pension scheme contributions wiU be stated N-vithin a scheme's 
rules and trust deeds. However, it is possible that the rules may be changed to allow for 
an increased level of contributions. This may arise through negotiation ý,,,, Ith emplm-ees, 
trustees or unions. For deferred pensions UK law specifies that there needs to be a 
minimum level of provision. Such changes to the scheme should be accounted for 
within the actuarial assumptions. The change to the cost should therefore be charged 
over the remaining service Eves of employees. Any exceptional change that is out with 
the scope of the actuarial assumptions will contribute towards the creation of a surplus 
or deficit. 
Discretionary increases may also occur through the life of a pension. However, 
if a discretionary increase becomes regular, then it is no longer discretionary, and 
therefore becomes part of the regular cost. Such increases can be Paid by the employer 
directly or they can be paid from the scheme itself Further, discretionan- increases may 
be subject to a review as they are not part of any commitment that the employer has 
made. However, once in place such increases in benefits will be expensed over the 
service lives of employees and will encompass part of the actuarial valuation method. 
1f there is a one off payment this should be treated as an ex-gratia payment. 
ConsequentIv, the cost of such a payment should be accounted for in the year in which 
it occurs, and not spread over the remaining service hves of employees. 
The treatment 
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of provicling ex-gratia pensions for certain employees is the same as for non-recurring 
discretionary payments. 
2.5.5 Accounfingfor Different Com panj Schemes 
There are a number of schemes that could be classed as hybrid schemes. Such schemes 
combine features that are common to both defined contribution and defined benefit 
schemes. ln trying to account for such pensions, it is necessan, to assess what n-pe of 
scheme is closest to the pension scheme in operation. This can be conducted through 
an examination of trust deeds and how the scheme is operated. Whercbý 
The accountiq treatment that should be applied will be dependant toon the underyliq substance oj'Ihe 
scheme" 
In looking to companies that provide international pension schemes, the 
standard requires that there should be a consolidation between the domestic and foreign 
schemes under the rules of SSAP-24. There are only two exemptions, and they occur in 
special cases as the standard recognIses that foreign obligations are as important as 
domestic obligations in determining the true position of a company's pension scheme. 
One exemption will be where the foreign obligation is fundamentally different 
from the UK obligation. One such situation would be where the firm has to pay into a 
national pension pot and so the obligation here are essentially different from the UK 
defined benefit or defined contribution costs. 
The second exemption is more encompassing, that is where there is not enough 
accounting disclosure or actuarial disclosure to adequately assess the foreign scheme 
under the standard. 1n this situation ho\vever, there should be a disclosure of the 
pension cost that is attributable to the foreign scheme and that a measure of the foreign 
8 SSAP-24 paragraph 39. 
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liabilities to the foreign assets should be 91,, en. Thýs %-,, Itl allo%-,, for a more accurate 
picture of the companies overall pension liabilities. 
Further to this, the company must account for subsidiary schemes in a similar 
way to which international schemes are accounted for. The main company should 
therefore show the full liability for the group as a whole. The subsidiary company 
should disclose the name of the holding company that bears the ultimate responsibility 
for the pension liability. 
2.5.6 Disclosure Requirements ander SSAP-24 
1n line with the accounting objective and the general movement towards greater 
transparency, the information that is presented should give the user of financial 
statements a true view of the impact of the pension scheme and its' liability on the 
group's and/or company financial statements. 
For a defined contribution scheme it will usuahy suffice to indicate the nature of 
the scheme and the amounts included in the profit and loss account and the balance 
sheet. 
For a defined benefit scheme more extensive disclosures are needed. This is due 
to the complex long term nature of problem and the uncertain liability that it places 
upon the firm. Disclosures that are required include the accounting policy, the actuarial 
valuation method and assumptions, the cost charged, with explanations of the cost, and 
certain actuarial valuation information. 
As a result of the long term nature of the problem, it is also required that the 
disclosures are not on1v in relation to the financial statements, but also to future changes. 
Any significant changes to the future costs that are expected under the current method 
of actuarial valuation and assumptions apphed should be reported. There should also 
FOGR 
2 
ACCOUNTIN(ý FOR P1:, NSIONS Page 31 
be a disclosure with regard to vartation in the contribution rates, as the actuarial 
valuation method that is applied should lead to level contribution rates. This will usually 
result in disclosures about how new entrants to the scheme are incorporated 9. 
In addition to these much more extensive disclosures, the standard requires that 
there should be a report of the most recent formal actuarial valuation or a re\-lew of the 
scheme on an ongoing basis. This should include disclosures about the market value of 
scheme assets and the level of funding in the scheme. Further, if these \-, alues have 
changed significantly between the formal or on going valuation, then there should be a 
disclosed adjustment figure so that the reported values are closer to their true value'O 
2.5.7 Formal Disclosure Requirements (SSAP Paragra pbs 87 & 88) 
The folloWing disclosures should be made in respect of a defined contribution scheme: 
a) the nature of the scheme (defined contribution); 
b) the accounting poticý; 
C) the pension cost charge for the period; 
d) any outstanding or prepaid contributions at the balance sheet date; 
The following disclosures should be made in respect of a defined benefit scheme: 
a) the nature of the scheme (defined benefit); 
b) whether it is funded or unfunded; 
C) the accounting policy, and if different, the funding policy; 
. plained in the assumptions of both the prospective 
benefits and accrued benefits 9 As ex I 
examples. 
'(' This would occur if there , vas a sigruficant change in the level of contributions ()r in 
performance of the stock market between the assessment of the scheme assets/funding and the 
release of the annual report. 
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d) whether the pension cost and proVision (or asset) are assessed in 
accordance with the advice of a professionally qualified actuarv and, if so, 
the data of the most recent formal actuarial valuation or later formal 
review used for this purpose. If the actuary is an employee or officer of 
the reporting companv, or of the group of which it is a member, this fact 
should be disclosed; 
e) the pension cost charge for the period together with explanations of 
significant changes in the charge compared to that of the previous 
accounting period; 
any provisions or prepayments in the balance sheet resulting from a 
difference between amounts recognised as cost or funded or paid 
direcdy; 
g) the amount of any deficiency on a current funding level basis, indicating 
the action, if any, being taken to deal with it in the current and future 
accounting periods; 
h) an outhne of the results of the most recent and formal actuarial valuation 
or later formal review of the scheme on an on going basis; 
This should include disclosure of- 
(i) the actuarial method used and a brief description of the main actuarial 
assumptions; 
(ii) the market value of scheme assets at the date of their valuation or reN-iew, 
(111) the level of funding expressed in percentage terms; 
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(ix, ) comments on any material actuarial surplus or deficiencý, indicated by (iii) 
above; 
1) any commitment to make additional payments over a limited number of 
years; 
J) the accounting treatment adopted in respect of a refund made in 
accordance with the proVisions of paragraph 83 \vhere a credit appears 
in the financial statements in relation to it; 
k) the details of aný, expected effects of future costs of aný- material change 
in the groups and/or company's pension arrangements; 
2.6 Background to FRS-17 - ASB Discussion Paper (2000) 
SSAP-24 was found to have two main flaws: 
1) There were too many options were available to the preparers of accounts, 
leading to inconsistency in accounting practice and allowing employers a 
great deal of flexibility to adjust results oil a short-term basis. 
2) The disclosure requirements did not necessarily ensure that, the pension 
cost and related amounts in the balance sheet were properly explained in 
the accounts. 
Despite the attempts of SSAP-24 to increase the disclosure of information 
regarding defined benefit schemes, problems still existed in trying to account for such 
schemes. How to arrive at a representative and useful cost for such schemes remains 
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extremely complicated. The nature of these schemes means that, it is not possible to 
arrive at a full cost for providing such benefits to an employee, until all recipients die" 
For accounting purposes the cost of proViding these benefits needs to be spread 
over the service lives of employees. However, the cost is dependant upon the length of 
service, length of retirement, return on investments, interest rates, inflation and final 
salary. The number of sign-1ficant variables and assumptions that are applied to arriving 
at a pensions cost is the fundamental flaw in SSAP-24. The standard requires, 
"the emplqyer to recognise the cost of providiqpensions on a gstematic and ratiolial basis orer 
the_pen'od dun*q xhich be delill, es benýfitsfrom the emplgees'senices " 
The scope of the defirUtion was too Wide and the standard is not prescriptive. 
The objective allowed for the use of models and assumptions that will satis(v the 
standard, but were actually insufficient for disclosing useful or comparable pension 
values. The accounting objective therefore allowed for the short term manipulation of 
the pension cost. 
"the standard in its'presentform allows emplqyers a great deal offlexibilio to adjust results 
on a sbort term basis, substantialjl impairs an uninformed reader's ability to makeJudgements aboul 
annual pensi . on costs, and in practi . ce prevents any general attempt to compare one emplqyer'S pension 
- 12 
cost Y)itb anotber's by adjusting one or both to a common calculation basis 
'To increase the comparabiliýl between entities and to make accounts more comprehensible the 
ICAE ff" beliere that the number of options in SSAP-24 sbould be t-edliced 13 11 
The ASB conclusions are; 
This refers to the direct benefits an employee xvill receive and anN, death in service benefits. 
12 Paragraph 10 Pension Research Accounting Group Report (PRAG) 1992. 
13 Paragraph 7(d) Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Report (IG\E\N, ý 
1992. 
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based upon the beliýf that an emplqyer has an obli 0 , gation to meet the pensi ns promised to 
emplojees and that the obli , gation 
is the liabiliojorpenfl'On benýfits earned ý), emplqyees to the balance 
sheet less the assets set aside to meet the obli , gation. 
It IS sometimes suggested that the accounts oj'the 
pension scheme should be consolidated in the group accounts of the s 'ý em ponson g plqj, el- or that the 
kabilifiesforpensiOn benefits and the assets set aside to meet it should be parate items on presented as se 
th Mejace of the emplger's balance sheet. The board does not take this view. 
2.6.1 Alternative Approaches to Accounfigjor Pension Schemes 
The ASB selected two methods of calculating pension costs in considering how to 
remedy the problems With SSAP-24. Underlying these two approaches are two different 
perceptions of the pension cost. 
1) The pension is viewed as an obligation of the employer that emerges 
over the long-term because of the present commitment to provide 
pension benefits. 
2) The pension is Viewed as an obligation of the employer as it exists now 
for the promised pension benefits. 
The first view, of a long-term obligation that only becomes apparent as 
retirement approaches, necessitates an actuarial valuation approach. This valuation 
results in a present value of the pension bability being calculated based upon actuarial 
assumptions. In this situation market values are not appropriate as they do not 
represent the long-term outcome of proViding retirement benefit. 
The second view, of applying market values, results in an employer measuring 
their obligations and liabilities based upon the current value of assets. In arriving at an 
assessment of a scheme, then the market value of assets such as equities are applied. To 
, arrive at a market value of the liabilities, the current value of deferred annuities can be 
FOGR 
FOR PE 'NSIONS 36 
applied. This therefore, allows a market value based surplus or deficit to be calculated; 
this will result in ,, ery different values to the actuarial method. 
The ASB preferred to apply the long-term actuarial method; however, the), 
recognised that there was both the desire and precedent for applying the market value 
approach. From the consultation process there was a general desire to apply the market 
value approach. Further, international accounting standards were moving towards a 
market value approach. Consequently, in line with the ASB objective of international 
harmonisation the market value approach has been assessed (and subsequently applied). 
2.6.2 Accounfingfor Pensions Using Market flalues -International 
Evidence 
In considering the problem the ASB recognised that both Australia and the US apply 
the market value approach. However, both Australia and the US apply the method in 
different ways. Australia was considering applYing the difference between the scheme 
assets and liabihties as the pension cost. Howex, er, given the ý, olatile nature of market 
values, this approach would result in profit and loss volatility. The ASB did not 
consider this as viable as excessive volatility in the profit and loss that is not related to 
firm performance is undesirable. 
The US approach in appl ing market values attempts to avoid this volatility. In Yi 
the US such fluctuations can be smoothed over time through a process of amortisation. 
As a result, fluctuations in market prices are not immediatelv recognised, and so the 
result is a lower level of \-olatility in the profit and loss. 
The ASB, therefore, found that individual1v both methods Nvere undesirable. 
The Australian method results in excessive ý-olatihty in the profit and loss. Where as the 
American method masks the true impact of market values, and so the disclosures are no 
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more useful than the SSAP-24 disclosures. As a result, the ASB propose a synthesis 
between the two methods. 
2.6.3 Accounfiqfor Pensions - Appl 'n pg the Actumi(dTlaluation 
Method 
The application of an actuarial valuation method is based upon many compIcx and long 
term assumptions. The actuarial theory is that, over a long time period these 
assumptions are mutually compatible, and therefore, offsetting. This would occur for 
example in asset returns. High equity prices would lead to lower bond vields and so if 
this changed the converse would be true. The ASB states, 
"In makiq tbis proposal the ASB ' not suggestin ,g that the em is plqyer, or actuag, to the 
pensi . on scheme, I'S inberenýly better than the 1"larket atpredictiq thefuture course of pn*cesfor either the 
assets or the kabilio of the scheme. Although the assum ptions are e. xpressed in indiiidual estimates, 
their essential cbaracten'sfic i's that thg are com patible xitb each other oi, er the long-term. 
Essentially, the ASB and the actuarial profession believe, that over the long term 
such relationships are stable. For the actuarial valuation methods there are four 
assumptions that are required. First, there are salary assumptions, second, the method 
of cost allocation, third, the recognition of surpluses and deficits, and last, how 
information should be disclosed in the company accounts. 
porafing Assumptions into I aluations 2.6.4 Incor 
1n reaching a value for the pension habibtý,, one of the most important assumptions is 
how to measure and incorporate the expected final salary of members. Under both the 
market value and the actuarial methods of valuation the expected final salary is 
incorporated into the calculation. In this case the hability is based upon the expected 
final salarýý of scheme members, including general pay rises and merit increases. 
LEEDS UW4ERSffy L'BRARY 
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There is however, another contrary vieNv to this method. This method views the 
pension liability as not being depenclant upon the final salarv of members, but upon 
members' current salaries. The lo ic to such an approach is that, the firms obligations 91 
only extend as far as the current level of salary and not upon an unspecified future 
amount. 
The ASB however, views that a defined benefits scheme constitutes a legaHy 
binding promise based upon final salan,. It is therefore appropriate to calculate 
estimates of the final salary to arrive at a value for the pension cost, regardless of 
whether actuarial or market values are applied. 
'A critical choice )Aen calculatiq the obli , galionforpension 
bellýfils is to determine how the 
p1gees. obligationforpension benýfits accumulates orer the lives of em 
In allocating these costs over the lives of employees there are two main methods 
that are apphed by actuaries. The first is the accrued benefits method and the second is 
the prospective benefits method. 
The accrued benefits method takes the present value of benefits earned in the 
accounting period by an employee as the pension cost. Ignoring other assumptions that 
are required to arrive at a truly representative CoSt14 , results in the pension cost rising 
year on year for each employee. For an individual employee then, 
14 Ignoring assumptions about demographics, new members, inflation etc., , vith an annual 
percentage increase in salaný, and therefore an annual percentage increase in the pension cost. 
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Figure 2-1 Pension Cost under Accrued Benefits Method 
Working Life in Years 
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Figure 2-1 highlights the evolution of pension costs over the life of a single 
employee under the accrued benefits method. Here the investments (contributions) that 
occur at the start of an employees working life are worth more as they Will generate 
returns over a much longer time period, than the contributions made at the end of an 
employees working life. Consequently, the cost of pension provision rises over the 
working life of an employee. 
Under a standard final salary scheme where each additional year of employment 
contributes to the pension benefits received in retirement. As a result of the time value 
of money for earlier contributions to equal later contributions, wherebv, earlier 
contributions will be smaller and generate a larger investment component xhile later 
contributions will be larger and generate a smaller level of return from investments. 
Figure 2-2Figure 2-1 iflustrates the pension cost for an employec under the 
prospective benefits method. The prospective benefits method is fundamentally 
different from the accrued benefits method in its treatment of the pension cost. 
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Prospective benefits attempts to value the total pension cost over the working lives of 
employees and then allocate the cost evenly over the remaining service lives of 
employees as a percentage of salary, consequentIv the pension cost is the same 
percentage of salary in every year of an employees working life. 
Figure 2-2 Pension Costs under Prospective Benefits 
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The fundamental difference between these two approaches is the treatment of 
investment income over time. The underlying issue is, 
"For a pension scheme tbatprovides an equalproportion of thefinalpension benefitfor each 
jear of sei'vice, the question is, whether the pensi . on benefit should be 'equal' when sen 11'CC I'S provided or 
'equal' by the fime relirement IS reached 
Accrued benefits follows that benefits should be equal on retirement, N-,, here as 
prospective benefits follows that it should be equal for each year of service. These 
issues become more complicated when applied to a Nvhole scheme xvhere there is a large 
work force, , vith manv members of different ages, and at 
different lengths of service. 
15 SSAP-24 
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To look at these issues under the accrued benefits method, there must therefore be a 
number of assumptions applied; first, it should be assumed that for each new member 
to the scheme there should be an older member leaving the scheme. Second, there 
must be an even age distribution, essentiaHy there will be a symmetrical distribution, and 
it is also necessary to assume stable past service". 
In this situation, when an accrued benefits model is apphed, then, for every 
'cheap' new or young employee, there will be an 'expensive' older \ýýorker. 
Consequently, it is possible to arrive at a level contribution rate. The accrued benefits 
method, however, will lead to higher pension costs if the assumption about the ratio of 
young to old workers is relaxed. lf the average age of employees rises or there is a 
decreasing intake of new younger employees, the result xvill be a higher pension cost". 
2.6.4. Advanta 
, ges ofAccrued 
Benýfils 
i) This method more closely represents the economic reahty of pension 
provision. Older employees cost more than younger employees to 
provide benefits for. This method takes into account the time value of 
money; 
ii) The calculated cost is directly linked to the level of benefits earned up to 
a specific point in time; 
The underlYing premise of prospective benefits does not hold. The 
assertion that, salary represents the value of services of the employee is 
not consistent. There exist circumstances Nvhere, a lower paid employee 
can provide the same service as a higher paid employee; 
16Fssentially all workers in the scheme only ever work for one company and there is no early 
retirement or deferred pensions in this scenario. 
I- The prospective benefits method vvill arrive at the same level cost as the method accounts for 
new employees and retirees in the assumptions of the model. 
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Given that pension benefits are deferred remuneration, then 11 it is best to 
recognise this cost evenly over an employees' service life, as benefits are 
accrued over an employees service Eve; 
An employee's salary is the best measure of their worth in any given 
period. The percentage of salary that is taken under prospective benefits 
therefore, is the most reahstic measure of the benefits earned to services 
provided; 
III) Prospective benefits results in a stable and predictable pension cost; 
IV) Prospective benefits is a simple percentage of salary figure, where, 
ExpectedPe nsion Cost = 
TotalExpectedCosts 
To talExpec tedSalaryCosts 
If the assumptions of a stable worker to pensioner ratio, age profile and 
demographics etc are applied, then, both methods will produce similar costs. However, 
the prospective benefits method will show a larger cost than the accrued benefits 
method. This occurs as the full cost of pension provision will only be reabsed at the 
end of the expected service lives of employees. Figure 2-3 shows highlights the fact that 
although the methods are associated with different cost structures over the service life 
of employees, they both should arrive at the same total cost figure for pension provision. 
For prospective benefits the cost is a stable percentage of salary over time, and for 
accrued benefits there is an increasing cost as older employees are more expensive than 
younger employees as the contributions paid will be invested over shorter time horizons. 
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Figure 2-3 Pension Costs under Prospective Benefits and Accrued Benefits 
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2.7 Recognition of Surpluses and Deficits 
43 
The application of an actuarial valuation method results in the calculation of the 'normal 
pension cost' that will be charged annually to the profit and loss. However, there are a 
number of situations which can lead to the creation of a surplus or deficit in a pension 
scheme. Surpluses or deficits require careful treatment within the company accounts as 
they can have a significant impact on a firm. There are two methods for recognising 
surpluses and deficits: 
Gradual Recogn'tion; 
2) Immediate Recognition; 
2.7.1 Is a Surplus or Defimit an Asset or a Ljabiliý, to an Emplger? 
If the levels of assets in a pension scheme are less than the pension scheme liability, 
then there , vill be a deficit in the scheme. Due to the legal obligation such schemes 
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place upon employers, then, there are two possible outcomes. First, additional 
contributions can be paid to the scheme. Second, the emplover can provide the 
necessary benefits directly from profits. 
Conversely, if the level of assets in a scheme is greater than the scheme habibtý, 
then there will he a surplus in the scheme. Tl-ýs situation is beneficial to the employer as 
a surplus is an asset to the employer. There are a number of options that are open to an 
employer to account for this. A surplus can be used to reduce contributions, increase 
the benefits provided by a pension scheme or a refund of the excess contributions can 
be taken 
18 
. 
To access a surplus is not straight forward for the employer however. There are C)-- 
regulations, laws and covenants within the trust deeds of a scheme Nx, hich restrict both, 
the access and the options of an employer. 1n a situation where xvithdrawals of 
surpluses are not allowed, then the employer can access the surplus indirectlý- through a 
period of reduced contributions. 
pluses and Deficits 2.7.2 Causes of Sur 
There are three broad categories which can cause surpluses or deficits. First, there are 
measurement assumptions. If the actuarial assumptions that were applied to calculate 
the liability and a funding plan for a scheme are not borne out by experience, the result 
ý, vill be a surplus or deficit for the scheme; these are classed as experience deficiencies or 
surpluses. The second measurement effect occurs Nx-hen there is a change in the 
actuarial valuation method or the assumptions underlying the valuafion model, 
consequently, the new measurement could result in surplus or deficit. 
18 A refund will be subject to taxation as no tax has been paid on the contributions. 
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In this situation, an actuary will make assumptions to arrive at the liability of a 
scheme and will then create a funding plan, so that assets can be accumulated over time 
to meet the liahility. However, if these assumptions do not hold in reahty, then there 
will be a surplus or deficit within the scheme. For example, if the assumptions about 
the rate of return on assets are too high then the scheme wiH e-xperience a deficit as the 
assets in the scheme are not sufficient to meet the liability. As a result of the long-term 
nature of the problem, experience surpluses and deficits can be significant. Such 
changes are common when triennial actuarial assessment occurs' 
The impact of these changes is shown on Figure 2-1, where, 
Liabifity for accrued pension benefits is greater than expected by 25, - 
(ii) The Value of Assets accumulated is less than expected by 20; 
Figure 2-4 Impact of Changes in Scheme Experience on Pension Costs and 
Benefits 
355 
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19 Illustrations are taken from ASB Discussion Paper Appendix 4. 
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If there are changes to the underlying assumptions e. g. changes to the 
demographic assumptions, then this will also impact upon the pension scheme. If the 
hfe expectancy of workers is expected to be longer, employers v-111 have to provide 
retirement benefits over a longer time period than previously estimated. ConsequentIN', 
the long-term cost of pension proVision has increased, implicith-, this means that the 
liability of the scheme has increased and the assets from the funding plan will no longer 
be sufficient to meet this additional cost. 
The second factor that can affect whether or not a pension fund has a surplus 
(deficit) is changes to the level of pension benefits provided. There are two categories 
of changes that can occur. First, there are retrospective changes. These are changes in 
real benefits relating to the past service of current employees. Second, there are changes 
to the real benefits of former employees. In both of these situations therefore, the past 
service cost that has been charged has been too low to accumulate a sufficient level of 
assets, the funding plan will not be able to meet pensions liability implied by the new 
and more generous level of benefits provided. 
One example of current employees receiving more generous benefits would be, 
where based upon a final salary scheme, the annual benefits could be improved form 
1/60th to 1/55th. These changes will firstly, increase the normal pension cost until 
retirement, and secondly, result in the past pension cost being insufficient. Such 
changes will have a number of impacts upon the scheme. First, the final liability Nvill 
increase. Second, the assets accumulated win be insufficient to meet the ne-ý, v habihn,, 
thereby increasing the deficit. Third, the past sen-ice cost will be inadequate and 
consequently, the deficit wiU be further increased. 
MOR 
2 
ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS 
Figure 2-5 The Impact of Changes in the Level of Benefits Provided 
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The impact of changing the benefits of former employees is not as clear. In 
arriving at the pension cost an actuary will make assumptions which will take a position 
of improved benefits to former employees. Consequently, in this situation a portion of 
the normal pension cost Will be allocated to an expected increase in future benefits. If a 
deficit occurs after such changes then this is an experience change rather than a change 
in real benefits. 
There are however, adjustments to the benefits provided that will result in a real 
increase in benefits provided for former employees. One such change would be the 
transfer of a pension to a spouse on the death of a former employee. In this scenario 
there has been a fundamental change to the level of benefits provided to former 
employees. Consequently, there v, -III be a change to the final liability of the scheme. 
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Such a change will increase or result in a deficit as the level of past pension cost has 
been insufficient. 
The final set of changes that result in the creation of a surplus or deficit within a 
scheme are changes to the actuarial valuation method. If the model of calculation is 
changed there will be a number of effects. First, the hablhty for the pension benefits 
that have been accrued up to the valuation date will be changed. Second, the liability for 
benefits that will be accrued in the future Nvill be altered. Last, the adjustment of 
method changes the past pension cost, current service and future scn-icc cost. 
In the folloWing example it is assumed there has been a change in the actuarial 
valuation method. The pension liability and the value of benefits to be earned have 
faHen by 25. However, the change of method has increased the fund deficit from 45 to 
70. 
Figure 2-6 Impact of Changes in Actuarial Valuation Method 
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2.7.3 The Relationsbip between Recqgnifion and Basis of ý leasin-ement 
1n applying an actuarial valuation method, the assumption about the pension cost is that 
it will 'emerge over the long-term'. Surpluses and deficits occur due to short-term 
movements in factors that the actuarial assumptions are based upon such as periods of 
lower returns on investments, 1-ýigh inflation and volatile interest rates all of %Nýhich 
impact upon the level of assets and the size of the scheme liability. 
It follows that the recognition of any surplus or deficit should occur over the 
long-term. Consequently, the solution would be to spread these costs evenIv over the 
remaining service Eves of employees i. e. the approach of SSAP-24. 
Alternatively, if the surplus or deficit is based upon current market values, then 
it is consistent to recognise any surplus or deficit immediately. In tl-ýs situation the 
current values represent the employer's hability as it exists now and the assets are the 
employer's current ability to meet these obligations. 
plqyer i's then the sum of the incremental cost of the pension 'The overallgain or loss to the em 
earned in the pen'od i. e. the normalpensiOn cost, the effect of any real changes in pension hene/i/s, and 
any sur 'g in *d because of measurement cbanges. 20 plus or deficieng occumý theper? O 
How to account for deficiencies and surpluses is a major issue. There are 
arguments for immediate recognition of actuarial surpluses and deficits. Essentially, if 
the actuarial model and method of valuation are consistent, then the recognition of such 
deficiencies should be immediate. 
Alternatively, following the US approach, SFAS-87 applies an accruals method 
for recognising an) T surplus or deficit. In this situation, benefits earned and the scheme 
hability are calculated using and accrued benefits method, and the scheme assets are 
20 SSAP-24 
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measured against market values. However, there is no immediate recognition of any 
surplus or deficit. As a result, anv fluctuations or unanticipated movements in assets 
and or habihties can be smoothed over time. 
2.7.4 Gradual Recqgnition of Surpluses and Dýfzcits orer Time 
Gradual recognItion is the preferred method of the ASB. In this situation then the 
cnormal pension cost' for each accounting period will be adjusted to include an 
additional component that will take account of the surplus or deficit over the remaining 
service lives of employees. 
Where there are experience deficiencies or surpluses then, gradual recognition is 
the most appropriate method of accounting. If there is for example an cxperience 
deficit, it is possible that over time the deficiency will be removed through long term 
changes in asset returns or changes to the measurement basis. Essentially the deficit is 
the result of short term deviations from the underlying assumptions of the model, but 
that over the long term then the assumptions could hold. Consequenffiý, to account for 
these deficiencies immediately is not prudent, and so to account for them over the 
remaining service Eves of employees is more suitable. 
Unlike experience deficiencies and surpluses, changes to the level of pension 
benefit provision do not emerge over the long-term. The change to the benefits 
provided is the result of a conscious decision by management. Furthermore, such 
changes wiU normafly affect a specific part of the workforce or former workers. When 
accounting for any surplus or deficit that arises from such changes imme(: hate 
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recognition is considered desirable by the ASB, as it is a truer representation of the 
economic reality that exiStS21. 
There are however, changes to benefits that occur N,, -here immediate recognition 
is consider inappropriate, If there is a change to the level of benefits that are proN-ided 
for current employees, such a situation is a much broader change. Given that emploý-ee 
compensation is given in return for service, in this situation it is likeh, that the firm Nxýlll 
derive greater economic benefits from current employees. Consequently, it is more 
appropriate to account for the cost of the extra service costs over the remaining service 
lives of employees. 
How to properly account for former employees is more difficult. Aný, increase 
in benefits that are received is only an increase in the bablbty to the company as there 
will be no additional economic benefit recen, ed. However, in general, changes to the 
benefits that former employees receive are a result of wider changes to the pension 
benefits of current employees. It is sometimes argued therefore, that the changes to 
current employees will result in increased economic benefit to the firm; such an 
argument is somewhat tenuous though. The ASB therefore takes the position that, the 
cost from changes to benefits should be split, where, the cost for current employees will 
be recognIsed over their remaining service lives, and the cost of former employees will 
be recogmsed immediateIN, 22 
Under the new standard there will not be any changes to the actuarial valuation 
method that is applied year on year. The only changes that will occur -when FRS-17 is 
implemented will be subject to the transitional arrangements put fonvard by the ASB. 
21 In the case of former -workers there is no additional economic return to be gained from 
increased benefit provision. 
22This apphes to real changes such as the abdity to transfer pension rights to a spouse when the 
former employee dies and not to cost of living increases i. e. price inflation. 
MOR 
2 
ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIMS Page 5 
2.7.5 How to Accountfor Interest on Surpluses and Docits 
'Eacb sta , ge of the calculation of a pension cost implicitjl involves interest. if"ben an actuarial basi'S of 
measurement Z*S applied the swplus or deficieng I'S calculated as ý. -i present value offiture cash floirs. 
Vhen a market valuation i's used the marketpn*ces ai-e the markel Perception of thatpresent ralue. 
Thus, from pen*Od to accounfin 'Od there will be an interest effect u Jent , gpen 'Pon an), suiplus or 
defi( -y due 
to the passage of time. 11"ben a market basis o is le le 'f measurement * used then it xill be cas' r to 1, *w the 
cban oftill, 6,23. , ge as a value adjustm., entfrom one pen*od to the ne., J to take account of the passqge 
Case A Case B 
Deficiency at the end 
of y 
ear 1 100 100 
Normal Pension Cost in year 2 15 15 
Contribution in year 2 (15) (115) 
Interest at 10% per annum 10 0 
Deficiency at the end of year 2 110 0 
The above example highlights the two approaches to the impact that interest has 
upon a scheme deficit. 
In case A, the employer does not increase contributions above the normal le\ýel. 
ConsequentIv, in the folloWing year the deficit increases by 10, that is, the original deficit 
plus interest charged at 10%. However, in case B, the employer immediately pays the 
normal pension cost plus an additional lump sum to remove the deficit. As a result, in 
the following year there is no deficit and the employer does not incur an interest 
char, o,, e 
24 
1 
23ASB 
'4 It is also possible to incur a smaller interest charge by only removing a portion of the deficit. 
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Any interest cost on a surplus or deficit must be accounted for within the 
normal pension cost from year to year. 1f there is not any annual recognition, then the 
result will be a much larger change to the surplus or deficit within a scheme , vhen a 
triennial valuation occurs. There are however, three methods which can be applied to 
take account of the interest on a surplus or deficit. 
The first is the straight line method, the second is the percentage of pay method 
and the last is the mortgage method. The straight line method diVides the surplus 
(deficiency) into equal amounts for the remaining service lives of current employees, 
and then accounts for the interest element of the surplus or deficiency. The percentage 
of pay method allocates the surplus (deficiency) so that the pension cost, net of 
amortisation and any interest payable, increases at the rate of salary increases. 
The mortgage method is not considered useful by the ASB but is included for 
illustrative purposes. In this situation the surplus (deficiency) is treated Eke the capital 
component of a repayment method and so any contribution pays of the interest and 
capital. 
If we assume that there is, a surplus of k5.2m, initial pensionable salaries of 
, (6.5m which increase at the rate of 
7% per annum, an interest rate of 9% and a normal 
pension cost of 12% of salary then: 
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Figure 2-7 Different Methods of Amortising Pension Surpluses over Time 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 
-0.2 
-0.4 
23 
Methods of Amortising a Surplus over Time 
6789 10 
Years 
54 
Normal Pension Cost 
Straight Line Nicthod 
Percentage of Paý Method 
Mortgage Method 
From figure 2-7 it be seen that depending on the method of amortisation then 
the annual pension cost variation can be substantial. The straight line method results in 
a negative pension cost over the first two years. This occurs because the amount 
allocated in the first years is highest, with the impact of interest on the surplus, then the 
pension cost in these years is negative. 
For the percentage of pay method there is a net cost in each ýIear after crediting 
the portion of the surplus and interest to the pension cost. Under this method the 
amount of the surplus that is allocated increases With salary increases. There is therefore 
more allocated in later years than earher years. 
The last method is the mortgage method. Under this method of allocation there 
is an increasing net pension cost over time. This occurs as the credit that is received in 
the earlier vears is purely interest and only a small portion of the surplus. Over time 
ho-wever, the interest portion falls and the capital portion received is greater. 
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In accounting for a surplus the there is a strong logical argument for using the 
percentage of pay method. Under this method there is a correlation between the 
increasing costs of pension provision with reduci ributions over time to account ing cont 
for the surplus. 
The ASB however in their consultation believes that the application of the 
straight Ene method of allocation as this method is simpler. Further, there should be no 
separation of the interest cost and the total pension cost, as this would keep the total 
cost of the pension provision simple in the company accounts. 
2.7.6 Gradual Recqgnition Disclosure Requirements 
"It I'S the o1yective of the ASB that an), disclosure ill Me nem, accounh . ng slandard )), ill allon, for a 
greater understandin of the true position of a com 'n scheme. Due to the com 19 
pang pensio 
_Plicated 
natnre 
of such schemes then, any chaqes to the underýyillg assumptions and their impacts IvIlst be disclosed. 
This hon, ei, er, )rill need to be balanced mith the presci, 7ýfiiv nature of the new standard, as it provides 
less discretion to actuan'es and accountants in a number of areas e., g. 1'ýI amottisiq a surplus or 
defi cit. 
25 1) 
The focus of the ASB disclosure is therefore upon how the pension cost is 
arrived at. The explanation should include the measurement assumptions, components 
of the pension cost, the accounting treatment of anv surplus or deficiency that has 
occurred and the balance sheet quantity for the pension cost and the impact of any 
unrecoglilsed surplus or deficit. 
If a gradual recognition approach is applied then it is necessary to disclose the 
basis for arriving at a Pension cost and any surplus or deficit xvithin a scheme. The 
disclosures that are common within a scheme under SSAP-24 are: 
25 ASB (2000) 
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1) the rate of increase in salaries 
the rate of return on investments 
3) the rate of increase in pension payments 
the rate of increase in (: hvidend income 
5) the rate of interest applied to discount liabilities"' 
Paý-, c 56 
The impact of even a smaH change in an assumption can have a significant 
impact upon a scheme. Any change in the underlying assumptions can lead to the 
creation of a deficit or a surplus, as well as impacting upon both future service costs and 
past service costs. Consequently, the ASB proposed that it would like the disclosure of 
all of the above categories and an explanation as to how the change has impacted upon 
the scheme. 
To allow for the pension cost to be fully analysed then it is necessary for the 
pension cost, and any amortisation of a surplus or deficit, to be fully described in the 
. 
pension cost disclosure will also, therefore, have to show if company accounts. Any 
there is any past service costs included in the current years pension cost. 
2.8 The Alternative Market Valuation Approach 
A market value approach is extremely different from the preferred actuarial method. 
Under the market value approach, there is immediate recognition of surpluses and 
deficits, as well as a market value based valuation of the scheme assets, habihty and the 
pension cost. In this situation the market values of these factors are applied instead of 
an actuarial valuation. The market valuation, in theory, wil-I represent the market price 
that would be paid for a scheme. There are situations v-here schemes are sold on to 
2(ý This is usuafly, the same as the rate of return on investments. 
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insurance companies; however, the price that is usuak paid is much greater than the 
FRS-17 value. 
2.8.1 Immediate Recqgnifion of Sur pluses and Dýzicits 
Under the market valuation approach there would be immediate recognition of 
surpluses and deficits. Year on year this could result in significant changes to the 
pension cost of a firm. lf there is no amortisation of surpluses or deficits, any change in 
the value of the scheme assets, the bability of the scheme and the past ser\-ice cost 
would need to be taken account of in the year in which theýý occur. The result be 
that in a given year the pension costs will fluctuate with market values, and the pension 
cost will be the change in an), surplus or deficit plus contributions. Due to the volatile 
nature of market prices then there wM be a significant increase in the volatility of the 
pension cost year on year. 
To try and mitigate the impact of applying market values, the ASB proposed 
that there should be a separation of the normal pension cost and valuation impacts. In 
this situation, then the volatihtN- would be removed as there would be a normal pension 
cost charge in the profit and loss, and any variations that occur year on year would be 
included in the Statement of Total Recopused Gains and Loses (STRGL). Any changes 
therefore, in market values, demographics and other basis measurements would be 
accounted for in the STRGL. This would result in a predictable pension charge and the 
balance sheet would show the employers habihtv, while accounting for the true liability 
of a scheme based upon market values2- 
2- In moving the market value impact to the STRGL then it also prevents a negative pension 
charge appearing in the balance sheet. 
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2.8.2 Surpluses and Deficits under the Alarket ValueApproacb 
The impact of changes to the underiving measurement assumptions would not have a 
significant impact over the long-term. As with the actuarial approach, then over the 
long-term assumptions are considered to be mutually compatible. The STRGL -would 
be close to zero in the long run e. g. lower returns in one period would be offset in the 
future with higher returns. The implication being that, the underlying assets will follow 
a random walk with a positive drift. 
To prevent manipulation of this STRGL facility the firms should disclose the 
assumptions underlYing the calculation of the normal pension cost. This xvill prevent 
the understatement (overstatement) of the pension cost year on ý, ear. If the cumulati%, e 
STRGL records a series of deficits then the long term assumptions that are being 
applied are too generous and should be revised downwards. 
As with the actuarial valuation, significant disclosure about the assumptions that 
underlie the valuation of the scheme and the normal pension cost are required. For the 
market valuation approach this would also require disclosure about how the STRGL has 
changed ftom the previous year as well as the cumulative total. The ASB beheves that 
this disclosure should also include, 
In addition, the board would require afire-year record of the cumulative suolus or dýficieng 
e. -, pressed as a percentage of the liabikofor accruedpension benefits at the end of the current andpast 
,g four-years. E, %planations and chages 
in the assumptionsgover'nin the normalpension cost would be 
e. %-pected if it appeared that the swplus or deficieng was continuously accumulafig. 28 y, 
As with the actuarial method any changes in the benefits provided are the result 
of conscious decisions and actions by management. Such changes are not the result of 
28 ASB (2oOO) 
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experience or market fluctuations. Consequently, such changes should be reflected 
immediately in the pension cost for the year in which they occur. This cost xvill also 
include the change in past service cost 
29 
2.8.3 Disclosure under a Market 1, aluation APProach 
The disclosure under the market -valuation approach still requires a normal pension 
charge. The ASB stipulated that this will be arrived at through the accrued benefits 
method, and will represent the increased liability to the firm from the additional year of 
service from employees. If there are any changes to the assumptions or unanticipated 
shifts in the scheme surplus or deficit these will be reported in the STRGL with 
explanatory notes. As With the actuarial method, the cost of changes to the benefits that 
are proVided will be recognised in the profit and loss in the year in N-,,, hich they occur. 
In addition to the disclosures that are required under the actuarial valuation 
method the board requires disclosures of- 
the market basis used to value assets, including equity, bonds and 
propertý; 
the rate of interest that is used to discount liabihties, this is usually the 
expected rate of return on investments; 
2.9 FRS-17 - Accounting for Pension Costs 
After the consultation period the ASB issued FRS-17. However, despite the case and 
rationale put behind the actuarial approach, the biggest change is the use of market 
29 -\s v. -ith the actuarial approach there %viH be no change in the valuation model as the new 
standard puts forward a prescribed model of valuation. 
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values. Their must be a fair value applied to defined benefit schemes. The main 
changes are: 
1) scheme assets are to be measured at market value; 
2) scheme babilities are to be measured applying the projected uMt method; 
3) the interest rate used to discount liabilities should be the y1eld at the 
balance sheet date of a high quality corporate bond of equivalent 
currency and term to hablhtý, 
4) the resultant deficit Will be presented on the balance sheet, net of 
deferred tax and located after all other assets and liabilities; 
The performance of the scheme will be measured as the change in the balance 
sheet figure. This will also show the current service cost, interest cost, the expected 
iI return on assets, gains and loses on settlements and curtailments ', and the past service 
costs. However, actuarial gains and loses e. g. experience gains or loses will be 
accounted for in the STRGL. 
Last, the new standard requires disclosure of the main actuarial assumptions 
underlYing the scheme. The assets in the scheme when placed into broad asset classes 
must be examined, and the expected rate of return on these portfolios must be disclosed. 
There must also be an analysis of the costs in the operating profit, finance costs and the 
STRGL. The STRGL must show the cumulative change over fix, e years and consider 
the changes that occur with respect to the actual return and the expected return. Last 
there must be an analysis of shifts in the surplus and deficit of a scheme, and over the 
long-term these must be accounted for in the balance sheet. 
"I A settlement is an action that reheves the employer of the pension hability such as lump sum 
cash paý, ments in exchange for pension rights. A curtailment is an event that reduces the 
expected years of future scrvice of employees such as termination of employment. 
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2.9.1 FRS- 17 Disclosure Requirements 
Defined conti7bution schemes 
75 The following disclosures should be made in respect of a defined 
contribution scheme: 
(a) the nature of the scheme (i. e. defined contribution); 
(b) the cost for the period; and 
(c) any outstanding or prepaid contributions at the balance sheet date; 
2.9.1.2 Defined bcnýfil scbemes 
76 The following disclosures should be made in respect of a defined benefit 
scheme: 
(a) the nature of the scheme (i. e. defined benefit); 
(b) the date of the most recent full actuarial valuation on which the amounts 
in the financial statements are based. If the actuan- is an employee or 
officer of the reporting entity, or of the group of which it is a member, 
this fact should be disclosed; 
(c) the contribution made in respect of the accounting period and any 
agreed contribution rates for future vears; and 
(d) for closed schemes and those in which the age profile of the active 
membership is rising significantly, the fact that under the projected unit 
method the current service cost -wiH increase as the members of the 
scheme approach retirement; 
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77 Each of the main financial assumptions used at the beginning of the 
period and at the balance sheet date should be disclosed. Thev should be 
disclosed as separate individual figures, not combined or netted. The 
main financial assumptions include: 
(a) the inflation assumption; 
the rate of increase in salaries; 
(c) the rate of increase for pensions in payment and deferred pensions; and 
the rate used to discount scheme liablhties; 
78 The most important assumptions underlying the present value of the 
scheme liabilities are the rates of increase in salaries and pensions in 
payment and the rate of interest applied to discount the estimated cash 
flows arising under the liabilities. The valuation of assets in the scheme is 
not affected by the actuarial assumptions because the assets are 
measured at fair value; 
79 The fair value of the assets held by the pension scheme at the beginning 
and end of the period should be analysed into the following classes and 
disclosed together with the expected rate of return assumed for each 
class for the period and the subsequent period: 
(a) equities; 
(b) bonds; and 
(C) Other (sub-analysed if material); 
80 The assumption made for expected return on assets does not affect the 
valuation of scheme assets as they are measured at fair value. It does, 
MOR 
2 
ACCOL', XTING FOR III-I'NSIONS 63 
however, determine the amount to recognise in the profit and loss 
account; 
81 The following amounts included within operating profit (or capitalised 
with the relevant employee remuneration) should be disclosed in the 
notes to the financial statements: 
(a) the current service cost; any past service costs; 
(b) any preViously unrecognised surplus deducted from the past service 
costs; 
(c) gains and losses on any settlements or curtailments; and any previously 
unrecogn-1sed surplus deducted from the settlement or curtailment losses. 
82 Any gains and losses on settlements or curtailments (and aný- previously 
unrecogn'sed surplus deducted from the losses) included within a 
separate item after operating profit should be disclosed in the notes to 
the financial statements; 
83 The following amounts included as other finance costs (or income) 
should be disclosed separately in the notes to the financial statements: 
(a) the interest cost; and 
(b) the expected return on assets in the scheme; 
84 The following amounts included within the statement of total recognsed 
gains and losses should be disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements: 
(a) the difference bet-, veen the expected and actual return on assets; 
(b) experience gains and losses arising on the scheme liabilities; and 
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(c) the effects of changes in the demographic and financial assumptions 
underlYing the present value of the scheme habibties; 
85 The notes to the financial statements should disclose, for the accounting 
period and previous four periods: 
(a) the difference between the expected and actual return on assets 
expressed as (i) an amount and (ii) a percentage of the scheme assets at 
the balance sheet date; 
(b) the experience gains and losses arising on the scheme liabilities 
expressed as (i) an amount and (h) a percentage of the present value of 
the scheme liabilities at the balance sheet date; and 
(c) the total actuarial gain or loss expressed as (i) an amount and (ii) a 
percentage of the present value of the scheme liabilities at the balance 
sheet date; 
86 A consistent trend of experience losses/gains in the statement of total 
recognised gains and losses may indicate that the assumptions used have 
been overoptimistic/ over-pes simis tic and may cast doubt upon the 
reliability of the amounts reported in the profit and loss account. Where 
such a trend has emerged it is important that careful consideration is 
given to the choice of assumptions in the future; 
87 The fair value of the scheme assets, the present value of the scheme 
liabilities based on the accounting assumptions and the resulting surplus 
or deficit should be disclosed in a note to the financial statements. 
Where the asset or habilitý- in the balance sheet differs from the surplus 
or deficit in the scheme, an explanation of the difference should be 
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given. An analysis of the movements during the period in the surplus or 
deficit in the scheme should be given; 
88 Differences between the asset or liability in the balance sheet and the 
surplus or deficit in the scheme will arise because of the related deferred 
tax balance and also when part of a surplus or deficit has not been 
recognised in the balance sheet, for example when part of the surplus in 
the scheme is not recoverable by the emplc, ý-er or when past service 
awards have not yet vested. 
89 The analysis of reserves in the notes to the financial statements should 
distinguish the amount relating to the defined benefit asset or liability 
net of the related deferred tax. 
90 There is a general requirement in company legislation and accounting 
standards for comparative figures to be given. It should be noted that 
this requirement applies to the disclosures specified in paragraphs 78 and 
8o relating to the position at the beginning of the period. 
91 Where an employer has more than one defined benefit scheme, 
disclosures may be made in total, separately for each scheme, or in such 
groupings as are considered to be the most useful. When an employer 
proVides disclosures in total for a number of schemes, the assumptions 
should be given in the form of weighted averages or of relatively narrow 
ranges With any outside the range disclosed separately. 
92 Useful groupings of schemes for disclosure purposes may be based on: 
(a) the geographical location of the schemes, for example by distjngulshing 
Ubý schemes from overseas schemes; or 
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(b) xhether the schemes are subject to significandv different rlsks, for 
example pension schemes and retirement medical care schemes. 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter has documented the evolution of pension accounting in the UK. In 
particular the chapter details the complexities associated with pensions and ho,, v best to 
account for them. These complexities and the concerns raised about the , vay in xhich 
pensions are accounted for has driven the development of the latest pension accounting 
standard FRS-17. The next chapter is the first empirical chapter and presents the data 
that is used in the subsequent analysis and the issues surrounding the creation of my 
sample are discussed. 
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3 
AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE 
PENSION PLANS IN THE UK 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 discusses and describes the data that will be used in the following empirical 
chapters. The data is collected from the FRS-17 disclosures in the annual reports of 
FTSE 350 companies. The FTSE 350 was chosen for two reasons. First, disclosure 
even in the largest companies (FTSE 100) is relatively poor in 2001 and 2002. The data 
disclosure in smaller companies over the sample is increasingly variable and worsens 
considerably if the list of companies expands to incorporate the rest of the Ff SE All 
Share. However, as the transitional period for adopting FRS-17 reaches its end, the 
level of disclosure improves as a greater number of firms move towards full 
implementation of FRS-17. As a result of the variable quality of disclosure and the time 
consuming nature of manually collecting complex data then the FTSE 350 is currently 
the optimal sample to work with. 
3.2 FRS-17 Disclosures and the Firm's Pension Promise 
As discussed in the previous chapter FRS-17 is the UK's new fair value accounting 
standard for company pension schemes and supersedes SSAP-24. The nev, market 
based approach provides much greater disclosure, of the structure of the pension 
scheme, the assumptions by which the present value liabilities are calculated and the 
fo(-, )R 
3 
AN ()\'ER\Illl 'NVOF CORPORATE PF-NSI()N PLANS IN THE UK 68 
assumed return on scheme assets. The new method results in the annual marking to 
market of where the pension assets, are in relation to changes to the present value of the 
pension obhgation of the firm. 
Another significant change in the UK relates to the nature of the pension 
liablhty. The pension liablhty has, for a number of reasons, both pohtical and economic, 
become a bond like obligation on the firm. Previously, pension arrangements , vere 
between the firm and the emPloyee. The implicit understanding was that employces 
were deferring some current remuneration to recel\, e an income in retirement. However, 
there was no explicit and legally binding guarantee that the firm would meet this 
obhgation to the detriment of the ongoing operations of the firm. 
However, this has aU changed and under the Pension Act 2004. The Act set up 
The Pensions Regulator (who replaces the Occupational Pension Regulatorý, Authority) 
and the Pension Protection Fund (similar to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
in America). The Regulator has been given wide ranging powers for the 'enforcement' 
of the pension obligation on the firm to prevent default on the pension promise. With 
this objective in mind, and the much wider ranging powers of the Regulator, provided 
by the Pension Act 2004, the pension liability is now a bond like obligation" 
'A pension scheme in deficit should be treated in the same way as anj other matefial unsecured 
credito 1.; 
2. ý) 
11 This is linked however to the ne\-,, accounting standard as it has made the magnitude of the 
pension promise much more apparent. 
12 Clearance Statements: Guidance from The Pensions Regulator, April 2004. 
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3.3 FRS-17 Data 
3.3.1 Individual Pension Asset Classes 
FRS-17 data can be divided into two main categories, first assets and habihties, second, 
assumptions. The assets fall into four broad categories, equity, bonds, property and 
other. Equity is the shares that are held in the pension portfolio, this constitutes the 
most significant component of the assets for most schemes. As a general rule of thumb 
the equity Will amount to around 60% of the assets held, (Lane Clark & Peacock (2006)). 
This figure is more representative of the end of my sample however, as equi 
accounted for around 70% of the assets in the portfolio at the start of my sample period. 
However, there are also a number of schemes that hold no eqwtý- and hold 
predominantly bonds and cash. 
The next most significant asset class is bonds making up around 30% of the 
assets held (in the latter part of my sample). This comprises government bonds, 
corporate bonds and index linked bonds. There is an issue here with the level of 
disclosure. Generally the disclosure is under the broad category of bonds; however, 
there are a small number of firms who disclose the quantity of the different týpes of 
bonds held. In the descriptive statistics presented the bonds held have been aggregated 
to allow for an examination of the assets and liabilities of the firm. It should also be 
noted however, that despite the disclosure of different bonds held by some firms the 
return assumption on bonds is never split into different bond return assumptions. 
The third category of assets held is propertý, making up about 5"0 of a typical 
pension fund. Despite the appeal of property, in terms of its long term nature and the 
33 Pension funds will have very little exposure if any to residential housing as the market does 
not suit the nature and structure of pension funds and so Nve assume that property refers to 
commercial property. 
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performance of commercial property over the past 30 years, there is, somewhat 
surprisingly, very little property held. The main reason for propertý- being held in such 
small quantifies is that property is an illiquid asset which makes it undesirable to hold in 
significant quantities. 
The last asset class is 'other' and this makes up the remainder of the assets held. 
This is, for the most part, cash holdings. However, a small number of schemes have 
very small exposures to insurance contracts and index linked funds. I also incorporate 
these assets into the other asset category. Where a firm holds annuities and deferred 
annuities, although these assets are 'other', however I include them into the bonds asset 
class as they have similar characteristics. There are onlý, five firms in the sample v-ho 
hold small amounts of annuities and so the impact of this will not be material on my 
analysis. 
In the disclosures for certain companies there are a number of unusual asset 
combinations. One example is Headlam Group, who group equity and property 
together, in this case the value of equity and property is around (20m and constitutes 
about 65% of the assets in the scheme. It consequently does not seem plausible that the 
major asset in the combined figure will be property and so the property and equity have 
been input as solely equity. Again a number of firms aggregate bonds and cash. In this 
situation I categorise these assets as bonds as it is unlikely, based on the average scheme, 
that a scheme would be 25% cash. 
3.3.2 Pension Assets and Liabilities 
The next categories extracted from the FRS-17 disclosures are the total assets and the 
pension hability. Total Assets is simply the sum of all the individual asset categories 
discussed in section 3.3.1. The next category is the total liability of the pensions that 
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have been accrued by the employees within the scheme. This liablht-v is the present 
value of the current benefits due to employees and is calculated through the accrued 
benefits method. Under this method, the pension liability says nothing about the 
liability in relation to the expected final salary of members. It therefore only reflects the 
benefits that the employees of the firm have accrued at the time of valuation. 
From the total assets and the pension liability I can calculate the gross 
surplus/ (deficit) of the scheme. This is simply the sum of total assets and total liability. 
If the assets in the scheme are greater than the liabilities then the scheme is in surplus, 
however, if the assets in the scheme are less than the habilitý- then the scheme is in 
deficit. 
The next category is deferred taxation. This is a rather complex part of the 
disclosure as it is somewhat misleading. Essentially, given a surplus/ (deficit) in the 
scheme, the firm, on winding up a scheme, would have to pay tax on any surplus assets, 
assuming that they returned to the firm, as no tax has been paid on them preViously. 
Alternatively, where there was a deficit, the firm would be able to write-off some of the 
cost of fully funding the deficit against taxation paid on its operations. 
1nterestingly, 31 state that although their scheme would have a k30m tax asset it 
is not included as the firm feel that this asset cannot be realised in the near future. As a 
result of the position that 31 take and the fact that all of these tax figures are notional 
then whether they are material is open to interpretation. In the proceeding analysis 
therefore I only consider the gross surplus/ (deficit) as I feel that it more accurately 
reflects the hability and risk of the firm. For completeness in this chapter hov, -ever, I 
present both the gross position and the net position (gross surplus/ (deficit) + deferred 
tax asset). 
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3.3.3 Multiple Schemes 
There are a number of firms who operate multiple schemes. This can be split into two 
broad categories, first, multiple UK schemes xvhere the firm runs a number of different 
schemes for its UK employees. Second, UK and overseas schemes (OS), in this 
situation firms proVide pension benefits to both UK employees and foreign employees 
in the countries in which they operate. Where there are multiple UK schemes these 
schemes are simply aggregated and the average return assumptions are used" 
Although a weighted average could be used to calculate the average assumption, 
the difference is not going to be significantly different from the average. Further, in 
certain cases it is not possible as disclosure is neither practical nor useful - HSBC for 
example operate 169 schemes worldwide. 1n disclosing for all of these schemes broad 
aggregates are provided, so any weighted average is not going to prove to be anýýmore 
useful than a general average, gIven the method of aggregation by HSBC is unknown. 
Where firms operate both UK' and overseas schemes (OS) I consider each as a 
separate category. The OS scheme has the same categories as the UK schemes in terms 
of the assets, liabilities, pension assumptions and the return assumptions. This also 
allows for the calculation of a total category where both the UK scheme and the OS 
scheme are combined so I calculate total pension assets (UK+OS) and total pension 
babilities (UK+OS). 
There are significant problems in assessing the accounting disclosure for 
overseas schemes. The level of provision expectations of future mortality, inflation and 
asset return assumptions are essentially N-vithout any reference point. In the UK for 
example, from experience for a firm to assume equity returns are 1.5"'o for example is 
34 Where assumptions are given as a range then the mid-point is used. Again this seems 
plausible given that the inflation assumption may be given as between 2",, -3"0' and so the actual 
range is small. 
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plausible as the historical rate of return is 7.1%35 and so the assumptions that are used 
can be benchmarked to some extent. However, if there are OS schemes in South Africa, 
South America and Australia (BHP Billiton) and there are assumptions that are put 
forward as an aggregate for these schemes it not possible to asses whether the return on 
equity, or any other assumption for that matter, is appropriate or prudent. 
In incorporating overseas schemes many are denominated in foreign currency 
and must be converted to Sterling for compatibility. 1 use the exchange rate at the 
balance sheet data for conversion as this seemed most appropriate. All of the figures 
that are used for the valuation and assessment of both UK and overseas assets are 
denominated in Sterhng. 
3.3.4 Asset and Liability Assum pfions 
The assumptions that are disclosed under FRS-17 are used to calculate the liability of 
the scheme and the expected return on the pension assets. These can therefore be 
broken down into two main parts; liability assumptions and asset return assumptions. 
The hability assumptions consist of inflation, wage growth, pension growth and a 
discount rate. The asset assumptions are expected rates of return for the different asset 
classes that are held in the pension portfolio. 
The first pension assumption is inflation; this is used to adjust the future value 
of the pension liability. The second variable is expected wage increases that are used to 
calculate the value of the pension liability. These two variables are significant together 
when arriving at the value of the pension promise. ln actuarial terms this is called the 
basis. A stylised example being where expected wage increases are 7% if inflation is 3'ý', 
there is only a 4% increase in wages in real terms. 
" Barclays Capital Equity Gilts Study 2007 - 50 year historical return. 
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The next variable is the expected increase in pensions. This variable is also 
important as there will be different rates of pension accruals based upon wage increases, 
contracts and Efe expectancy. This variable links with the increase in wages it there are 
high increases in (expected wages) then there Nvill be a higher level of pension accrual 
and consequently an increase in the pension liab1hrv. 
The last variable in tl-ýs category is the discount rate. This is used to discount 
the future liability to the present value of the pension fiabihtý, which is disclosed in FRS- 
17. Under FRS-17 it is supposed to be a AA bond yield of suitable duration and 
maturity. 
The last category of assumption is asset returns and are the expected rates of 
return on the assets held in the pension fund portfolio. These are important in looking 
at the solvency of the pension scheme. If the experience of the scheme is radically 
different from expectations then this will have a significant bearing on the ability of the 
firm to meet its pension liability. For example, if the expected returns on equities were 
to fall significantly, then the pension liability would essentially increase as there would 
be a shortfall in the value of the assets that will be used to meet this liability. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics Pension Assets and Liabilities 
3.4.1 Total Pension Assets and Liabilities 
The first group of descriptive statistics, presented in Table 3.1, are the annual statistics 
for the total pension assets and liabilities of my sample companies. The table presents a 
break down of the individual asset classes, the total assets, the pension habiliry, the gross 
surplus/ (deficit), the deferred tax and the net surplus position. The sample consists of 
FTSFý 350 FRS-17 disclosures for 2001-2004. 
ic)GR 
3 
AN OVERVIFWOF CORPORATE PIIINSI()\'Pl,,, \NS IN THE L'K 
Table 3-1 Descriptive Statistics for Total Pension Scheme Assets and Liabilities 
-5 
Thc panels below show descriptive statistics for 4 years of FRS-17 disclosures for FTSE 35C) firms total pension assets as well as pooled de-, crjpti%-c statistics for the whole sample. The data consists of assets which are equity, bonds, property and other. The bonds data 
presented is the aggregate bonds held i. e. both corporate and government debt, the other category is assets which are predorninantlý 
cash although a small number of firms hold small amounts in insurance policies etc. The gross surplus/ (deficit) is total assets plus 
liability and the net surplus is the gross surj)lus/(d(: ficit) plus deferred tax. Deferred tax is the amount of tax that would be paid or 
credited if the pension scheme was to be wound up immediately. The data period is 2001- 2004. For each cell the first %-. IriibIC 
presented is the mean value, the next value down is the standard deviation and the last values art the minimum/ maximum. For 
example, in 2001 the average value of equity is L598.77m, the standard deviation is 1832.32m and the minimum is CO while the 
maxinium is C19200m. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 Pooled 
598.77 461.23 549.66 577.07 546.69 
Equity 1832.32 1426.68 1795.34 1958.96 1763.34 
0/19200 0/14701 0/20978 0/24305 ()/-143()5 
282.87 258.96 294.92 314.81 287.89 
Bonds 1007.9 775.3 862.78 928.54 896.96 
0/13117 0/5988 0/6436 U/7400 0/13117 
37.13 39.28 39.88 47.33 40.91 
Property 200.73 225.52 226.52 258.44 228.51 
0/2800 0/3300 0/3300 0/3600 0/36()() 
39.15 32.38 37.12 60.93 42.4 
Other 128.88 106.54 121.75 251.28 162.92 
0/1383 -400/1067.53 0/1114.08 -0.6/3855 -400/3855 
957.92 791.85 921.58 1000.14 917.89 
Total Assets 2844.65 2317 28()4.37 3082.91 2774.29 
0/27100 0/21500 0/27820 0/31682 0/31682 
968.9 997.53 1108.81 1186.27 1065.37 
Liability 2886.36 2976.01 3297.75 3592.36 3198.02 
28930/0 30533/0 32036/0 36269/0 36269/0 
-10.97 -206.45 -187.22 -186.12 -147.68 
Gross Surplus 246.48 710.43 530.62 563.44 544.78 
-1830/1753 -9033/154 -5136/146.7 -4731/786 -9033/1753 
5.77 48.36 43.18 48.13 36.36 
Deferred Tax 82.46 193.3 137.12 150.38 147.19 
-821/863 -48/2710 -36.1/1541 -55/1434 -821/2710 
-5.2 -158.09 -144.04 -137.99 -111.32 
Net Surplus 210.73 532.53 421.4 435.82 421.08 
-1281/1753 -6323/108 -3859/334.83 -4424/774 -6323/1753 
Table 3-1 presents the descriptive statistics for the total pension scheme, this is 
made up of both UK schemes and any overseas pension schemes that a firm may have. 
For 2001 the average equity held is k598.77m, the average quantity of honds held is 
k282.87m, property is (37.13m and other assets such as cash are k39.15m. The average 
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total assets held are f. 957.92m. However, the average liability is greater than the average 
total assets held at (968.90m giving an average deficit of (1 0.97m 36 . 
The averages for these figures do not capture the magnitude of the fiabibties of 
many firms. The maximum 'total assets' held in 2001 is k27bn while the minimum is 
k1.9m. Again with the total liability the largest liability is ; C28.93bn and the smallest 
liability is k2.2m. We can see therefore that the range of the sample is considerable". 
In analysing the figures for 2002 what is most significant is the change in the 
average value of the equity held and the value of the bonds. As the stock market goes 
through a bear market over 2002 and into the first half of 2003 then the variability in 
the value of the assets held to meet the pension promise becomes apparent. 
The mean value of the equity held is si nificantly lower than the value of the 9M 
equity held in 2001. The mean equity value held is (461.23m this is about k138m less 
than the previous year. The value of the bonds held has also fallen to 'C258-96m. 
However, property is slightly larger at k39.28m and while other assets have fallen to 
k32.38m. The value of the total assets that are held therefore is clearly dependant upon 
the performance of the stock market. This follows expectations given the composition 
of the average pension portfobo. 
The bability has also increased with an average liability of L997.53m in 2002. 
The pension promise has therefore become a bigger risk for most firms as the value of 
the assets held has fallen quite considerably, and the average liability that 
firms face has 
increased by about k30m. This is reflected in the gross deficit of the average scheme of 
k206.45m. 
36 \\'Ith the average notional deferred tax being k5.77m then the average net deficit is k, 5.2m. 
37 This ignores the zeros that , N-ere included to remove missing values. The 
figures reported are 
taken from the ra,, N- data. 
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Again the average masks the true extent of the problem. For the smallest 
liability this has fallen to k1.8m while the largest liability has risen to k30.53bn. As 
noted above the gross deficit increased to k206m. The biggest deficit in 2001 however 
stands at just over ý-9bn. lt is very clear that over 2001 and 2002 the pension problem 
faced by firms became much more significatit. 
It is also interesting to note that around this time there was a substantial increase 
in the press coverage given to the pension 'crisis' facing the UK. The new accounting 
standard proVided disclosure that could be readily understood by investors. Faced with 
tumbling equity prices then pensions' liabilities became a signIficant problem. However, 
when the stock market crashed in 1987 most pension funds had significant equity 
exposures, despite this there was no significant discussion of a funding crisis. The new 
accounting standard has therefore changed the awareness of investors and analysts with 
regards to pensions, the previous view was much more long term, and so market falls 
and even crashes did not matter as much as they do under the market approach 
currently employed. 
As the market recovers through 2003 and 2004, the average value of the eqwtý 
held increases to T549.66m and k577.07m respectively. The 2004 value however is still 
around k20m lower than the average 2001 value. The value of the bonds held increases 
above the 2001 level by 2004 where the average value of the bonds held is k3l4m. 
lnterestingly there are some signs of a change in the structure of the average 
pension portfolio. The equitý, values are obviously lower despite the recovery in the 
market, and the value of the bonds held has increased - this could be due to a 
combination of better bond prices and increased exposure to bonds as an asset class. 
The property held ho--, x, ever increases hy a large amount. The 2003 average holdings are 
comparable to 2001 and 2002 xvith average value of property in the portfoho being 
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around k39m. However, in 2004 this has risen to k47m which is an increase of about 
20%. Again the exposure to other assets increases significantly between 2003 and 2004 
where the average value increases from f39.15m to (60.7m. The composition of the 
assets in pension portfolios definitely changes over the sample however this is not 
conclusive as we cannot be certain if this is due to restructuring or drifts in asset Prices. 
The average liablhties increase year on year between 2001 and 2004. Howevcr 
between 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 the liabilities increase by quite considerable amounts. 
Between 2001 and 2002 the increase is about (30m. However, over 2002-2003 the 
habihty increases by about kl 12m and between 2003 and 2004 the hability increases býý 
about k70m. 
In 2001 the gross surplus/ (deficit) position is a deficit of about 01m. In 2002 
however the gross deficit position increases to (206m. In the following years the gross 
position recovers slightly to (187m and (186m for 2003 and 2004 respectively. This 
trend also persists when the net position is considered; the values are only lessened bý 
the notional deferred tax asset. The solvency of the pension scheme can be seen to 
deteriorate significantly between 2001 and 2002 but improves shghtly over 2003 and 
2004. However, the magnitude of the problem is sign1ficant over the whole sample. 
3.4.2 UK and OS Pension Assets and Liabilities 
From Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 we can analyse separately the UK pension exposure 
(Table 3-2) and the overseas pension exposure (Table 3-3). The average asset values are 
much higher in A years for the UK compared to the overseas schemes. In 2004 for 
example can see that the average UK portfolio was made up of k513m equity, 
, (283m 
bonds, k44m property and (51m other, while the average overseas scheme was 
, (64m equltý, 
2.9m property and k9.5m other. However, the range of ., ý-31rn bonds, ( 
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overseas exposures is large. There are a number of large firms wl-ých haý-e , -cn- 
signi'ficant overseas pension exposures, these firms are mainly large international banks 
such as Barclays and HSBC, large min. Ing firms such as Anglo American and BHP 
Billiton and the big oil companies; BP for example has the largest overseas liability at 
,, 
Cl 5.8bn in 2004. 
Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics for UK Pension Scheme Assets and Liabilities 
The panels below show descriptive statistics for 4 years of FRS-17 disclosures for FTSF. 350 firms UK pension assets as wen as 
pooled descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The data consists of assets Which are equm, debt, property and other. The debt 
data presented is the aggregate debt i. e. both corporate and government debt, the other catugon is assets which are predominantly 
cash although a small number of firms bold small amounts in insurance policies etc. The gross surplus/ (deficit) is total assets plus 
liability and the net surplus is the gross surplus/ (deficit) plus deferred Lax. Deferred tax is the amount of tax that would be paid or 
credited if the pension scheme was to be wound up immediately. The data period is 2001- 2004. For each cell the first variable 
presented is the mean value, the next value down is the standard deviation and the last values are the minimum/maximum. For 
example, in 2001 the average value of equity is C534.17m, the standard deviation is 1643.88 and the minimum is _fO while the 
maximum is k, I 9200m. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 Pooled 
534.17 412.49 484.96 513.16 486.2 
Equity 1643.88 1277.22 1551.1 1686.19 1-546.82 
0/19200 0/13800 0/17300 0/18600 0/19200 
250.76 228.45 261.25 283.39 255.96 
Bonds 971.67 723.01 804.25 874.72 847.68 
0/13117 0/5446 0/6300 0/7400 0/13117 
35.58 37.29 37.48 44.43 38.7 
Property 197.17 221.4 221.14 252.73 223.77 
0/2800 0/3300 0/3300 0/3600 0/3600 
33.64 25.27 30.34 51.46 35.18 
Other 114.53 92.38 106.23 233.17 147.91 
0/1146 -400/1067.53 0/1114.08 -0.6/3647 -400/3647 
854.16 703.51 814.04 892.45 816.04 
Total Assets 2599.51 2094.5 2486.25 2742.28 2490.6 
0/27100 0/21500 0/26900 0/29600 0/29600 
845.32 864.61 962.34 1039.55 927.95 
Liability 2597.64 2591.85 2836.89 3087.38 2784.02 
28930/0 30533/0 32036/0 34331/0 34331/0 
8.84 -161.1 -148.3 -147.1 -111.91 
Gross Surplus 303.25 598 457.66 491.12 479.02 
-1830/4134 -9033/316 -5136/1458 -4731/1908 -9033/4134 
2.63 39.24 35.56 41.02 29.61 
Deferred Tax 94.64 176.74 128.94 143.84 139.94 
-1240/863 -95/2710 -437/1541 -572/1434 -1240/271() 
11.47 -121.86 -112.74 -106.08 -82.3 
Net Surplus 240.39 430.62 343.07 355.41 352.86 
-1281/2894 -6323/221 -3595/1021 -3297/1336 -6323//281)4 
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The data also show that in both the UK and overseas schemes equity is the 
dominant asset held in the pension portfolio. In looking at the value of the equity in 
both UK schemes and OS schemes there is significant variation as the stock markets faH 
from the highs of 2001 and enter into the bear market of 2002 and 2003 although they 
do recover some of their value at the end of the sample period. 
Table 3-3 Descriptive Statistics for Overseas Pension Scheme Assets and 
Liabilities 
The panels below show descriptive statistics for 4 years of FRS-1 ' disclosures for FT'-)l ý 350 firms overseas pension assets as NveH is 
pooled descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The data con-, ists, of assets which are Cquit - ý, 
debt, property and other. The debt 
data presented is the aggregate debt i. e. both corporate and government debt, the other category is assets which are predominantly 
cash although -a small number of firms hold small amounts in insurance policies etc. The groýs -, urplus /(deficit) is total assets plus 
liability and the net surplus is the gross surplus/ (deficit) plus deferred tax. Deferred tax is the amount of tax that would be paid )r 
credited if the pension scheme was to be ýxound up immediately. Thc data period is 2()()1- 2004. For each cell the first variable 
presented is the mean %-. iluc, the next value do-wri is the standard deviation and the last values ýirc the minimum/maximum. For 
example, in 2001 the average value of ecluity is ý, 64.60m, the standard deviation is 335.60 and the minimum is LO while the 
maximum is L5094m. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 Pooled 
64.6 48.74 64.7 63.91 60.49 
Equity 335.6 250.6 382.21 407.83 348.92 
0/5094 0/3886 0/6336 0/6976 ()/6976 
32.11 30.51 33.67 31.42 31.93 
Bonds 133.7 131.15 149.98 146.49 140.42 
0/1317 0/1392 0/1755 0/1914 0/1914 
1.55 1.99 2.4 2.9 2.21 
Property 11.07 16.46 19.06 18.7 16.62 
0/141 0/231 0/257 0/222 0/257 
5.51 7.11 6.78 9.47 7.22 
Other 23.75 30.64 30.68 47.24 34.18 
0/237 0/251.25 0/335 0/549.63 0/549.63 
103.77 87.57 107.55 107.7 101.65 
Total Assets 477.55 402.95 556.62 586.92 510.58 
0/6789 0/5653 0/8596 0/9375 0/9375 
123.58 132.92 146.47 146.72 137.42 
Liability 601.21 720.77 834.4 921.14 777.95 
9247/0 11906/0 14085/0 15870/0 1-)8'()/() 
-19.81 -45.35 -38.92 -39.02 -35.77 
Gross Surplus 154.95 350.16 305.42 353.71 4 301.92 
-2458/514 -6253/49.49 -5489/367.82 -6495/62.3 -6495/514 
3.14 9.12 7.62 7.11 6.75 
Deferred Tax 26.76 67.57 39.78 44.25 46.97 
-43.9/419 -30/1170 -21.8/609 -53/735 -53/11-10 
-16.67 -36.23 -31.3 -31.9 t -29.02 
Net Surplus 132.77 285. -)6 270.94 312.27 2-59.68 
-2039/514 -5083/148.41 -4880/4ý 1.73 -5-60/38.3 -_)760//514 
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UK equity in 2001 was, on a: ýýerage valued at ý534rn in 2001 and this fell to 
412m in 2002. For the overseas schemes the 2001 equity value , ýýas k65m and in 2002 
the equitýl feH to (49m. The fall in the UK schemes was more pronounced and was 
around 20% of the 2001 value. Th-is is consistent with expectations as UK pension 
schemes are invested heavily in the UK stock market. Overseas schemes are likely to 
hold shares in the countries in which the pension bability is owed. Implicitly, they will 
benefit from both higher emergling market returns, and lower correlation with the US 
and UK markets. One consequence of this is that these schemes ,,,, erc not as exposed 
to the declines observed in developed markets. 
The UK hability is again on average more sign-1ficant than the average overseas 
exposure. In 2001 the average liablhty was k854m and by 2004 this had risen to 
, Cl. 04bn. For the overseas schemes 
however, the average liabifity in 2001 N,, ýas k124m 
and by 2004 this had risen to C147m. Again there is great variation in the magnitude of 
the pension liabibty in both the UK and the overseas schemes. The maximum bablhty 
in the UK in 2004 is C34bn (Bf) and while for OS schemes it was f 15.8bn (BP). The 
hability and the ma -itude of the promise are considerable 
for some firms and both 9M 
overseas and UK schemes exhibit quite a significant amount of variation. 
This variation is also apparent in the surplus or deficit that these schemes have. 
In the UK in 2001 the gross surplus was on average k9m however, by 2004 these 
surpluses had turned to deficits With the average deficit being k147m. This is due to 
increasing liabilities over time and sign-Ificant falls in the value of the assets held to meet 
the pension obhgation. For the overseas schemes, interestingly the average for 2001 
was a deficit of (20m. Bv 2004 this has doubled to be a gross deficit of k40m. Again 
this occurs as the pension liability increases year-on-year and the value of the equity held 
to meet the liabihty is lower in 2002 - 2004. 
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3.4.3 (-., 'K Pension Liabilio Assumptions 
The pension liability assumptions are used to arrive at the value of the pension liabifitý-. 
The figures are nominal increases in wages and pensions, inflation assumptions and a 
discount rate. In this data there is agwn significant variation. For the inflation 
assumption in the UK this varies across companies more than across time. From Panel 
A, in Table 3-4 we can see that in 2001 the average inflation assumption is 2.55"., '(, and 
increases to 2.77% in 2004. There are quite large ranges within this; in 2001 the range 
was 1.5% although in 2004 the range had fallen to 1.05%. 
For the wage growth assumption there is some variation over the sample. In 
2001 the average wage growth assumption is 4.11 %, this falls in 2002 to 3.84% and bv 
2004 this has recovered somewhat to 4.07%. The pattern of wage growth in each ycýir 
broadly follows the performance of the stock market performance. This again seems 
plausible as one would expect that increases in wages would be tied into firm 
performance. The range for this assumption however is quite considerable and is 5.8% 
in 2001 and 5.7% in 2004. This is also a significant assumption because if the wage 
increase is lower then the implied liability for that scheme will be less. " 
As with wage growth there is a change in the pension growth assumptions year 
on year. For 2001-2004 pension growth was 2.55%, 2.43%, 2.69% and 2.74% 
respectively. As with the wage growth assumption if the pension growth assumptions 
are low then the change in the liability year on year will be reduced and so the presented 
liabihty will not be as severe. 
38 In analysing the pension assets and liabilities we replaced missing values with zeros to average 
the pension assets and liabilities across all firms. Ho,,,, -e\-er, for the assumptions we do not 
follow this procedure as ()')o wage growth for example is an assumption that some firms make 
and so missing values are retained here. 
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The last pension assumption is the discount rate. This is used to discount the 
pension liability into a present value. If a firm employs a higher discount rate then they 
will reduce the magnitude of the liability Over the sample the average discount rate 
falls from 5.95% in 2001 to 5.40% in 2004. 
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Over time the range of the values used to discount the haMity faEs. 1n 2001 the 
range is 2.25% while in 2004 the range is 1.57%. These changes however, maNI reflect 
changes in the AA bond yield or alternatively there may be a 'bedding in' of the new 
standard and so firms move to the 'optimal' assumption. 
3.4.4 OS Pension Liabilio Assumptions 
As mentioned previously the pension assumptions for the overseas schemes are not easý- 
to put into context. The pension promise for a US scheme is not the same as a pension 
promise in South Africa, if both of these schemes are together then it is not possible to 
understand how appropriate of favourable any of the assumptions are. Consequently, 
the descriptive statistics only show how the data looks without any underlying story. 
Panel B of Table 3-4 presents my descriptive analysis of the liabihty assumptions 
of overseas schemes. The overseas inflation assumption is 2.61% in 2001 and is lower 
in all the other sample years. The wage growth assumptions are 4.22% in 2001 and this 
falls in the other years and in 2004 average expected wage growth is 3.92%. Again with 
the other assumptions average pension growth falls over the sample from 1.69% in 2001 
to 1.52% in 2004. 
The most interesting assumption here is the discount rate for the scheme 
babilities. In 2001 the discount rate is 6.78%; however, this value falls over time to 
5.48% in 2004. The range in 2001 is 8.52%, however, in 2004 this range has faUen to 
5.25%. The average discount rate for the overseas scheme in 2004 is only 0.08% higher 
than UK discount rate. Given that the discount rate is linked to the risk of the schemes, 
then the discount rates would suggest that the overseas promises are actually of a similar 
risk to the UK schemes, although this seems unhkely iven the potential differences that 1 91 
exist in the regulatory environment and the pension promises that the 
firm is making. 
f5c)(-, )R 
3 
AN OVERVIFWOF CORPORATE P1-1'NSION PLANS IN THE UK Page 86 
Asset return assumptions can be used to impact upon the profit and loss 
reserves. 1f the return on equity is expected to be 7% and the actual return is -. 5'',, then 
the firm can put a credit into reserves based upon the extra return generated on equity. 
Conversely if the return was to be below this there would be a fall in the value of the 
reserves. However, these assumptions can have a significant effect depending on the 
size of the pension scheme. Consequently, only a small percentage difference in equity 
returns for example, such as 50 basis points, could have a considerable effect on the 
income statement where the equity held in the portfolio is large enough. 
3.4.5 UKAsset Return Assumptions 
Panel A of Table 3-5 shows that in 2001 the average equity return on UK schemes was 
7.69%. There was however, considerable cross sectional N-ariation as the range is 2.88%. 
For the other years the expected return on equity falls slightlýl and in 2004 the expected 
return on equity is 7.66%. Interestingly however, the range increases considerably to 
3.9% as the minimum expected return on equity has faHs to just 5.10%. 
For the bond return assumptions the same pattern broadly emerges. In 2001 
the average expected rate of return was 5.29% and the range was relatively high at 
3.25%. Interestingly, the maximum expected return on bonds was 7.25% and this is just 
0.47% lower than the average return on equity. The expected return however falls over 
the sample period and in 2004 the average expected return on bonds is 4.89%. The 
range of the bond return assumptions in 2004 however has increased significantly to 
4.62%. 
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For the return on property assumptions the average expected return on property 
is 6.9% in 2001 and is similar across all of the years and by 2004 this has fallen to 6.57%. 
As with the other asset return assumptions the spread of the assumptions increases 
quite significantly over time. In 2001 the range is 2.6% and in 2003 the range has 
increased to 3.4%. Although the largest range is 8.5% (2002 and 2004), this figure is 
somewhat misleading as there was an assumption of zero return on property and so the 
increase is not representative. 
Unbke the return assumptions for the main assets held in the portfolio, the 
returns on other assets does not follow the trend with higher averages in 2001 and lower 
averages in 2004. Over time the return is broadly the same and with the highest average 
return being 4.61% in 2004 and the lowest being 4.29% in 2003. The range in the 
assumptions is quite large with the maximum being 5.5% given that other assets are 
predominantly cash such a return on a cash portfobo in this instance is extremely high". 
One possible reason for the pattern that emerges with the assumptions over 
time is that the new accounting standard was introduced in 2001. Over the sample we 
therefore see an evolution in how to account for pensions. Potentially, as the way to 
effectively apply the accounting standard to benefit the company emerges then 
assumptions are changed to benefit the numbers reported in the company accounts. 
3.4.6 OS Asset Return Assumptions 
As with the pension assumptions for the overseas schemes it is not possible to anything 
from the asset return assumptions as it is difficult to benchmark the return assumptions 
and put them into an appropriate context. The figures only tell how the data looks but 
there is httle story that can be brought to hght. 
"I As with property the inclusion of a zero return on other assets in 2001,2003 and 20(4 biases 
the largest range in the sample and so Nve only discuss the 2002 range. 
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From Panel B in Table 3-5 it is clear that the average return assumption for 
overseas equity is higher in all years than the UK equity return assumption. In 2001 the 
average expected return on overseas equity is 8.81% With a range of 6.85", ',,. In 2(04 the 
equity return is 8.25% but the range has actually narrowed to 6.4% unlike the UK 
assumptions where there is an increase in the range over time. 
For bond returns the picture is the same as the average bond return in 2001 is 
6.27% With a range of 9.25% and in 2004 the average return has fallen to 5.21", - x6th a 
range of 6.3%. The same pattern emerges in both property and other assets where in 
2001 the property expected return is 8.21% and this faHs to 6.27% in 2004 as weU as this 
there is a dramatic faH in the spread from 14% in 2001 to 6.5% in 2004. For the other 
assets the average expected return falls from 5.52% in 2001 to 4.19% in 2004. 
lnterestingly the range in for other assets decreases from 12.75% in 2001 to 8% 2003'0. 
3.5 Pension Assets and Liabilities - Sorted by Tobin's 
The final two sections of this chapter carry out descriptive statistics over two separate 
sorts of the data. The first set of sorts carried out was by Tobin's Q, where, 
Market Value + TotalDebt + PreferenceCapital 
TotalAssetsEmployed 
I sort the data using Tobin's Q for a number of reasons. First, it is a standard 
metric bý, which company data is sorted in corporate finance. Second, Tobin's Q senes 
as a proxy for corporate value. As such my expectation ,,,, ould be that measures of 
corporate value would reflect the magnitude of the pension promise and the associated 
funding of the scheme". Based upon this intuition I would expect those firms that have 
40 
ý, 
\ 
I \vc do not report the 2004 range as it is biased by the assumption of zero return. 
41 \SS ing that market efficiency holds. , "Limi 
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high measures of Q to be associated with high levels of scheme funding and/or smaller 
liabilities. Conversely, for low Q firms the expectation would be that they have larger 
pension exposures and worse levels of funding. In this situation corporate value should 
be lower as the large liabilities and low funding levels reflect a long-term cash outflow as 
the liability has to be funded from the within the existing resources of the firm. This 
expectation also ties up With the notion that Q proxies for the investment opportunities 
of the firm. Those firms that have large liabilities and IoN-ý- levels of funding are 
therefore less likely to be able to invest in all available projects as the funding of the 
pension scheme reduces the availability of cashflow within the firm for investment. 
Table 3-6 to Table 3-9 present the descriptive statistics of the UK pension assets, 
liabilities and assumptions sorted by Tobin's Q. I present quartiles where quartile 1 
contains those firms with the lowest Q values and quartile 4 has the highest Q x-alues'2 
The data is analysed in bý, different years and in different groups. The data is grouped 
into pension assets (Equity, Bonds, Property and Other), total pension assets and 
liabilities, (Total Assets, Total Liability Gross Surplus Deferred Tax and Net Surplus), 
pension assumptions ýnflation, Wage Growth, Pension Growth and Discount Rate) 
and lastly return assumptions (Equity Return, Bond Return, Property Return and Other 
Return). 
From carrying out the descriptive statistics based on the sorts it is problematic 
to derive strong patterns within the data from standard descriptive statistics. This is in 
part due to the fact that the pension can be viewed as an external factor to the 
performance of the firm. 
42Table 4c presents the Q values for each quartile. The values are slightly lower as the stocks 
are more mature for the majoritýý of the sample. 
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One example which highlights the variance of fl-iis is, bý- considering a single 
industry. I look at three large banks, namely, Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and HSBC. 
AD of these companies are in the FTSE 100, all are in the same industry and are 
comparable in many ways and serve as a good example of the nature of the problem. In 
2001 the Royal Bank had a surplus of (446m, HBOS had a surplus of (3m (essentiallý 
zero relative to the liability) and HSBC had a deficit of k742m. The standard sorts of 
the data therefore make it very difficult to build up a coherent picture as there is no 
clear relationship that emerges. This is in itself however an interesting facet of the data 
and the nature of the problem. 
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Table 3-6 presents the descriptive statistics for the different asset classes held in 
each year. It is difficult to see an obvious pattern over all quartiles in the data o\-cr time. 
In 2001 for the lowest performing firms (Q1) the average amount of equity (, C700m) is 
the highest. The range here is quite large with the minimum equity held being zero and 
the maximum being kS. 6bn. However, if Q3 is considered the aN, erage equity held is 
slightly lower at k659m but the range is considerably higher at kl9.2bn. This occurs as 
some of the largest schemes have fallen into this quardle and their pension scheme 
assets and liabilities dwarf the pension schemes of the other firms in the sample. The 
only consistent pattern that can be seen is that Ql is always greater than Q4 for the 
equity held. 
For the bonds held the only pattern that can be observed is the same as for 
equity where year on year the quantity of bonds held in Q1 (low Q firms) is greater than 
the amount held in Q4 (high Q firms). From the table it can also be seen that the firms 
with the largest pension schemes move between quartiles over time as the range in the 
different quartiles is sigmficant over time. For Q4 for example in 2001 the range is 
k2.4bn but in 2002 this has increased to C4.8bn but faHs back down again in 2003 and 
2004 to , C2.8bn and ý2.6bn respectively. 
This pattern can be seen over all of the assets held and also over time. In 2001 
for example in Q1 the average value of bonds held was L489m and the range was 
,, cl3. lbn, highbghting the significant range in pension promises that 
firms have made. 
Again in Q4 the average value of bonds held was (413m while the range was k5.2bn 
showing the extent of pension promises. 
The average value of property assets held for Q1 are worth k5lm and the range 
is kl. 2bn. While for Q4 the average value of property is kI 1.84m and the range is 
033m. The dominant quartile for property however changes. In 2001 and 2002 Ql 
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holds the largest amounts of property, in 2003 and 2004 however Q3 holds significandy 
larger amounts of property in the portfolio than the other quartiles. Again this does not 
tell us much about the pension babilities of the firm's in these groups but that 
companies are moving from 1 group to another. 
For the other asset class Q1 is greater than Q4 in all years but the range changes 
significantly year on year. In 2001 the average other assets held in Q1 is k5lm and in 
2004 this has risen considerably to k94.64m. For Q4 the 2001 value of other assets is 
C15m and for 2004 the average is C24m. One interesting fact that emerges ftom this 
sort is that in 2002 and 2004 there are minimums which are negative, in these instances 
the pension scheme has borrowed cash to fund their positions. This only occurs three 
times over the whole sample. 
Table 3-7 presents the total assets, total liability, gross surplus and net surplus 
for UK schemes between 2001 and 2004. The broad pattern across all of these 
categories is that Q1 dormnates Q4. As with the individual asset classes the variation in 
the ranges show where the firms With the largest schemes, move between quartiles over 
tAme. 
From the total assets it is apparent that the value of the equity held falls in 2002 
quite considerably and recovers in the latter years. This is the same for all quartiles. For 
the total liability there is no discernable pattern above the fact that Q1 has greater 
habih6es in all years than those firms in Q4, this is not down to performance however 
but the size of the pension promise. BT for example have the largest pension promise 
and in 2001 the firm is in Q3 but in 2001 they move into Q4 and in 2003 they track 
back to Q3. 
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The gross surplus (total pension assets plus pension hability) shows that in 2001 
on average firms had a surplus in their schemes. However, when the range is 
considered there is a huge amount of variation in each quartile. The greatest x-ariation is 
in Q3 where largest deficit is kl. 8bn and the largest surplus 1 giving a range of is (4.1bn ii 
just under k6bn. This highlights the fact that many pension schemes were in 
considerable difficulty even before the fall of the equity markets in 2002 and 2003. 
The net surplus tells the same story as the gross surplus although the values here 
are not as large as they take into account the impact of the notional tax asset/liability 
that the scheme could utihse. 
Table 3-8 presents the descriptive statistics of the liability assumptions that are 
applied to arrive at the pension liability. These are the inflation, wage growth, pension 
growth and discount rate assumptions. Here there is ý, ery little variation in the sample 
for different values of Q. For inflation in Q1 in 2001 the average inflation assumption 
is 2.52%, the largest average is Q3 where inflation is 2.58%. This variation is very small, 
although it should be noted that depending on the size of the scheme such small 
changes, in conjunction with other favourable assumptions may lead to quite significant 
changes in the implied liability of a scheme. 
Over the other years there is a similar picture and there is no discernable pattern 
between quartiles. However, over time it is clear that inflation is expected to increase as 
the average values increase in all quartiles over time. For wage growth it is a similar 
story in that there is no real pattern to be found across the quartiles. Expected wage 
growth can be seen to vary with the performance of the stock market and thereby firms. 
As the market dechnes the expected increase in wages faHs and as the market recovers 
the cx ected increase in wages rises again. Inflation and Nvage gro,, vth clearly exhibit p Cý Cý 
similar characteristics as the ranges through time and across different quartiles, is similar. 
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For pension increases there is, as with the other assumptions, no pattern across 
quartiles. In 2001 the average pension increase for Ql is 2.53% and for Q4 this is 
2.57%. It is interesting to notice that the maximum pension increase in 2001 is 5% and 
this is the same for both 2002 and 2003, this value however, falls to a maximum in 2004 
of 3.88%. However, the expected increase in pension payments rises o\-er the sample 
for all quartiles. 
Again for the discount rate there is no discernable pattern across time. For the 
different quartiles Q1 has a slightly larger discount rate than Q4. In 2001 for example 
Q1 has an average discount rate of 5.95% while Q4 has an average discount rate of 
5.92%. 
Table 3-9 presents the asset return assumptions. For equities the expected 
return for Ql is 7.7% in 2001 and 7.66% in 2004. VAtile for Q4 the return in 2001 and 
2004 is 7.71% and 7.63%. With the exception of 2001 the expected return on equities 
from 2002 onwards is greater in Q1 than in Q4. Although there is only a small 
difference of 0.03%, and no discernable pattern emerges over quartiles or through time. 
In analysing the return on bonds the pattern is less clear as no one quartile has 
consistently higher returns in each year and the range for different quartiles ý, ear-on-ý, car 
varies by considerable amounts. While the expected return on property it is consistently 
higher for Ql compared to Q4 in aE years. The range for these quartiles varies 
sign1ficantly over time and there is no apparent order. Finally, for the other asset class 
Ql has greater mean expected returns when compared to Q4 for all years except 2004. 
As noted above the lack of patterns through time or cross-sectionally reflects 
the an interesting facet of the problem as the habilitv is not systematically related to 
standard corporate finance variables such as Tobin's Q or even industrý. 
SO OR 
4b. ' 
E 
LL 
I- 
a 
ri) 
ICL4 
V) 
(i) 
CN 
H 
Z- 
Of- 
a, eq 
-,: ý ý., u 
C: a 
Lrý 
"o Lf , Lr, Lf 
C: 
c 
C: 17, 
L-r) 
qj 6L Ljr) Lr) 
cr) Lr) 
PQ 
cd , 
ýý 
" cd 
-ýj -0 , 
ý3 C) 00 Lr) 
U, \-r, ) Lr) 
u 
00 Lr) 00 Lr) 
C) o 
, -, -0 
-, t 
Lr) OC C) 
:ý .0:,, .0ý, 
-Z L, U eq 
= 
Lr) L, X: 4 
Cl) 
u OC 00 
,axU, 
Lr) "o \0 c-I 
CJ cs 
-2: ý c -CD 
Uý 
u, c 
c 
0cu 
IC lu 0 Ln C: ) Ln 
,cII r-4 . 14 C-1 Lr) N :; u (= 
u 
OC Lf) In Ln Lf) 
Oo )C 
C: 
Lri 
00 7- 
cq 
Lf') 
4Z L(-, (7,1 
"0 
V 00 ýýc 'ý' G'\ 
ýý 4 -t 4 4 
CD 
CD 
Z 
ýz 
re) ý4 
0ý 
« =, >ý cý) ý CD 
+ý "0 il 
M 
CKD "r- 
X Ln (= C=) c) 00 Z- Ln Ln 
Lr; <ý 
C) C) C) 
(: ý "zt: C7ý 
c) (: D 4 -1- C'I Q 
ý 
' .a Ln oc '- ) C, 
Lr) C, OC Cý 
t 4 -,: 1- -'t 
CD C, 1 Z 
,.., ýc OC) r-, Z LC) 
"0 
" re 
Ln 1,0 C ) 
cr) cq rn 
Ln Lr,. Lri 
L-r, Lr, 
ýz iý ýX- 
L-r, 
lz- 
Lr) 
Z ýc 
ICL. 
> z Z Z k-ri 
OC 
en C c) - q) . C: D R) Lf ) 00 
oc Lr) 
M ý: ý 
U , r-ý r-ý t--: 
r- Z-- "0 lZ: ) 
z- -- = Ln 
Ln Lr) 
rq 
ý5 "o Ln = Ln 
U P-0 - -- q- Ln 
(Z) 00 cli 00 
Z Ln 
ýý Lr) r- Z z- eq 
U zi LO 
Lr, (ýI 00 
- 1-1ý cn Z 
<-- oc 
3c L(l, 
>1 r-- lZ- Z Z 
cq en 
o ýý --ý r-ý, --ý ýi C) 
:3 
ýa -_,, - j- - 
C) ,, - ýc rn I 
E 
c-, cl) Ln Lfý 1--. Lrý ', Cý 
Lr) zc C: ) 
r-- 
'zý 
--r 
2- 
Lr) 
Lf-) CD zý c> 1--: Ci Z CD 
- , M "e- C- -- r`ý Cl, Or- 
44 
u 
t-r, 
X CD - Z 
Q 
, ýo CD Z ýýc 00 
cn 
ýc Lr, 
Lfý 't. 
;ýI-, I- , I- -t -, I- 
:ý 2 . ý:: Z, ý 2 
- 4ý Zý ý-- : - 
r- X 
X 
.% : - = I r 
Cý I 7ý - 
3 
AN OVERVIIAVOF CORPORATE PFINSION PLANS IN THE UK 100 
3.6 Pension Assets and Liabilities - Sorted by Market Value 
Next I perform sorts of the data based upon the market value of the firm and here the 
data presents a much more obvious pattern. I choose to sort b\- the absolute market 
value as this allows for a specific characterisation, of the data. The alternative sort would 
be to use some relative metric such as pension liabilities scaled by market value. 
However, if this relative sort was used then verN, small firms with N'ery small liahibties 
may fall into the category of having large pension exposures e. g. a k50m market 
capitalisation and a, 1, T25m pension liabifitý would produce a ratio of pension liabilities to 
market value of 50%. As such this firm would fall into the category of large pension 
exposures; the actual cash value of this however, is very small and prevents me from 
being able to typify companies based on size. 
Converselv, if I sort by absolute market capitalisation, this allows for me to 
assert that the largest firms have the largest absolute liabilities and are invested heavily in 
equity. Further, this sort also highlights that the largest pension exposures by absolute 
value are concentrated in the largest firms. This would otherwise not be possible if a 
relative sort had been used. 
For the indiVidual assets and the pension liabilities it is the firms With the largest 
market values that have bigger pension liabilities. This follows expectations for two 
reasons. First the biggest firms for the most part will have the greatest number of 
emplovees and xvitl have been operating for the longest period of time. The result of 
this will be that these firms will have the biggest pension promises to keep. Second, a 
number of the biggest firms in the UK were formaRy nationahsed companies and 
consequently have a much higher number of deferred or reured employees. The most 
f5c) OR 
%lbý 
3 
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I- highly pubhcised example of this is British Air%vays whose pension liabifity Nvaý -) of 
the market capitalisation of the firm in 2003" 
From Table 3-10 it can be seen that for all years, the eqwty for those firms -with 
the highest market value (Q4) is significantly higher than all of the other quartiles. In all 
years the average equity value is over ý1.2bn and the range for all ý, ears is much greater 
than in all of the other quartOes. 
43Lane Clarke and Peacock, Accounfing for Pensions (2003). 
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In all of the other assets classes this pattern can be seen across all of the 
quartiles for all of the years. For Q4 in 2001 and 2004 the value of the bonds held is 
, (641m and f790m respectively wl-ýile for Q1 in the same years the value of bonds held 
is (191m and just C34m. In looking at the same quartiles for property in 2()(. -) 1 the 
smallest firms hold an average of just (5.5m while the largest holds k122m. HoxN-evcr, 
by 2004 the quantity of property held by firms in Q1 has fallen to just k1.67/m whereas 
the value for the largest firms has increased to k154m. This is the pattern which also 
emerges for the other asset class. Between 2001 and 2004 for Ql the quantity held falls 
from fl 1 rn to k4.25m. Whereas for Q4, the quantity held rises from rl 07m to kl 72m. 
Table 3-11 presents much the same pattern as Table 3-10. In all years the total 
assets held by the firms with the largest market values are sigmficantly larger than those 
firms with smaller market values. For those firms in Q1 the average total assets held is 
k333m, k140m, k94m and k88m for 2001-2004 respectively. In Q4 over the same 
period however, the average total assets held were c2.53bn, k2bn, k2.6bn and (2.74bn 
respectivelý . 
Table 3-11 also presents the pension liability. Again those firms With the largest 
market values have the largest pension liabilities. For 2001 the average bability for Q4 is 
,, 
C2.5bn and by 2004 this has risen to C3.2bn. Within this however there is a 
considerable range with the maximum liability in these years being k29bn in 2001 and 
, 
T34bn in 2004 (British Telecom). 
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Next I consider both the gross and net surplus/ (deficit)" it is interesting to see 
that those firms with the largest market value in 2001 had gross surplus assets of around 
k35m but in 2002 the average firms has a gross deficit of k464m. However, for those 
firms With the smallest market value in 2001 to 2004 there a deficit in all %ýears, in 2002 
the deficit is k37m and by 2004 this has increased to a deficit of k27m. Interestingly the 
deficit for those firms With the largest schemes hardly moves from the low of 2002. By 
2004 the average deficit is k458m; this is only a fall of k6m and is onl%- a fraction of the 
deficit. 
Table 3-12 presents the economic assumptions that are applied to calculate the 
pension bability. Inflation does not ý, ary by much across quartiles. However, over time 
the range between the average values falls. For 2001 the range between the highest and 
lowest values falls from 0.05% in 2001 to 0.03% in 2004. It should also be noted that 
the expected inflation increases over time from around 2.5%in 2001 to about 2.78% in 
2004. 
My sorts of wage growth present a more obvious pattern across time as in A 
years, as the expected wage growth for the largest firms is greater than the average wage 
growth of smaller firms. Again this is consistent with expectations. First those firms 
with the biggest employee base would have on average higher wage increases than 
smaller firms with a smaller employee base. Second given that the hability of the largest 
firms does not change significantly over the period then, lower expected wages would 
increase liabilities bv a smaller amount and higher expected wages would increase 
liabilities by a larger amount. 
44 Only the gross position is discussed but the exact same pattern emerges in the net data. 
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For pension growth the firms with the largest pension liabilities in the first three 
years the expected growth in pensions is greater than for those firms in Ql. Over time 
for A quartiles expected pension growth increases. The higher year-on-year pension 
growth that is observed over time is consistent with the observed increase in the 
pension liabilities of the largest firms. 
The discount rate however lacks a clear pattern both cross-sectionally and 
through time. Firms with the smallest market values and the smallest liabilities they 
apply, on average a larger cbscount rate than for those firms vith the largest liabilities in 
all years. For Q4 the range of discount rates increases over time and bý, 2004 the range 
is 1.15% while for the smallest firms the range has fallen to 0.65%. There is therefore 
greater variation in the discount rate that is applied by the largest firms. This is also 
consistent With the greater range in the gross surplus/ (deficit) s Within Q4 compared to 
Q1 that was observed in Table 3-11. 
Finally, I consider the return assumptions of firms With the highest market value, 
Q4, from Table 3-13 we can see that they apply the highest expected rate of return of 
equity in all years. The range of the assumptions in Q4 is also greater than the range 
observed in Ql. Interestingly, the expected return on bonds, for those firms with the 
smaHest pension liablEties, have the highest expected rate of return on bonds in all years. 
This can also be seen for the return on property in all years. However, for the return on 
other assets those firms which have significantly larger exposure to this asset class i. e. 
those firms in Q4 apply the highest expected rate of return for these assets. 
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3.7 Summary 
The descriptive statistics teH us a number of things about the pension schemes that are 
in operation in the FTSE 350. First the magnitude of the pension promise varies 
significantly from firm to firm. This 'v,, as highlighted with the banking example above. 
Second there is no clear relationship between firm performance and the pension 
promise. Although for those firms which have the largest market capitalisation a picture 
has emerged. 
Large firms are more hkely to have much more significant pension habihties. 
This follows expectations as the biggest firms will have a much larger number of 
employees to whom pensions have been promised. As a result they will haN, e more 
assets with which to meet these bahilities. Further, those companies that were formaUy 
nationalised industries such as BA, BP and BT have extremely large pension liabilities as 
they have significant numbers of current, deferred and retired members. 
The next chapter is the second empirical chapter of the thesis. Chapter 4 
analyses the way in which managers account for the pension scheme of the company. I 
ask two main questions. First, how has the new fair value accounting standard been 
implemented in practice? Second, are the accounting amounts that are disclosed in the 
annual report value relevant? 
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4 
FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING AND 
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter 1 analyse the extent to which managers exercise discretion , vhen applying 
fair value accounting and the value relevance of these disclosures. Proponents of fair 
value accounting argue that historical cost obscures the true underlying economic 
position of the firm, whilst critics believe that the transitory nature of fair value injects 
unnecessary volatility in to financial reports. 
Prior research has shown that market participants are unable to reach a 
consensus on information presented in annual reports, particularly %vhen it is complex 
(Hirst (1998)). Similarly, pension accounting under fair value has considerable potential 
to remain opaque and problematic for users of financial accounts. There are two main 
reasons for this. First, pension accounting is, by its verN, nature, complex. Anv 
assessment of the liabilities in a pension scheme requires detailed mortality calculations 
and forecasts on future macroeconomic conditions. Second, fair value accounfing 
for 
pensions gives considerable discretion to management. The accounting assumptions C 
used in the assessment of pension valuation are ultimately decided upon 
bý- management, 
under the guidance of the firm's actuary, and overseen by the auditor. 
They are 
potentially open to manipulation within broad confidence intervals. If there is 
large, 
and un,, N-arranted, variation in pension assumptions across firms, fair value accounting 
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fails in one of its key goals, namely the provision of transparent, consistent and 
accessible financial statements. 
Recent work on pension accounting has focused on the value and credit 
relevance of fair value footnote disclosures under U. S. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards 87 (SFAS-87) (Hann, Heflin and Subramanyan (2007)). They 
found that fair value footnote disclosures c[id not improve the information quality of 
financial reports above SFAS-87 disclosures. However, they -ý,, cere unable to assess how 
management implement fair value when there needs to be full recognition in the balance 
sheet. 
The ongoing debate in the U. S. about the appropriateness of introduction of fair 
value accounting for pensions is one of the key issues for future accounting standard 
development. A number of researchers ha\-e tried to assess the potential impact of such 
a move (Hann, Heflin and Subramanyam (2007)). However, the U. S. has ý-et to fulIN- 
adopt a system that is equivalent to IAS-19, although it has recently moved closer with 
the introduction of FAS-158. Analysing FAS-158, Grant, Grant and Ortega (2007) 
reported that the setting of aggressive assumptions still exists, although almost all the 
fair value disclosure still only appears in the footnotes to accounts. 
The U. K. introduced fair value pension accounting in 2001 with Financial 
Reporting Standard 17 (FRS-17). It therefore presents a unique opportunity to analyse 
how fair value pension accounting has been implemented in practice. 
This setting is 
important for two reasons. First, to my knowledge it is the largest available sample of 
fair value pension accounting disclosures in existence. 
Second, a longer time period 
allows for an analysis under changing economic circumstances, such as changes in 
bond 
\, iclds and falling equity values, which have a significant impact upon the value and risk 
of pension schemes. 
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I make four main contributions to the literature. First, I document the variation 
in assumptions that management apply when accounting for pensions under fair value. 
One of the fundamental reasons for adopting fair value is to make the information in 
financial accounts consistent and representative across firms. (ASB (2001)). If there is 
significant variation in accounting assumptions across firms, this calls into question the 
underlying motivation for adopting fair value. 
My second contribution is to analyse the impact of auditor and actuatý- on 
managerial discretion. I investigate whether the variation in assumptions across firms 
can be attributed to either of these external groups. Although accounting and auditing 
firms are likely to have similar technologies, there is scope for different firms to have 
different 'house views' on particular assumptions. This would be reflected in variations 
in pension accounting assumptions across companies that can be explained by their 
choice of audit or actuarial firm. Conversely, if there is considerable variation in the 
assumptions used across the clients of a particular auditor and/or actuary (i. e. no 
consistent house view), this could suggest that actuaries and auditors are influenced in 
the assumption process by commercial considerations and potential conflicts of interest. 
I then consider the determinants of both managerial choice and conservatism in 
i en by a accounting for pensions. The assumptions that management adopt may be driv 
number of scheme-based and/or firm characteristics. Prior research has found strong 
links between the percentage of pension assets held in equity, the expected return on 
plan assets and corporate events (Bergstresser et al. (2006)). My analysis examines the 
determinants of assumption choice in accounting for pensions, as weU as, for the first 
time, the determinants of managerial consen-atism under fair value. 
Nl\, final contribution is to analyse both the value relevance of the assumptions 
that are used to arrive at the accounting amounts as , vell as the 
fair value disclosures 
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presented in the annual report. Prior research on pension disclosures in the US has 
considered the value relevance of these factors under SFAS-87 (Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman (1993)). The results showed that the amounts that were disclosed in the 
annual report were reflected in the market valuation of the firm. I therefore test 
whether fair value disclosures have any value relevance i. e. do they impact upon firm 
value. 
My results are as follows. I document that the difference in underlying pension 
assumptions across firms is substantial. There are sound economic reasons why 
discount rates and expected rates of return on particular asset classes should be similar 
across firms, but this is not what 1 observe in MýT sample. The differences are not related 
to the identity of the firm's actuary or auditor, suggesting differing 'house views' 
amongst advisers is not the explanation. 
I also find that management have x-ery different objectives depending on the 
solvency of the pension scheme. Companies with the greatest level of funding (i. e. the 
ratio of pension assets to pension liabilities) have the highest discount rates and 
discount rate spread assumptions. I also find that firms with large pension scheme 
deficits relative to the size of the firm tend to choose higher equity return and equity 
return spread assumptions. In this case, management appear to choose assumptions that 
maximise the level of reported financial income that can be derived from pension 
scheme assets. 
FinalIv I show that the assumptions underlying the pension calculation are value 
relevant. Further I shov., that the amounts presented in the annual report impact upon 
the market value of the firm. Pension funding levels, liabilities and asset class all effect 
the value of the firm. The market therefore views both the assets and 
habihties of the 
pension scheme as the assets and hablhties of the firm. This is consistent N-,, Ith the 
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corporate finance view of pensions. Fair value disclosures therefore impact upon the 
value of the firm. 
In the next section, FRS-17 is described in detail. In section 4.3,1 develop the 
motivation and hypotheses that are tested in the chapter. Section 4.4 presents the data 
and methodology. Section 4.5 discusses the empirical results and Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Financial Reporting Standard 17 
The introduction of FRS-17 in the UK has fundamentaHy changed how firms account 
for defined benefit pension schemes. Until 2001, pension accounting was governed by 
the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 24 (SSAP-24). This standard was Nvidely 
criticised as not providing useful or comparable disclosure of the underlying risks of 
company pension schemes 45 . One of the major criticisms was that the 
Standard 
afforded management too much latitude in how they accounted for pensions. 
After a wide consultation, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issued FRS-17, 
which applied to all companies reporting financial statements after June, 2001. FRS-17 
was a watershed in accounting for pensions in the UK. For the first time, firms had to 
apply fair value in accounting for their pensions within a much more rigorous 
framework than under any previous standard. 
The framework for FRS-17 can be split into two broad categories: 
methodological and information disclosure. Unlike previous standards, which allowed 
the actuary and/or management to select the actuarial method of liability calculation, -" 
FRS-17 specifies that liabilities must be calculated using the projected unit method. 
'- 
45 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and \X, 'ales (ICAEV-). 
46 SS, W-24 paragraph 1 S. 
4- FRS-17 paragraph 20. 
F<)GR 
4 
FAIR ACCOt"N'TINGAND Nfy\N,, \GERI,, \I, DISCRETION 115 
This is an accrued benefits valuation model, which takes account of the rights to 
benefits earned by scheme members up to the valuation point, allowing for future 
increases in the level of pensionable salaries and the value of pensions in payment. 
The standard also sets out the appropriate discount rate that must be applied 
when calculating the present value of the pension habihtý,, where the discount rate must 
reflect both the time value of money and duration of the pension bability. The ASB 
states that the yield on a high quality (AA-rated) bond of equiValent duration to the 
pension liabilities is the appropriate benchmark. This rate should reflect both the time 
value of money and a small premium for the risk of the scheme. 48 
The second focus of the standard is on information disclosure, which is broken 
down into four categories: valuation assumptions, asset return assumptions, pension 
costs, and recognition. The required valuation assumptions are the rate of inflation, 
wage growth, pension growth and the discount rate. The pension scheme assets are 
recorded at fair (market) value and their valuation does not require actuarial 
assumptions. The disclosure of the fair value of pension assets is split into four broad 
asset classes: equities, bonds, property and 'other'. 'Other' assets are generally cash and 
annuities, although some firms also hold insurance contracts or small exposures to 
managed funds. The company must also disclose the expected rate of return on the 
various asset classes. While the expected rates of return assumptions do no affect the 
stated asset values, theN, do affect the amount of pension income credited to the profit 
and loss account. 
In addition to the different assumptions, a detailed disclosure of the costs of the 
defined benefit scheme is provided. FRS-17 requires that the current sen'ice cost, past 
service cost, actuarial gains and losses (including the 
difference between the actual and 
48 FRS-17 paragraphs -')2-')3. 
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expected return on scheme assets), and anv historical adjustments to pension costs as a 
result of changes in the level of benefit provision are disclosed. 
The final disclosure is the difference between the assets and the liabilities of the 
scheme on the balance sheet of the firm. Where the fair value of assets exceeds the 
present value of the pension habiht\ý, the scheme is declared to be in surplus and a net 
asset should appear on the balance sheet. Converseh-, where the value of scheme assets 
are less than the present value of the pension liability, a net liability will appear on the 
balance sheet. 
To mitigate the impact of applying market values, the standard separates the 
normal pension cost and valuation impacts. In so doing, the volatility of market values 
is lessened as there is a normal pension cost charge against the profit and loss, and aný 
variations that occur year-on-year are included in the Statement of Total Recognised 
Gains and Loses (STRGL) and taken directly to reserves. Any changes, therefore, in 
market values, demographics and other basis measurements are accounted for in the 
STRGL rather than on the face of the profit and loss account. In doing so, the ASB 
ensures there is a predictable pension charge and that the balance sheet reflects the 
employer's liability, while at the same time accounting for the true liability of a scheme 
based upon market values. 
4.2.1 Pension Accounting under FRS- 17: An example. 
Two stylized examples are presented to illustrate the interactions between different 
pension components and how management can manipulate the assumptions to impact 
upon the size of the hablbtý, faced by the firm and the income it can 
derive from the 
pension scheme assets. 
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4.2. /. 1 Liabilio A lanipulations 
Pension babilities increase year on year due to Increases In employee wages, changes to 
the benefits provided and projections of future mortality and interest rates. If I assume 
that the present value of this payment is , r500M4' based upon a discount rate that is 
taken from the prevailing AA bond yield (for the example I will assume a rate of 5%). 
The management of the firm may choose to apply a higher discount rate and so the 
increase in the present value of the liability will be less. Consequently, the change in the 
liability from one year to the next will be underestimated in the annual report. 
Through the application of an 'actuarial rule of thumb' Bozewicz (2004) 
highlights the impact of small changes to the chosen discount rate and the present value 
51 
of the pension babifity. Where , 
Nev Liabilio = (Old Liabilio) *(1.06") 
From this, if 1 assume an increase in the discount rate 5.00% to 5.50% then 
New Liabilio = (k500m) *(l. 06(4)*(0-005)) = k445m 
The 0.5% change in the discount rate has therefore reduced the present value of the 
pension hablhty by 12%. 
The above example highlights a number of key features of changing the discount rate 
for pension liabilities. First, it is clear that the size of the liability is functionally related 
to the size of the discount rate and so ceten*sparibus a higher discount rate will reduce the 
49 Although we only focus on wage growth, the increase of the pension Liability will 
be a 
function of pension growth, inflation wage growth and changes to the level of 
benefits provided. 
The assumed increase in wages howeN-er, is by far the biggest 
driver of increases in the liability 
owed by the firm. 
5() Ili the Di'scowil Rate). In the formula that is presented by Bozewicz 
(2004) 1.06 is a constant and -4A=(4)*(Iii, -I-e)(ist, 
I(Dect-e(zse) In the Discount Rate). 
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pension liability of the firm. Second, the magnitude of the pension liabilitv is ven, 
sensitive to small changes in the discount rate. As such management have considerable 
scope for understating the liability of the firm. 
4.2.1.2 Projit and Loss Manipulations 
Firms also have considerable scope to manipulate the pension assets for crediting the 
profit and loss account under other financial income. I now assume that a firm pension 
is 100% invested in equity with a babifity of klOOm and assets of k8Om, thus having a 
, 
f20m deficit. Further, the discount rate is assumed to be 5% and the expected return 
on equity 10%. From one year's unwinding of the scheme, the interest cost wifl be k5m 
(5% discount rate multiplied by the pension liability). The expected return on plan 
assets in the same year will be T8m (from the 10% return on the k80m of plan assets). 
In reconciling this to the profit and loss statement, there would be an interest charge of 
(k5m) and a financial income credit of C8m. The profit and loss will therefore be 
credited with a net income of k3m. Consequently where the difference between the 
discount rate and the expected return on plan assets is higher then firms can credit the 
profit and loss with more income from the pension assets. 
4.3 Motivation and Hypotheses 
In the U. S., FAS-87 has come under increasing criticism and pressure from regulators 
and industry amid calls for a move towards fair value pension accounting. The CFA 
Institute has stated that the FAS-87 method of accounting "imposes a huge and costly 
burden" on the users of financial accounts. The U. S. Senate Finance Committee has 
also threatened legislation that would remove the complex smoothing mechanism of 
actuarial gains and losses under FAS-87. 
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In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concluded that balance 
sheets are "often not transparent as to the true funded status of pension plans"5' leading 
to calls that pension accounting should be reformed by the FASB. In response, the 
FASB proposed a two-stage process to reform pension accounting, the first part of 
which was the introduction of FAS-158. Phase one came into effect for fiscal ve-ar ends 
after December 15,2006. Phase two is preclicted to be much more significant and wide 
ran ing. One of the most controversial aspects of this second phase may be the 91 
removal of the FAS-87 smoothing mechanism altogether (Hann et al. (2007)). 
Underpinning the proposed solution is the notion that fair value accounting xN-111 
improve the reporting quahty of financial accounts. If this is true, it is to be expected 
that profit and loss statements will become more meaningful, transparent and 
comparable. However, the perceived benefits of fair value in theory and its application 
in practice maý' differ considerably. I therefore firstly look at whether the assumptions 
underlYing the calculation of the different pension components are consistent across 
firms 52 
. Where this is so, the application of 
fair value would address some of the 
concerns about current methods of pension accounting. This leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
HI: The cboice ofpension accounting assumptions by manqgement i's consistent acrossfirms. 
Another facet of consistency in reporting is the relationship that different 
advisors and/or external bodies have with the firm. Firms employ actuaries to give 
advice on their scheme and auditors to provide an objecti\-e assessment of the quahty of 
51 SEC (2005). 
ý2 The use of the word consistent is with respect to the average case. 
If an firms adopted the 
standard without exercising selectivity in the choice of assumption used then on average there 
would be no statistically significant difference 
between the expected value of a given assumption 
and the average assumption. 
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their financial reports. It is possible that any patterns observed in the cross-section of 
assumptions are a function of who advises the firm, since different advisors maN- hold 
'house views' on the various assumptions. Similarh,, the auditor may hold a'housc 
on what assumptions are acceptable and represent a fair and true view of a firm's 
pension babihty. 
H2a: The pension accounfiq assumptions of afirm are not related to the identity of thefirm's acmaq. 
H2b: Tbepension accounh .n ,g assumptions of afirm are not related 
to the identio of tbefirm's auditor. 
Despite the intention for FRS-17 to provide a more prescriptiN-c basis of 
pension accounting, management still have considerable latitude in the underlying 
assumptions that are applied. Bergstresser et al. (2006) focus on the sensitivity of firm 
earnings to the expected return on pension plan assets. Their results show that where a 
firm's income is sensitive to the expected return on pension assets, for example where 
pension assets are large relative to firm size, management are more likely to choose 
higher expected return assumptions. They also find that the adoption of such favourable 
assumptions is Enked to corporate events such as takeovers, and to the exercise of share 
options by management. 
1n my sample, equity accounts for the vast majority of pension assets. Despite 
the tax advantages of holding large amounts of bonds in pension assets, (Black (1980) 
and Tepper (1981)) the average pension portfolio in 2001 in my sample consisted of 
70% equity, 25% bonds and 5% other assets. The high allocation to equity 
has 
implications for the potential for management to manipulate earnings -, -Ia the 
assumptions for expected returns on pension scheme assets. 
The expected return on 
equity is arguably the most subjective of all the pension accounting assumptions. 
Consequently, if management xvish to boost reported income from the pension assets 
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then they would hold larger amounts of equity in the pension portfolio and use a high 
expected return figure for those assets. 
H3: Tbe e4ected return on equio assum ption is not related to thepropoi7ýon of equily in the pension 
assets 
In the U. S. there has been little scope for management to select a favourable 
pension discount rate because since 1993 the discount rate has been based upon 
Moody's Aa interest rate index. " As a result, previous studies have not considered the 
determinants of the choice of discount rate. However, recent legislation, passed in 2004, 
allows firms to apply the y1eld on a portfolio of long-dated corporate bonds as the 
discount rate for the pension liability. 1n doing so, there is greater potential for 
selectiVity in the discount rate of the firm in the future. 
The example in section one higWights how sensitive the pension liability is to 
smafl changes in the discount rate. Under FRS-17, management have greater discretion 
over the discount rate. From this, a number of insights can be gained into the 
behaviour of management in exercising this discretion. There may be a number of 
motivations that determine how management beha%, e in this situation. Consequently, I 
derive a number of competing hypotheses to test which factors influence management's 
choice of discount rate. 
The first hypothesis is the null that there is no relationship between the chosen 
discount rate and pension scheme characteristics. If this is the case, it implies that 
management are applYing fair -value accounting in the spirit of the standard. Under 
FRS-17 the required discount rate is the yield on a AA-rated corporate bond of 
ý' In 1993, the SEC's Chief Accountant ruled that this was the appropriate discount rate 
for 
calculating the present value of a firm's pension 
liabdltA,. 
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equivalent duration to the pension Eabihties, which maN, be a sufficienth- prescnptl\-e 
requirement to limit the exercise of management discretion. 
H4a: There is no relationsho between the choice of discount rate andpension scheme characteristics. 
However, there are also a number of other potential outcomes. First, the firm 
would be perceived to be bearing significant risk when the pension liabilitý- is large 
relative to the size of the firm. In response, management may elect to apply a 
Iiigher/lower discount rate than other firms to reduce the perceived risk of the firm. 
pensio ýibdily select the largest discount rate H4b: Tbosefirms witb the largest 'nb, 
Conversely it could also be that the management of the firm choose to adopt a 
higher discount rate in circumstances where the pension liability is small relative to the 
firm. Over time, management may therefore systematically understate the habibty of the 
scheme so that it does not increase the perceived risk of the firm. 
H4c. - Tbosefirms witb the smallestpension liabilio select the largest discount rate 
Last, management may be concerned with the level of funding in the pension 
scheme. The funding level of a pension scheme (pension assets divided by pension 
liabilities) is the figure that is regularly quoted in the financial press. Although this is 
unrelated to the size of the firm, it is a significant variable since it measures the solvency 
of the pension scheme. Scheme funding is a function of both the increases in the 
pension liability and the fair value of the assets held to meet the pension liability. Where 
there are large fluctuations in asset values, a scheme will appear to 
have a volatile 
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funding level". Management may therefore choose to apply a higher discount in this 
situation to present a 'stable' funding ratio in the annual report. 
H4d. - The choice of discount rate is determined hy the solveng of thepension scheme 
My analysis is also introduces a methodological refinement. Prior studies have 
considered the absolute level of pension accounting assumptions that are presented in 
the annual report. However, as the example in section one illustrated, the true impact of 
the pension scheme on the profit and loss account or balance sheet comes not from the 
absolute value of assumptions such as the expected return on equitý, or the discount rate, 
but from the relationships between them. 1n particular, the valuation of the pension 
liability on the balance sheet is affected by the spread between the discount rate and 
assumed future wage growth and pension growth, while the pension income or expense 
on the profit and loss account is affected by the spread between the expected return on 
scheme assets and the discount rate. 
lf managers attempt to miMmise the pension hability or boost the reported 
income from the pension scheme, the difference between these assumed values for 
these variables becomes important. A high spread between the discount rate and future 
wage growth will reduce the pension liability, other things being equal, and a high spread C) C) 
between the assumed return on equity and the discount rate will boost reported financial 
income from the pension scheme. From these spread variables, I proxy managerial 
conservatism. If assumption spreads are large, management are not applýing prudent 
assumptions in accounting for their pension schemes. If I observe considerable 
variation in managerial conservatism this will undermine the usefulness of 
fa-ir value 
I ion of the firm will be obscured. accounting since the economic reahty of the true posit 
54This is more likely to be the case where equity is the dominant asset in the pension portfoho. 
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As this is the first analysis to consider managerial conservatism, I have a number of 
competing hypotheses that foHow the motivations for the choice of discount rate, as 
differing levels of conservatism would be driven by similar factors. 
H5a: There i's no relationship between balance sheet conservatism andpensiOn scheme chai-actea'Sfics 
H5b: Firms with the lar *On kabilio select the largest discount rate spread gestpenSI 
H5c. - Firms Y)ith the smallestpensiOn liabilio select the largest discount rate spread 
H5d. - The choice of discount rate s, of the pensiOn schelve pread i's determined ýy the sobvicl, 
Management may also opt to deriVe financial income from the pension assets. 
The spread between the expected return on assets and the discount rate therefore 
measures the 'true' manipulation that occurs. When the spread is large, the firm incurs a 
low interest charge from appl ing a low discount rate thereby increasing the return Yi 
generated from plan assets that can be credited to the profit and loss account. 5' As 
noted above, when the equity component of pension assets is large, management have 
the greatest potential to derive income from the pension scheme in tl-ýs way. 
H6: There i's no relationshiP between manqgen*a1prq/it and loss conservatism and the value of the 
pension scheme assets. 
Although fair value accounting provides considerable scope for manipulating 
the pension assets and habilities such actions are only beneficial if they have a tan ible 91 
effect on the market value of the firm. I firstly test the relationship between the 
discount rate, the expected return on equity, my discount rate spread variable and my 
equity spread variable. I test the discount rate and the expected return on equitý 
variables individuafly as they are two of the most important variables in arriving at the 
55 It Is also possible that firms will apply a comparable discount rate in their assumptions and 
then select a much higher expected return on equity to ensure a large spread. 
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pension liability and the return on the plan assets. A high discount rate, all other things 
being equal, will reduce the pension liability thereby increasing the market value of the 
firm as the pension scheme funding appears to be higher. Conversely, a high expected 
return on equity, all other things being equal, will increase the other financial income 
component on the income statement of the firm. 
H7a: The market value of equio is unrelated to the discount rate of thepension liabibly 
H7b: The e, %pected return on equio assumption does not affect the e. %pected return on equio,. 
As noted above the interactions between different assumptions ha\, e a much 
more significant bearing on the accounting amounts that are disclosed. 1 therefore test 
the value relevance of my spread variables. The discount rate spread could have 
effects. First, given that a higher spread reduces the present value of the pension 
bability then this may increase the market value of the firm as the pension scheme 
appears to be more solvent. However, in employing a large spread variable a higher 
interest cost will be incurred and thýs could potentially reduce the market value of the 
firm. 
H8: The market value of equio is unrelated to the magnitude of the discount rate ýpread 
Again for mangers to be able to credit the profit and loss With other financial 
income the more important variable is the interaction between the expected return on 
equity and the discount rate. Higher spreads will result in a larger credit to the profit 
and loss. If this holds then larger spreads should result in significantly higher market 
values. 
H9: The market rable of equio I'S unrelated to the sl'ýy of the eqiiiý, retum spread 
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Another important part of the extant literature on pension accounting is the 
value relevance of the actual accounting amount reported in the annual report. Barth el 
al (1993) and Weidman and Weir (2004) analyse the value relevance of pension 
disclosures. Pension amounts are reflected in the market value of the firm. Ho,, x, eN-er, 
the extent to which the values are reflected is dependant upon the legal regime in which 
the firm operates. Barth et al (1993) show that both the assets and hablhties of the 
scheme are reflected in the market value of the firm for a sample of US firms. 
Weidman and Weir (2004) for a sample of Canadian companies, show that the market 
value of firms only reflects the liabilities of the scheme and so anýý surplus assets do not 
add to the market value of the firm. This occurs as Canadian law stipulates that any 
surplus assets are the property of the pension holders and the not the firm. 
I therefore analyse the value relevance of the accounting amounts that are 
presented in the annual report. This is important for two reasons. First, if fair value 
disclosures improve the quality of financial reporting then the amounts presented in the 
annual report should relate to the value of the firm. Second, if managers are 
manipulating they must expect that this impacts on the value of the firm. 
HIO: The accounting amounts presented in the annual report do not affect the market value o equiý, - f 
4.4 Data and Methodology 
My analysis employs two main data sources. Individual firm pension accounting 
data is 
collected from FRS-17 disclosures in the financial reports of sample companies. 
For all 
other data I use Worldscope. From the FRS-17 disclosures, I collected the value of 
pension assets and liabilities, the value of the individual asset classes, the expected return 
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assumptions and the valuation assumptions. From Worldscope, 1 collected the ý-ear-encl 
firm market value, total assets, total debt, and the book value of equity. 
My sample comprises companies from the FTSE 350 between June 2001 and 
June 2004. The index is made up of the largest 350 corporations in the UK and is 
rebalanced quarterly. I include all companies that appear in the index over this time, 
which amounts to a total of 392 firms. 
From the FTSE 350 universe I exclude 44 investment trusts (listed closed end 
investment funds). For defined contribution schemes there is no balance sheet effect 
(Cooper et al (2001)). Consequently I exclude 62 companies that only provide defined 
contribution schemes to employees. Finally, I drop 2 firms that do not proVide any 
retirement benefits for employees. In addition, over the sample period a number of 
firms merged or de-listed. My final sample ranges from 206 to 232 comparues in each 
year giving a total of 876 firm years. 
A number of different variables are created to characterize the pension scheme. 
I construct two variables that proxy for scheme size through scaling the total pension 
liability by firm total assets and by firm market value. The solvency of the pension 
scheme is defined in several ways. First, I calculate the absolute solvenq, of the scheme 
by considering total pension assets and pension liabilities. Where pension assets are 
greater than/Oess than) the pension hablht-v, the scheme is in surplus/ (deficit). 
The 
gross surplus/ (deficit) is scaled by firm both market value and firm total assets. 
In 
addition, I calculate the funding ratio of the scheme - the ratio of plan assets to plan 
liabibties. 
in mv analysis on expected returns I only consider the equity component of plan 
assets. This decision is based upon the work of Bergstresser 
(2006) who finds that the 
expected return on plan assets and the equity component of the pension assets is 
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significant for deriving financial income from pension assets. This is also intuitive due 
to the composition of pension assets in UK pension schemes". It foHows, therefore, 
that if management are going to attempt to derive a large amount of reported financial 
income by manipulating expected return assumptions, the equity component is the most 
sigMficant as it is the largest asset in the portfolio. Further, it will also afford 
management the greatest latitude in choosing a high expected rate of return. I therefore 
characterize scheme assets by calculating the equity percentage of scheme assets. 
In addition, all pension assumptions are standardized to a vear-on-vear level to 
remove any biases that may occur due to time-varying factors such as changes in the AA 
bond yield from year to year. For each assumption I calculate-, 
Assumptioni, - p, 
StandardError- 
it 
4.4.1 Desctipfive Statistics 
Table 4-1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample companies in year one. 
The final column in the table presents the difference between the mean values in year 
one and year four. The first section of the table presents firm characteristics. It can be 
seen that the average market value of firms falls during the sample period, consistent 
with wider market experience during this time. Further, I observe an increase in 
leverage as the mean total debt of firms in the sample grows. 
ý', U. S. pension schemes are of a simi-lar composition to UN, schemes and on average 
hold large 
amounts of equin'. 
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From Table 4-1, it is clear that a number of firms had significant pension 
exposures both in terms of the magn-itude of the pension liability and from the level of 
funding in the scheme. In 2001 the median pension habil-ity , vas 1, % of total assets. 
This, in itself, is large and British Telecom, 5' for example, illustrates the magnitude of 
the problem faced by some firms. Their ratio of pension liability to total assets was 
111 % with a 70% funding ratio. The size of this scheme babiEty was also substantial at 
approximately T30bn in 2001. 
The mean funding level (pension assets / pension liabilities) in 2001 x,, -as 97% 
with a median of 94%. As with the size of the pension liability, the minimum funding 
level is significantly different from the average at 61%. To put this into context, the 
surplus to total assets serves as a more useful illustration of the problem. Where a 
scheme is 61% funded it appears to be at risk, however, it is only at risk when the 
shortfall in assets is large relative to the firm. In looking at the surplus to total assets, on 
average, pension deficits were 1.00% of firm total assets. However, by 2004 the mean 
had increased to 5.00% of total assets. From this it is clear that under fair value the 
pension exposures of UK firms are substantial. 
An analysis of the range of assumptions gives some insight into managerial 
conservatism in pension accounting. For the discount rate the median rate was 6.00%. 
The range was 1.75%, with a minimum of 5.50% and a maximum of 7.25%. It should 
be noted that the inter-quartile range is only 20 basis points, which suggests firms tend 
to select the discount rate in a broadly similar way. However, It is more important to 
focus on the spread between the discount rate and wage growth, ,,. +ých has a more 
direct impact on the reported pension habibty. Here, the range (from 0.20"", to i. 250, o) 
and the inter-quartile range (50 basis points) are larger than the comparable 
figures for 
j7 A former government o,,,,, ned utihty. 
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discount rate alone. The wide range of the spread means that individual firms assign 
quite different present value (liability) figures to the pension obligation to employees 
with equivalent current salary and tenure. 
As highlighted by Bergstresser et al (2006), the return assumptions applied by 
management are highly subjective. In looking at the composition of the equity held in 
these pension funds it is reasonable to assume that they hold broadly diversified 
portfolios that can be considered to reflect the market portfolio. 5' As a result, I would 
not expect to see much variation in the expected return on equity assumption across 
firms. From the table it can be seen that the median equity return assumption is 7.25% 
and the mean is 7.69%. The magnitude of the range however, is substantial from 6.12% 
to 9.00%. As before, the more direct impact on the financial statements comes from a 
spread between two variables, rather than from the return variable itself. If I look at the 
spread between the equity return assumption and the discount rate, I find a similar range 
and inter-quartile range as for the equity return assumption alone. 
4.5 Results 
In this section, I explicitly test the hypotheses developed in the chapter. Section 4.5.1 
discusses firm-level variation in pension assumptions. Section 4.5.2 exarrunes the role 
of the auditor and actuary in assumption formation and Section 4.5.3 analyses the 
relationship between firm and pension scheme characteristics and the stated 
assumptions across auditors and actuaries. Lastly, in section 4.5.4 1 analyse the 
determinants of managerial choice and conservatism across firms. 
ith actuaries and fund managers about ýS This information comes from private correspondence wl I 
the composition of assets in defined benefit pension schemes of large UK corporations. 
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4.3.1 Van'ation in Assum ptions across Firms 
My first hypothesis relates to the consistency of pension assumptions that are chosen. 
Where fair value is adopted consistently by management across firms, there will be little 
variation in the underlying pension assumptions and these will centre on the mean 
economic fundamentals on which the assumptions are based. The variation I see across 
assumptions is considerable. 
The results in Table 4-1 show that firms select discount rates in a broadly similar 
way. Although, as noted above, this may be due to the restrictions (AA bond yield) 
placed on firms with respect to this variable. However, the discount rate although 
important, is much more significant when it interacts with other assumptions for 
manipulating the profit and loss and/or balance sheet. 
1n looking at both the equity return spread and the discount rate spread I find 
that the inter-quartile ranges are large. The potential implication of this variation is that 
if firms are choosing unwarrantedly high discount rates (or discount rate spreads), they 
will be understating the level of their pension liabilities, and if they are choosing 
unwarrantedly high equity return assumptions (or equity return spreads) they wiU be 
overstating the financial income floWing from the pension scheme. 
Table 4-2 presents results from inference tests on the difference between the 
stated assumptions that are used to impute pension valuations and expected 
assumptions based on the economic fundamentals. To arrive at these priors I select the 
average yield on a AA bond over the sample period. For wage growth I calculate the 
average wage growth for the private sector in the UK oN-cr the sample period". Finally 
60 for the expected return on equity I take the 50 year historical return on UK equities 
ý" Data is taken from the Office for National Statistics. 
6( 1 The 50 year historical average is taken from Barclays Capital Equity Gilt Study 2007. 
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The choice of the 50 year historical average may be at first glance and arbitrary choice. 
However, Within the actuarial communin, there is no hard and fast rule as to xý-hat a 
suitable expected return on equity is, and there is still a considerable level of debate 
surrounding this (and other) assumptions. With respect to the choice of the 50 year 
historical return it is the case, therefore, that this is one of many plausible expected rates 
of return. Management however have scope to apply an assumption N-6thin an accepted 
range based on differing expectations of the underlying economic fundamentals. 
Table 4-2 Sign Test for Distribution of Assumptions across 
Firms 
Table 4-2 presents a pooled firm level cross-sectional analysis of the different pension assumptions. I 
analyse whether the mean assumption adopted is significantly different from expected values. The table 
presents the mean assumption across all firms, the median, the average expected value, and the t- 
, taLISUC for the associated sign-test. Nly expected values are the median AA bond yield for the discount 
rate, average Nvage growth for the UK, and the historical average return on equity. 
Mean Median Expected Value T-Stat 
Discount Rate 5.60 5.50 5.48 20.80* 
Wage Growth 4.03 4.00 3.70 10.33* 
Expected Return on Equity 7.70 7.80 7.10 17.48* 
Discount Rate Spread 1.55 1.50 1.78 -8.70-* 
Equity Return Spread 2.11 2.20 1.62 25.24* 
If assumptions are unbiased, the mean stated assumption should on average be 
equal to my expected economic fundamental. lt is clear from Table 4-2 that pension 
assumptions are systematicaBy different from expectations. For each assumption, there 
are statistically significant differences between the expected value and the mean value 
that is used in the financial accounts. When considered jointly, the observed variation, 
and the differences between expected values and actual values, raises serious questions 
about the implementation of fair value in practice, since management are clearly 
exercising a high degree of selectivity in arriving at their chosen assumptions. I can 
therefore reject my null hýpothesis that the choice of assumption is consistent and 
unbiased across firms. 
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4.5.2 AnajlSI*S of the Role of Auditors andActuan*es in Assumption 
Setting 
If individual firms of actuaries have 'house -ý,, iews' on the key pension accounting 
assumptions, disclosed assumptions may vary across firms because of which actuarial 
firm they use. If disclosed assumptions vary widely across the clients of a particular 
actuary, this suggests that firms may be exerting influence on their actuaries to get them 
to move away from their house view. A similar analysis applies in each case to firms of 
auditors who are required to sign off accounts as giving a true and fair view. 
Table 4-3 presents the results of inference tests of differences between stated 
assumptions and unbiased historical average economic fundamentals. There is striking 
consistency in the degree to which assumptions deviate from historical averages across 
both auditor and actuary groupings. Within both actuary and auditor groupings, 
Pension accounting assumptions are at the extreme end of the allowable historical 
ranges. 
Taking the discount rate first, the average historical Yield on AA-rated corporate 
bonds was 5.48%. 1rrespective of the auditor or actuary identities, the actual 
assumptions that were used on average were at the higher end of the variation in AA 0-- 
bond yields. Similar results apply to the other four assumptions. Thus, I am able to 
reject my nuH hypotheses that the pension assumptions of actuaries and auditors are 
unbiased. Consequently I can argue that these firms do not hold house viexx's on the 
ýcorrect' assumpfion. 
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4.5.3 Cross-Sectional Determinants of Pension Assumptions 
Nly analysis now considers the determinants of managerial choice and consen-atism in 
adopting fair value accounting. I report the results of linear regressions of assumptions 
on alternative specifications of firm and pension scheme characteristics. All 
specifications include firm-by-year fixed effects and controls for firm size, book-to- 
market and the capital structure of the firm. I do however add an additional proxy for 
funding relative to firm size by scaling the gross surplus/ (deficit) bý, total assets (STA)" 
Assumptiotý, =a+ ß'STA +ß2 Fundingi, + ß'Equitv +ß4 Size + ß'B TMi, + ß'D /Ei, + e, t 
The descriptive analysis showed that there is 1-ittle consistency in the 
assumptions that management adopt when accounting for their pension schemes. The 
previous analysis has also shown that these differences are unrelated to the firm auditor 
or actuary. I therefore analyse the different factors that may influence the choices that 
management make. 
Hypothesis 3 considers the abihty of managers to derive income from the 
pension scheme assets. The work of Bergstresser et al (2006) finds strong results for 
management deriving income from pension assets based upon subjective assumed 
returns, pension portfolio composition and corporate events. Where management 
derive large amounts of financial income to credit the profit and loss then the 
meaningfulness of financial reports is reduced as investors cannot estimate the true 
profitability of the firm. 
Table 4-4, column 1, presents my analysis of the expected return of equity 
assumption. The results on portfolio composition are consistent with the work of 
61 We have only presented a single regression for each assumption. The analysis Nvas carried out 
over a number of different specifications. The analysis of the size of the pension 
habfllt\, 
relative to the firm by market value and total assets was insignificant as was the gross 
s urplus /deficit scaled by market value. 
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Bergstresser et aZ (2006) in that where equity is the largest component of the pension 
portfolio the assumed return on equity is higher. I therefore reject my nuH that 
portfolio composition and expected return assumptions are unrelated. 
Table 4-4 Regression Analysis of Managerial Choice and Conservatism 
Tablc 4-4 presents the results for fixed effects regressions for the determinants of the pension assumptions and managerial 
conservatism. The table presents the regression coefficient and immediately below is the corresponding t-statistic. * indicates 
significant at 99'',,,, ** indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 90%. The dependent variable for each model is 
prc. ýcnted at the head of each column and the independent variables are presented in the far left column. Size is measured by the 
log market value the market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity/book value of equity, debt-to-equity is total debt/market 
value of cquitý,. Surplus to Total Assets is the pension surplus (deficit)/ Total Assets, funding is measured by pension 
assets/pension liabilities and the equity percentage which is calculated as equity/total pension assets. The standardised assumption 
is calculated by (-'] SSIIIIIPIIWIýI - y')ILVIandard Error,,. 
I Equity Return Discount Rate Discount Spread Equity Spread 
Intercept -22.51 -9.28 13.75 -18.48 
(-1.81)*** (-0.47) (1.03) (-1.34) 
Surplus/Total Assets -36.31 6.27 -3.43 -34.30 
(-2.68)* (0.29) (-0.24) (-2.28)** 
Funding 20.10 54.76 20.44 2.77 
(3.39)* (5.83)* (3.23)* (0.42) 
Equity Percentage 17.39 4.80 -2.54 14.42 
(3.27)* (0.56) (-0.44) (2.45)** 
Size -0.31 -5.57 -2.80 1.44 
(-0.23) (-2.53)** (-1.89)*** (0.94) 
Book-to-Market -5.43 -0.53 -4.20 -2.67 
(-2.17)** (-0.13) (-1.55) (-0.96) 
Debt-to-Equity 2.19 -3.01 1.00 2.01 
(1.24) (-1,07) (0.53) (1.03) 
For the discount rate analysis I posited a number of competing hypotheses. Mý 
findings reject my null and support the alternative hypothesis H4d, that firms select the 
discount rate on the basis of scheme solvency. Column 2 of Table 4-4 presents the 
analysis of the discount rate. I find that those firms that have the highest funding ratio 
of pension assets to liabilities are applying higher discount rates. For managers the size 
of the pension habihty relative to the firm is not a significant determinant of the 
discount rate. Further the size of the surplus/deficit is insignificant. This is interesting 
as it suggests that management are concerned only about the perceived solvency of their 
pension scheme. 
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My funding variable is commonly reported in the financial press, and as such 
win impact upon the markets perception of firm risk. Another explanation of my result 
is that well funded schemes may be concerned about transitory fluctuations in the 
solvency of the pension scheme. As a result the selection of a larger discount rate will 
understate the 'true' liability and will reduce the impact of large asset fluctuations. 
In addition to this, I examine the level of managerial conservatism that is apphcd 
in calculating the present value of the pension liability under hypothesis 5. The selection 
of a high discount rate is not sufficient to minimise the pension liability. Nly discount 
rate spread variable proxies for the level of conservatism that management are applying 
in estimating their pension liability. Where the spread is large then management are not 
applYing prudent assumptions. From the descriptive analysis in section 4.1 it is clear 
that cross-sectionafly management are discounting their pension liabilities differently. 
The results in column 3 of Table 4-4 allow us to reject my null hypothesis 5a in favour 
of the alternative hypothesis 5c, wl-ýich is consistent with the selectivity observed in the 
discount rate. I therefore show that the least conservative estimates are used by firms 
that have the highest funding levels. 
This supports the results in column (2) that managers are concerned about 
perceiVed risk of the firm. As a result they choose assumptions that understate the 
liability of the firm. This again supports my assertion that fair value has not improved 
the transparency of balance sheets as management are systematically understating their 
pension habibty. In doing so they are reducing the perceived risk of the firm. 
lt should also be noted however that the magnitude of the pension liability and 
the discount rate are functionally related e. g. smaller pension liabilities are associated 
with a higher discount rate. As a result the level of funding in a scheme would 
be 
expected to be a function of the size of the discount rate. If scheme assets and all 
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liability assumptions, with the exception of the discount rate, are held constant over 
time the funding of the scheme becomes solely a function of the discount rate and so 
the application of a larger discount rate reduces the pension hability and increases 
scheme funding. 
Next I consider the ability of management to derive income from the pension 
assets by employing a large equity spread. In column (1) of Table 4-4 my anah-sis on 
scheme funding and the surplus/ (deficit) to total assets at first appear to be at odds as 
those schemes that have high funding and those schemes that have large deficits relative 
to firm size both adopt higher expected return assumptions. However, , Nýhen the equity 
spread analysis is considered in conjunction with the expected return analysis in column 
1, then the result becomes more intuitive. In the final column of Table 4-4 it can be 
seen that for the spread variable then funding becomes insignificant. 
This is important as 1 find that across management there are two different 
objectives. For those schemes that are weH funded then management are concerned 
about the perceived risk and solvency of the pension scheme. Where they adopt a 
higher discount rate and discount rate spread then they wiH incur a high interest cost. 
To offset this interest cost the management then assume a higher expected return to 
offset the cost. This will mimmise any resulting charge against profits. 
Conversely, where schemes have significant solvency/ funding concerns, the 
management do not elect to manipulate the size of the bability/deficit. Instead thev 
choose to maximise the financial income that can be derived for the profit and loss 
from the assets of the pension scheme. They therefore adopt lower discount rates, 
higher expected returns on equity, thereby maximising the equity return spread. 
i0cla 
4 
FAIR VAI, UEACCIM--ýNTING AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION P, i-,, c 14() 
4.5.4 1 "alue Relevance Regressions of Fair I lalue Accounting .-I mounts 
Table 4-5 presents my %, alue relevance of the disclosed assumptions that are used for 
discounting the pension liability and the expected return on scheme assets. FoHowing a 
similar methodology to Weidman and Weir (2004) 1 regress the market value of equity 
against the different pension assumptions that are applied. 
MarketValu eo)Equity =a+ ß'Assumption + ß'FirmAssets i, + ß'FirmDebts i, + ei, 
Where the market value of equity is balance sheet market \ýalue scaled by 
common equity outstanding, assumption is the pension assumption from the annual 
reports, firm assets and firm debts are the total assets and debts of the firm at the 
balance sheet date scaled by common shares outstanding. From the table 51 can see 
that individuaHy neither the discount rate nor the expected return on equity has a 
signiificant effect on the market value of the firm. I cannot therefore reject my null 
hypotheses 7a and 7b. 
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Table 4-5 Value Relevance Regression Analysis of Pension 
Assumptions 
Table 4-5 presents the results for regressions for the value relevance of the pension assumptions. 
The table presents the regression coefficient and immediately below is the corresponding t- 
staustic. * indicates significant at 99%, '- indicates significance at 951'- and *** indicates 
significance at 90'ý'-,. The dependent variable is presented at the head of each column and the 
independent variables are presented in the far left column, The discount rate and F. quity return 
are taken from the FRS-17 disclosures. Discount rate spread is the difference between the 
discount rate and wage growth. Equity return spread is the difference between the expected 
return ()n equitý, and the discount rate. Firm assets are the total assets of the firm, firm debts is 
the total debts of the firm and market value of equitý (dependant variable) is the balance sheet 
market value of equity all scaled by the number of common shares outstanding at the balance 
sheet date. 
I Market Value of Equity/Ords 
Intercept 4.78 1.13 4.44 2.98 
(1.62) (0.64) (11.12)* (6.29)* 
Discount Rate -0.18 - - 
-(0.34) 
Equity Return 0.34 - 
(1.51) 
Discount Rate Spread -0.41 - 
-(1.73)*** 
Equity Return Spread - - - 0.38 
(1.77)*** 
Firm Assets 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
(4.82)* (4.71)* (4.75)* (4.70)* 
Firm Debts -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
40.82) -(0.73) -(0.80) -(0.72) 
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However, when I consider my spread variables they have a significant impact on 
the value of the firm. The discount rate has a significantly negative relationship with the 
market value of the firm's equity. I can therefore reject my null that the discount rate 
spread does not impact on the value of the firm. Firms that apply higher discount rates 
and lower wage growth i. e. understate the magnitude of the pension liability receive a 
lower market value. This is consistent with such a manipulation being associated xith 
higher interest charges that Will reduce the profitability of the firm. 
Converseh, I find that those firms who apply the highest equity return spread 
have higher market values. This is again consistent with expectations as higher spreads 
are associated -\vIth lower interest costs from one years un-,, -Inding of the pension 
liability 
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and deriving higher levels of income from pension assets. I can therefore reJect my null 
hypothesis 9 that the equity return spread is not value relevant. 
My final set of tests considers the value relevance of the amounts that are 
disclosed in the annual report again following Weidman and Weir (2004) 'vvhere, 
Market Valu eofEquity j, =a+ P'Assets j, +p2 Liabilities, + P'Funding,, + Controlsi, + ej, 
The market value of equity is balance sheet date market value scaled by common 
equity outstanding, assets and liabilities are the pension assets and liabilities scaled by 
common shares outstanding. I also include firm assets and firm debts scaled by 
common shares outstanding as controls. 
From Table 4-6 it can be seen that the pension assets and liabilities, funding 
levels and asset composition all have some value relevance. This is itself an important 
factor in looking at managerial discretion and the application of fair value accounting. 
Managers utilise the discretion that the standard affords them as it has a tangible effect 
on the equity value of the firm. From columns 3 and 4 of table 61 can see that pension 
assets have a positive effect on market value while liabilities have a negative effect and 
so well can reject my nuH. 
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However, from columns 5 and 6 when the funding level in the scheme is 
controlled for, this relationship becomes insign-ificant but funding becomes significant. 
Consistent With Barth et al (1993) and the corporate finance view of pensions funding is 
positively related to the market value of equity and so both the pension assets and 
liabilities of the firm are perceived as belonging to the firm. This is contrary to the 
findings of Weidman and Weir (2004) who find evidence of the labour economics \-iew 
of pension assets and liabilities. 
Finally in column 5 and 61 test asset composition. Bergstresser et al (2006) 
showed that equity affords management the greatest scope for generating financial 
income for the profit and loss. 1f this is the case then higher equity allocations should 
be associated with higher equity market valuations. Consistent With this I find a 
significant and positive relationship between the percentage of pension assets invested 
in equity and the market value of the firm. Interestingly when 1 control for the funding 
level of the scheme I find that the percentage of equity increases in significance and 
pension liabilities become sign-ificant. This is suggestive that asset allocation and 
liabilities have a greater bearing on the market value of the firm as opposed to the 
funding level. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter analyses managerial discretion, value relevance and fair value 
accounting. I consider ,,, ýhether the adoption of fair value will address many of the 
concerns that have been voiced about current methods of pension accounting. Using a 
unique sample of fair value pension disclosures from the new UK fair value pension 
accounting standard FRS-17 I analyse the Nvay in which fa-ir value has 
been adopted by 
firms in practice. First my results show that the variation in the underlying assumptions 
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for the pension scheme across firms is considerable. TI-iis in itself brings into question 
the suitability of fair value as method of accounting for pensions as financial accounts 
will remain opaque where management are not reporting consistently across firms. 
Second I also find that variation in the assumptions that are presented in the 
financial accounts cannot be explained by the use of different audit or actuarial firms. 
This finding also raises questions as to the efficacy of fair value accounting for pensions 
as auditors and actuaries are not appl ing the standard consistently across firms. Yi 
Further it is also clear that these external bodies do not hold 'house vicvvs' on what 
constitutes a reasonable or prudent assumption. 
Tl-ýird 1 consider the determinants of managerial discretion. Nly results show 
that management adopt different assumptions in response to the solvency of the 
pension scheme. Where scheme solvency is high, management choose to apply higher 
discount rates. Further where scheme solvency is high management apply less 
conservative methods of estimating the pension liability. In this case they systematicaUy 
understate the liability. Conversely, where schemes have large deficits relatWe to the 
firm managers choose to derive a larger amount of financial income from the assets in 
the pension scheme. Here management apply the least prudent return assumptions and 
thereby increase the profit of the firm. 
Last I analyse the value relevance of both the assumptions and accounting 
amounts that are disclosed in the annual report. I find that these amounts do impact 
upon the market value of the firm. This is important for two reasons. Pension 
disclosures under the new standard firstly impact upon the value of the firm. However, 
the observed variation in disclosures suggests that the manipulations that are undertaken 
by management will bave a tan ible effect on the value of the firm. 1 
91 
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Bringing all of these results together I find that the case for adopting fair value 
accounting is questionable. Advocates of fair value accounting believe that it NN-111 make 
financial accounts more representative of the true economi iti ic posi 'on of the firm. 
However, my results show that where management have discretion over how the 
standard is applied, financial accounts remain opaque. 
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5 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
TRANSPARENCY: EVIDENCE 
FROM DEFINED BENEFIT 
PENSION SCHEMES 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I analyse whether measures of systematic risk and firm distress reflect 
pension risks, and if managers actively manage these risks. Pension habilities represent a 
very real risk to the ongoing operations of the firm. For many companies the size of the 
pension liability is large relative to both the market value and total assets of the firm. 
Schemes With very low funding levels are likely to attract pressure from employees and 
pension fund trustees. Likewise, pension fund asset allocation can have a significant 
effect on the observed level of funding in a given year. Those pension schemes With 
large equity components will be more sensitive to funding ratio swings as the equity 
markets go up and down. To manage this risk, schemes can move out of volatile assets, 
such as equity, and into bonds to reduce volatility in the funding ratio. 
Rauh (2007) examines risk management and risk shifting in U. S. corporate 
defined benefit pension schemes and found that riskier firms, having higher credit risk, 
are more fikely to invest in low risk debt securities as pension assets. This relationship is 
shown to be present both cross-sectionafly and through time. The desire to hmit 
financial distress is also a particularly strong determinant of asset allocation in defined 
benefit schemes. Although much of the existing empirical evidence supports the 
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presence of risk management, and not asset substitution/ risk sl-ýifdng, earlier -, vork fails 
to address a crucial point. If firms do not receive a concornitant reduction in overall 
firm risk then the necessity or motivation for undertaking pension risk management is 
unclear. 
I make four main contributions to the extant literature on risk transparency and 
risk management. First I analyse whether the market correctly prices pension risk. If 
the market does not correctly incorporate pension risks companies will be mispriced in a 
standard risk-return context. I extend the analysis of jin, Bodie, and Merton (2004) bý 
considering the impact of different types of pension risk. Rather than deriving a beta 
for the total pension exposure I analyse whether funding and scheme size are reflected 
in measures of systematic risk. 1 do this because a large pension scheme is markedly 
different from a poorly funded scheme and so both factors are therefore separate risk 
factors. Further to this 1 consider the relationship between pension asset allocation and 
measures of systematic risk. 
Second, I analyse whether measures of firm-level operational distress reflect the 
risk of the pension scheme. Pension schemes with greater liabilities and volatile risky 
assets are prone to large swings in their net surplus/deficit position. Consequently, 
these risks should be reflected in measures of operating distress 62 . Firms that 
have 
higher levels of operating distress can opt to manage their pension risk by investing 
pension portfolio assets into less volatile securities. I would therefore expect that those 
firms with higher levels of operational distress to invest more pension assets in bonds. 
Higher levels of operating distress within in the firm is characterised by lower levels of 
cash being generated from ongoing projects and investments. Consequently the 
firm is ý71 
less able to provide additional finance to the pension scheme, an investment in bonds 
62 Following Andrade and Kaplan (1998) we measure firm-level operational distress as the return 
on assets. 
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therefore creates a more predictable and stable pension cost and Emits the need to 
provide exceptional finance. 
TI-iird, I analyse the relation between firm financial distress, pension liabilities, 
funding, and asset allocation. I argue that firms With higher levels of financial distress 
are likely to have higher pension liabilities and lower funding levels. Large pension 
liabilities and deficits represent large constraints on the firm as it must fund the scheme 
through cash contributions from the firm and employees. In terms of asset allocation, 
higher levels of financial distress imposes a cash flow risk on firms and risky pension 
assets may exacerbate that risk because of the higher probability of additional funding 
being required in poor market conditions. Bonds provide a more predictable cash flow 
and thus a more predictable pension costs for highly leveraged firms. As a result I 
would expect those firms With higher levels of financial distress to allocate a larger 
percentage of pension assets to bonds. 
Finally, I examine the relationship between firm-level default risk, pension 
liabilities and the level of funding in the pension scheme. If pension liabilities are large 
and funding of the scheme is low, the likelihood of default is higher. A high default 
probability provides a setting whereby risk management and risk shifting incentives are 
strongest (Rauh (2007)). If risk shifting is observed in the pension portfolio then 
managers would allocate larger amounts of pension assets to equity when their firms 
have higher credit risk. Conversely if risk management is undertaken then a higher 
percentage of pension assets would be invested in less risky assets, namely bonds. 
In examining market efficiency I consider the Fama-French 3-factor model 
(1993). From this 1 analyse the relationship bet-,, N-een firm risk, measured by beta and 
pension risk. ? Nly results show that market risk reflects the risk of having a large pension 
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liability and also a poorly funded scheme. This is an important finding as both risk 
factors are reflected by the market risk factor. 
Further, consistent with expectations, for the market beta I find that higher 
betas are associated with greater pension asset risk i. e. where equity is the dormnant 
asset in the portfolio. The market therefore prices the investment risk and the implied 
volatility in the funding level of the pension scheme associated with high levels of equit-V 
investments. For the HML loading factor we do not find a significant relationship 
between HML and pension portfoho risk. However, for the SAM factor , ve find that 
higher loadings on the SMB factor are associated N,,, Ith higher levels of pension portfolio 
risk. 
I then consider the relationship between value and growth risk factors and firm 
and pension risk. Intuitively I would expect these groups to have very different pension 
risk exposures. Value firms are characterised as having large pension exposures since 
they are more mature, while growth firms have lower exposure to pension risks since 
they are relatively smaller. My results show that value firms are exposed to large 
pension liabilities and funding deficits. However, I find that size risk factors increase as 
pension risks fall. However, one possible explanation may be due to migration effects 
(Fama and French (2007)). Over time, successful high-growth companies rrugrate from 
growth to value portfolios. As a firm's exposure to size risk falls, i. e. they become larger, 
then their pension risk exposure increases as they rrugrate towards the value portfolio. 
My results also suggest that measures of operating distress reflect both the size 
and deficit of the pension scheme. Those firms that have higher operating distress are 
therefore more exposed to larger pension liabilities and lower funding ratios. Further, I 
find that firms xith higher levels of operational risk tend to have a larger portion ()t - 
pension assets allocated to bonds. This is consistent with pension risk management. 
In 
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this situation there is a lower probability that the pension scheme will require additional 
financing since the pension assets are more stable. 
I also report that firms with higher financial distress have larger pension 
liabilities relative to market value. This finding also holds for the surplus/deficit 
position of the scheme and so higher financial distress is linked to large pension funding 
deficits relative to market capitalisation. Further, the observed pension asset allocation 
is consistent with risk management and so those firms with higher levels of financial 
distress allocate a greater amount of pension assets to bonds. 
An examination of default probability suggests that the slzc of the pension 
liability relative to the firm is associated with a higher probabihtý, of default. In 
analysing the composition of the pension portfolio however I do not observe any 
relation between probability of default and pension scheme asset allocation. 
In Section 2,1 discuss the various risk management strategies that firms can 
undertake. Section 3 presents the relevant literature and the hypotheses are developed 
in Section 4. Data and Methodology is discussed in Section 5, results are presented in 
Section 6 and I conclude in Section 7. 
5.2 Risk Management Strategies in Defined Benefit Pension 
Schemes 
The adoption of fair value pension accounting in the UK has highlighted the 
risks that defined benefit pension obhgations pose to firms. Management 
have to 
address these risks, since they face considerable pressure from investors, employees and 
pension trustees to ensure the solvency of both the firm and the scheme. Investors are 
naturafly concerned that the scheme will be a drain on the cash flo,,,,, of the 
firm thereby 
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reducing the return on firm investment, while employees and trustees are concerned 
that management will under-fund the scheme, reducing the long-term security of their 
own benefits. 
The most common form of pension scheme risk management is habihty driven 
investment. This is achieved through liability duration matching, where the inN, cstment 
strategy of a scheme is designed to take account of plan-specific characteristics such as 
the composition of the firm's workforce, indusm, type, and sensitivitv of the scheme to 
changes in inflation and interest rates. Most pension portfolio allocation strategies are 
founded on the rationale that equities outperform bonds in the long term and the total 
return on equity meets the future pension liability. This strategy however is not always 
effective. Under fair value accounting, the year-on-year fluctuation in asset values are 
reflected in the reported plan assets, which results in an increase in balance sheet and 
scheme funding volatility. Furthermore, when funding deteriorates, the firm may have 
to proVide additional finance to ensure the solvency of the scheme, with a concomitant 
impact on the income statement. 
Pension liability calculations are very sensitive to changes in both inflation and 
interest rates. Although it is possible to estimate the duration of a scheme's liabilities 
and assets, there is generally a value mismatch because of the long investment horizons 
associated with pension hablEties. Significant mismatches wiH cause asset and bablhty 
movements to differ when changes in interest rates occur. Consequently, the funding 
level of mismatched schemes can deteriorate quite substantially over time if the tracking 
error between plan assets, liabilities and interest rates is large. 
ljabihný driven investment strategies therefore attempt to Increase the duration 
of the pension plan assets. This can be done in a number of -ways, the most common of 
which is a significant increase in long-term bonds Nvithin the pension portfoho. 
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Although increased duration can also be achieved through the use of fixed income 
derivative products, this is unlikely to occur since it introduces counter-parry risks and 
may also put pressure on the liquidity of the scheme and firm at some point in the 
future. 
5.3 Relevant Literature 
3.3.1 Risk Management I ý's Risk Sbffitiq Effects 
There is a substantial bterature that considers whether managers adopt risk management 
or risk shifting strategies. Managers face conflicting incentives to manage risk, 
particularly when their firms are most constrained i. e. high default risk. In this situation, 
firms trade-off the ablEty to undertake new investments (Mayers and Snuth (1987)) with 
the need to ensure hquidity so as to prevent bankruptcy (Smith and Stultz (1985)). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit risk shifting in this situation, whereby, undertaking 
riskier strategies increases shareholder value as firms move towards distress. In this case, 
the risky project, if successful, leads to a much larger pay-off which increases 
shareholder v, alue as opposed to bankruptcy where shareholders experience total loss. 
There is very little empirical research that reports strong e6dence of risk 
shifting in pension funds. Cocco and Volpin (2007) find some evidence in a smaU 
sample of UK firms. However, they focus on the governance of pension schemes 
rather than firm risk. Essentially, firms with lower levels of governance allocate more 
pension assets to equity and pay lower contributions to the pension scheme since this 
maximises shareholder value. 
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5.3.2 Pension Porý`ofio Composition 
There are a number of theoretical papers which show that the optimal allocation of 
pension assets should be concentrated in bonds. Both Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) 
show that this should be true for tax reasons. Essentially the use of bonds allows for 
some risk reduction in the portfolio and where bonds are the sole asset class in the 
portfolio a dollar change in the pension plan surplus, before tax (t), increases the value 
of the firm by $(l-t). 
There are other incentives that may dictate why firms invest in other asset 
classes. A wide range of assets in the pension portfolio offers access to asset classes to 
which investors would otherwise not have access (Campbell and Viceira (2005)). With 
respect to investments, individuals generally overweight their exposure to property and 
underweight all other assets classes that have a large effect on household consumption 
(Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005)). A broader range of pension portfolio assets 
therefore provides households With a more diversified portfolio. Alternatively, firms 
may also Wish to offer the upside potential of riskier assets to employees since 
individuals are underweight in most assets (Sweeting (2005)). 
The objectives of the pension fund also come into effect in tl-ýs situation. If the 
firm only proVides the scheme to generate retirement incomes for current and former 
employees, the optimal portfolio will be one that follows a Black (1980), Tepper (1981) 
and Bodle (1990) investment strategy wl-&h will be dominated býý long dated, 
high 
quality corporate debt. Alternatively firms may Wish to minimise the long-term cost of 
the pension scheme, as well as offering potential upside gains to shareholders. In this 
situation, management will adopt a total return strategy and pension assets will 
be 
invested predominantly in equitN. 
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However, pension assets have consistently been shown to be a useful tool for 
management who can manipulate the pension accounting assumptions to smooth the 
earnings figures of the firm (Bergstresser, Desal and Rauh (2006)). Investment in more 
volatile assets classes, such as equity, creates an incentive for management to manipulate 
earnings through the discretionary setting of pension plan accounting assumptions. 
5.3.3 Risk Transpareng and 1, abie Tran, ýbareng 
The first part of my analysis looks at risk transparency, where the risk of the firm is a 
function of the risk of the pension scheme. There are a limited number of papers in 
this area and they have shown that the stock market is able to price the underlying 
pension risks despite the opaque accounting that surrounds pensions. Most recently jin, 
Bodle and Merton (2006) for the US, and Trivendi and Young (2006) for the UK, have 
shown that the stock market reflects the underlying risk of the pension scheme. 
Research on value transparency (Bodie, Light, Morck and Taggert (1985), Bulow, 
Morck and Summers (1987) and Bodie and Papke (1992)) has found that equity market 
valuations incorporate information in the annual report about the pension scheme, and 
that the surplus or deficit in a scheme is a determinant of equity market values. 
However, A of the research so far has focussed on US data, and fall under a , -ený 
different pension accounting regime to the one in which all countries are moving 
towards. 
U. S. pension accounting is guided by SFAS-87. Under this re ime there is a 91 
smoothing of pension costs and volatility of pension assets. Further, there is a complex 
mandatory contributions system that is triggered if scheme funding falls 
below a certain 
threshold. Under fair value - the situation in the U. K. - pension assets and 
liabilities are 
annualk, marked to market and so there is greater volatility in 
both the funding level of 
PC) OR 
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the scheme and pension assets. Consequently, this volatility may 1mpaIr the relevance of 
any accounting amounts in the financial reports. 
There is still some debate on the value transparency of pension assets and 
habilities. First is the view that the assets and habilities of the pension scheme are the 
assets and liabilities of the firm. Surpluses should thus be reflected as assets of the firm, 
which is generally the starting point for research in this area. However, there is also a 
view that only the hability/deficit of the scheme should be considered. This is because 
the pension assets belong to the members and so the scheme should be viewed as a 
separate legal entity of the firm (Weidman and Weir (2003)). 
Carroll and Nelhaus (1998) address this issue by looking at the relevance of 
pension funding and corporate debt ratings. They show that for every doflar decrease in 
scheme funding, there is a dollar fall in firm market value. However, a dollar increase in 
the surplus of a pension scheme does not actually increase the value of the firm by a 
doHar. This is consistent with the notion that the cost of the pension liability is fuEy the 
responsibility of the firm. Surplus assets however, are not really the assets of the firm 
since the firm may not be able to access the surplus, and in any event the firm will have 
to pay tax on any assets that can be returned. 
5.4 Motivation and Hypotheses 
The most recent paper to exam risk transparency of corporate pension schemes is jin 
et al (2006), who derived a beta measure for pension scheme risks and showed that the 
total risk of equity, measured by the CAPM beta, incorporated their beta for pension 
risks. Nly approach is different in that I investigate , -, -hether extended measures of 
systematic risk (i. e. Fama-French size and value factors) reflect the Individual 
POOR 
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components of pension risks. To create pension risk measures, I scale the liabibtN- and 
pension surplus/deficit by firm size. lf I observe that higher pension liabilities and 
smaller pension surpluses, relative to the size of the firm, are associated with higher risk 
estimates, this would suggest that the market incorporates pension risk %vhen assessing 
comparues. 
As noted in jin et al (2006) there are a number reasons why this may not be the 
case. First, pension accounting is complicated and the values that are presented in the 
financial accounts are the result of complex estimates about interest rates, future 
earnings and life expectancy. Second, there are two N, en, distinct views on how the 
pension scheme relates to the firm. The labour economics view is that the pension 
scheme is a distinct legal entity to the firm. Consequently, onlv deficits would be a risk 
factor in this view of the world. Alternatively, there is the corporate finance view, 
where both the assets and liabilities belong to the firm. In this situation I would expect 
that the size of the pension liability, and any surplus/deficit would be incorporated into 
measures of risk. 
I include book to market equity and size to control for different firm 
characteristics. 1n eneral, larger firms have bigger workforces with larger pension 9 C)C3 
exposures where benefits are being provided. Conversely, small firms win have a 
smaller exposure to pension risks by virtue of their size. Companies with stronger 
growth characteristics will have small workforces and be earlier in their life cycle. Tl-ýs 
would be in contrast to value firms that are likely to be later in their Efe cycle and 
be 
more exposed to pension risks than growth firms. 
g nsk sio HI: Systematic risk Illeasures do not reflect the underl), in *s of tbepen 'n schemie. 
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1n looking at the risk of pension schemes the risk is not limited to the relative 
size of the scheme but also to the investment risk of the scheme. The choice of 
investment and the portfoho weightings between equities and bonds can have a 
significant impact upon the year-on-year funding level of the scheme. If the dominant 
asset in the pension portfolio is equities, the funding level of the scheme, measured as 
the ratio of pension assets to liabilities, will fluctuate with equity market movements. 
Consequently, the risk of their being significant underfunding in the scheme is high. We 
therefore expect that higher measures of beta will be associated with higher levels of 
equity investment in the pension portfolio. 
H2: Measures of gstematic n'sk do not reflect the n'sk of the pension porffolio 
In trying to further assess the relationship between firm risks and pension risk I 
consider two additional measures of firm risk. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) analyse a 
number of different risk characteristics of firms that undertook leveraged transactions 
that terminated in financial distress. Their analysis considers two different types of risk, 
financial distress (deb t-to -equity) and operating distress (Return on Assets). 1 therefore 
apply these measures to reflect the operating and financial distress of our sample firms. 
My first measure considers financial distress, which is measured as the debt-to- 
equitý, ratio of the firm. Firms with higher levels of financial distress are likely to ha-ý-e 
large pension schemes as they represent a large cost to the firm. Further, poorly funded 
schemes will put additional constraints on the cash flow of the firm since there may be a 
need to provide additional financing in the future, putting pressure on the ability of the 
to service its debt. Firms with higher levels of financial distress would be expected to 
have pension schemes that are poorly funded. 
LJ 2 
11-..,: Thefinancial distress of tbefirm if unrelated to Pension n*sk cbaracteristics of tbefirm. 
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My second measure of firm risk is operating distress, measured as the return on 
assets. The return on assets reflects the abihty of the firm to generate cash flow from its 
investments. jin et al (2006) analyse the relation between their pension risk beta and 
show that pension risks are associated with hýigher levels of operating distress. If the 
return on assets is low, the firm will have less cash floNv to maintain ongoing projects, 
undertake new investments and service its debts. Pension risks may therefore pose a 
real risk to the ongoing operations of the firm. Firms with large pension deficits would 
have to provide additional contributions to their scheme. 
,g 
d1stress of thefirm i's unrelated to pension n'sk characten'StIcs of thefirm. H4: The operatin 
In analysing the probability of default in the firm, pension risks are likely to be a 
contributing factor to an increased risk of default in the firm. This is likely where the 
size of the pension scheme relative to the firm is large. Further, where a pension deficit 
is large relative to the firm, the shortfall in funding of the pension scheme increases the 
likelihood that additional finance will be required. Again this may impact upon the 
probability of default. One further relationship that may hold is between the debt of the 
firm, the pension deficit and the probability of firm default. High levels of leverage in 
firms, increases the probability of bankruptcy in the firm. As a result of the binding 
nature of pension liabilities it is possible that the level of debt in the firm and the 
pension deficit are jointly related to the probability of default in the firm. 
H5: Theprobabilio offirm default 1*S unrelated to the risks of thepension scheme 
To examine v, -hether risk shifting or risk management occurs I analyse the 
relation between portfolio composition and my different risk 
factors. With respect to 
firm leverage, the pension portfolio composition , vill reflect conscious decisions 
bý 
management on how the pension liability is managed. If risk shifting is obsen-ed, equity 
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would be the dominant asset in the pension portfolio. Alternativelv, if management 
undertake risk management, I would expect pension assets to be predominantly invested 
in bonds. 
H6. - Pension porffolio composition is unrelated to thefinancial distress of thefirm. 
The ability of the firm to finance its ongoing operations is a tangible current risk 
to the firm, while the capital structure of the firm represents a long-term risk to the firm. 
This is therefore another environment where risk shifting and risk management 
incentives may be particularly strong. When faced N7,, Ith limited financial resources, a 
risk management strategy (predominance of bonds) would result in a relatively stable 
and predictable pension cost. Although more volatile assets over the long-term may 
meet the pension liability on a total return basis, this strategy could expose the firm to 
large intermittent pension contributions which would increase their operating distress 
further. 
H7. - Pension porffiblio composition i's unrelated to the operating distress of thefirm. 
FolloWing much of the literature on risk-shifting and risk management I 
consider the role of default, as measured by Altman's Z-Score. Risk management and 
risk shifting is most likely to occur in firms in financial distress. Firms with high default 
risk can shift value from bondholders to equity holders by undertaking risky projects. 
Prior research however has found little evidence of risk shifting. Many studies, most 
recentINT Rauh (2007), have found that that as the probability of default increases, 
firms 
aflocate more of their pension assets to safer securities. 
H8: The asset allocation of thepenSiOn schelve i's unrelated to theprobabilil), of default in thefirm 
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5.5 Data and Methodology 
My sample comprises all firms in the FTSE 350 from June 2001 until June 2004. The 
FTSE 350 is the index of the largest 350 corporations in the U 1, ý 
13 
. Again from this Est 
I remove 44 listed investment trusts, 62 firms that provided incomplete pension data 
and 2 that do not provide any retirement benefits. My maximum sample is therefore 
284 firms per year and 1,136 firm years. The final sample however is 884 firm ý-cars. 
This occurs for two reasons. First a number of companies suspended listing, merged or 
were taken over. Second, the sample period co\-ers the transitional arrangements for 
FRS-17 and not all firms adopted the standard at the start of the sample period. The 
level of disclosure therefore in the early part of the sample is low and improves over 
time. 
FRS-1 7 is the new fair value accounting standard that covers pension accounting 
in the UK and was replaced in 2005 with IAS 19. However, much of the disclosure 
requirements under both standards are the same". When firms comply with FRS-17, 
they present in the financial accounts different asset classes compositions of the defined 
benefit pension scheme. This allows us to coUect data for equities, bonds, property and 
cash in each scheme for every year in the sample. From this, 1 sum the individual asset 
classes to calculate the total pension assets. 1 also calculate the surplus (deficit) of the 
pension scheme by summing total pension assets and total pension liabilities. To 
characterise the pension portfolio assets, I calculate the percentage of total pension 
assets composed of equity and the percentage of pension assets invested in bonds. 
63 Taking account of quarterly rebalancing the total number of companies that appeared in the 
index over our sample period -was 392 
64 Both standards require fair value accounting for the pension scheme assets and 
liabilities. 
FRS-17, in some respects, has a stricter disclosure regime because the return on each individual 
asset class must be presented whereas IAS-19 allows 
for a weighted average return on all plan 
assets. 
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Daily share price data and FTSE All Share market index data, year end market 
capitallsation, total assets, book value of equity, total debt, return on assets, earnings 
before interest and tax, retained earnings and sales are collected from Worldscope. 
The pension liability and funding variables are each scaled by the market 
capitahsation of the firm because the standardised measure more accurately reflects the 
risk that the scheme poses to the firm. For example, although a pension deficit of 
, C50m is a large number, relative to a firm with a market capitabsation of LlObn, the 
amount is relatively small. However, if the market value of the firm was k-100m, the 
deficit of the pension of the scheme would be very large, since it constitutes 50% of the 
firm's market value. 
From the stock returns data, I calculate both the market model beta where, 
Rit -a+P, R,,,, ei, 
And the Dimson beta with one lead and one lag: 
I 
R,, =aj +L 
Pj+k Rjt+k + Pit 
k=-l 
In addition, 1 calculate the Fama-French (1993) 3-Factor model. Monthly 
portfolios are created at the end of the first month of my sample period. Each portfolio 
is then re-weighted monthly until the end of my sample. SNIB and HM-L follow the 
standard definitions and are the returns on arbitrage portfolios consisting of smaH minus 
large firms and high book to market firms minus low book to market firms. 
Rit -., -: a+ß, R + yiHAM + 
5iSA2 + Ei, 
Finally, I estimate the probability of default from Altman's Z-Score where, 
PýýGq 
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5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5-1 presents the descriptive statistics of my sample firm and risk characteristics. 
The top row of the table presents the firm characteristics, It is clear that firm market 
values fluctuated quite considerably over the sample. The mean market value in 2001 
being about k5.7bn and by 2004 this had fallen to T5.2bn. The movements in the 
equity values that I see are consistent with equity market movements over the sample 
period I analyse. 
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In looking at the total assets and debt of the firms in the sample, both measures 
increase over my sample period. For total assets, the median is considerabh- lower than 
the mean. This high level of skewness is drwen hy the largest firms in the sample. This 
is also evident when the total debt of the sample firms is considered, since the median is 
appreciably lower than the mean in all years. 
I also consider a number of firm risk characteristics. The next section of the 
table presents the operating distress, financial distress and the probability of default in 
the firm. The operating distress of the firm is measured as the return on assets. It is 
clear that the average and median return on assets is relatively stable over the sample 
period. Financial distress is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. As With 
operating distress, this is broadly similar year-on-year, with an average debt-to-equity 
ratio of 26 percent. 
The probability of bankruptcy is measured from Altman's Z-Score. In all years, 
the mean score is greater than 3 and so on average firms are not hkejý7 to experience 
bankruptcy. However, it is also clear that there are a number of firms that he within the 
grey area between 1.8 and 3. Of the firms in my sample, I therefore have a number of 
companies where there is an increased risk of bankruptcy. This is important since one 
of the key areas that 1 consider is the relationship hetween default probability, pension 
schemes risk and pension asset allocation. 
The final section of Table 5-1 shows the different betas that were calculated. I 
present the standard market model beta, the Dimson beta and the Fama-French market 
beta. The Dimson beta was calculated to mitigate the problem where the risk of those 
shares that are traded most frequently is overestimated and the risk of those shares that 
are thinly traded is underestimated. Following the methodology of 
Dimson (1979) 1 
calculated t-, vo different beta specifications, one lead and one lag, and mro 
leads and t-, -,, o 
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65 lags . From the table I can see that all of the betas in the sample increase between 2()()l 
and 2004. 
Table 5-2 presents the descriptive statistics of the pension scheme characteristics. 
It is clear that the size of the pension exposure in some firms is large. In 2(-)()l, the 
median pension liability constituted 21% of the market value of the firm and bv 2004 
this had risen to 29% of market value. The funding level of the schemes also 
deteriorated over the sample period, which is consistent with accruing pension liabilities 
and equity market volatility. By 2004 the average pension deficit was 8", '(, of market 
capitalisation. 
Table 5-2 Descriptive Statistics Pension Risks and Asset Allocation 
Table 5-2 presents the descriptive statistics of a sample of FTSF 350 company defined benefit pension schemes. Lýiabflitý-to- 
Market-Value is the year end pension habifity divided by the ý, ear end firm market value. Surplus-to- Nlarket-Value is the 
surplus/ (deficit) in the pension scheme scaled by the year end market value of the firm. Whcre the pension surplus/ (deficit) is 
calculated as pension assets + pension liability. Eclum- percentage is the percent-age of pension assets invested in equity. 
Where equity percentage is calculated by pension assets invested in cquity/total pension assets. Bonds percentage is the 
percentage of pension assets invested in bonds. Where bonds percentage is calculated bý- pension assets invested in 
bonds/total pension assets. AH figures are presented as decimals and are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Liability to Market Value Surplus to Market Value 
Year Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 
2001 0.40 0.08 0.21 0.50 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
2002 0.49 0.10 0.28 0.59 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.14 
2003 0.50 0.10 0.29 0.68 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.14 
2004 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.58 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11 
Equity Percentage Bonds Percentage 
2001 0.69 0.61 0.73 0.80 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.29 
2002 0.64 0.54 0.68 0.76 0.29 0.17 0.25 0.36 
2003 0.64 0.55 0.68 0.76 0.29 0.18 0.26 0.36 
2004 0.62 0.53 0.65 0.73 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.38 
Table 5-2 also presents the asset allocation of the pension portfolio. The 
proportion of equitý' in the pension portfolio fell over my sample from a mean of 69% 
equity in 2001 to a mean equity percentage of 62%. Conversely the mean aHocation of 
bonds increased between 2001 and 2004 from 24% to 29%. Despite this it is clear that 
equity and bonds are the dominant asset classes in the pension portfolio since, together, 
', ý In the testing that is carried out we only use the one lead and one lag beta as a 
descriptive 
analysis of the different specifications showed there was essentially no 
difference from the two 
lead and lag beta. 
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the mean equity and bonds held constituted 93% of total pension assets in 2001 and 
91% in 2004. 
5.6 Results 
In this section, I explicitly test the hypotheses that were developed m section 5.5. 
Section 5.6.1 examines the relationship between pension risk and measures ot systematic 
risk. Section 5.6.2 discusses financial distress and pension risk. Section 5.6.3 analyscs 
the relationship between pension risk, operating distress and default risk. Section 5.6.4 
examines pension portfolio composition, systematic risk and the Fama-French factors. 
5.6.5 analyses pension asset allocation and financial distress. Section 5.6.6 looks at the 
relationship between operating distress and probability of default with pension portfolio 
asset allocation. Lastly in section 5.6.7 1 analyse the impact of active risk management 
on measures of firm risk. 
5.6.1 Pension Risk and Sjstematic Risk Measures 
The first part of the analysis considers market efficiency and risk transparency. If 
markets are efficient, a firm's systematic risk (beta) will be higher when the pension 
liability is large relative to the size of the firm. The same rationale applies to the deficit 
of a pension scheme. 
From Table 5-3, it is clear there is a significant and positive relationship between 
systematic risk (beta) and the pension babibtý,. Further I find a s1gnificantlY negative 
relation with the pension surplus. In both cases, a large pension hability and significant 
pension deficit relative to the size of the firm increases corporate risk. 
Due to the 
complexity and opacity of pension accounting, this is an unexpected result 
but strongly 
suggestive of market efficiency and transparent assessment of risk. 
POGR 
5 
RISK MAN AGEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY: EVIDENCE FROM DEFINED BFINEFIT 
PENSION SCHFAIHS Paze 16, -)' 
Table 5-3 Pooled Regressions of Firm Risk Measures against Pension Risk 
Factors 
Table 5-3 presents the rcsults of pooled regressions of firm risk against pension scheme risks. I calculate the market beta 
and the size and book value portfolios from the Fama-French 3-Factor model where, 
R j, a+P il R,,,, +P j' HAIL +p i3 SMB + Ej, Liability/Market value is the FRS-17 pension liability divided by the 
balance sheet market value of the firm. Surplus/Niarkct Value is the sum of pension assets and habibties divided by the balance sheet date market value of equity. I also include controls for firm size and capital structure and book-to-market. The dependant variable is presented at the head of each column and the independent variables are present in the far left hand column. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented direcdy belo%ý-, 
' indicates significance at 99"/,, and "indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 90%. 
Market Beta HML SMB 
Intercept 0.94 0.93 -0.57 -0.58 2.70 2.71 
(7.66)* (7.48)* (-3.78)* (-3.79)* (26.52) (2 9 5) 
Liability/MV 0.10 - 0.18 - -0.05 
(2.7 1) (4.14)* (-1.69)** 
Surplus/MV - -0.48 - -0.92 - 0.20 
(-2.37)** (-3.67)* (1.16) 
Size 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.30 -0.30 
(0.00) (0.08) (1.43) (1.54) (-23.94)* (-23.55)* 
Book-to-Market -0.18 -0.16 0.77 0.79 -0.29 -0.29 
(-3.15)* (-2.9 1) (10.96)* (11.30)* (-5.95)* (-6.08)* 
Capital Structure 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.07 
(2.78)* (2.78)* (0.09) (0.10) (2. -/ 8) 7 (2., ()) * 
The next systematic risk measure I examine is the HNIL factor. From Table 5-3, 
it can be seen that corporate exposure to the HML risk factor is higher when firms have 
large positive exposures to pension risks, large pension liabilities being significant and 
positive and pension deficits being significant and negative. This is consistent With 
market efficiency, since both the size of the pension scheme and the size of the pension 
deficit are captured by the value risk factor. 
The final column of Table 5-3 analyses the relationship between the SNIB factor 
and pension risks. lnterestingly I find that 1-ýgher size risk factors are associated xvith 
smaller pension habilities relative to firm size. Further I find that there is no relation 
between the size risk factor and the surplus or deficit of the pension scheme. 
can therefore reject my null for hypothesis 1 that the market 
does not 
incorporate pension risk measures. My results extend those of jin et al 
(2006) since I 
shov, that not onlv does the market price pension risks of the firm 
but that it also prices 
the different individual components of pension risk. 
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5.6.2 Sjstemafic Risk and Pension Porffolio Com position 
Table 5-4 presents our analysis of systematic risk and pension investment risk 
From column 1 it can be seen that there is clearly a significant and positive relationship 
between higher levels of systematic risk and increased pension risk through higher 
allocations to equity. In terms of market efficiency this clearly demonstrates that the 
market incorporates the risk of the investment risk of the pension scheme. 
Table 5-4 Pooled Regressions of Firm Risk 
Measures against Pension Portfolio Risk 
Table 5-4 presents the results of pooled regressions of firm risk against pension 
portfobo risks. Wc calculate the market beta and the size and book value portfohos 
from the Fama-French 3-Factor model whcrc, 
Ril + Pi'R,,,, + Pj'SMB + Pj'HAIL + Ej, F, quiLy/Market Value is the 
market value of equity held in the pension portfolio on the balance sheet date scaled 
by the market value of the firm on the balance sheet date. The dependant variable is 
presented at the head of each column and the independent variables are present in 
the far left hand column. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the 
corresponding t-stat is presented directly below, * indicates significance at 99""1, and 
**indicates significance at 95"/,, and *** indicates significance at 90%. 
Market Beta HML SMB 
Intercept 0.97 0.25 0.39 
(8.13)* (1.78)*** (10.28)* 
Equity/Market Value 0.07 0.05 0.10 
(3.03)* (1.61) (3.77)* 
Size -0.002 -0.03 - 
-(0.13) -(1.69)*** 
Book-to-Market -0.17 - -0.20 
-(3.02)* (0.41) 
Capital Structure 0.09 0.18 -0.05 
(2.92)* (4.55)* -(1.49) 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5-4 show or analysis of the HML factor and SMB 
factor and investment risk respectively. For the HML factor there a positive relation 
between the HML factor loading and the investment risk of the scheme. The 
relationship however is insignificant. From the final column of the table that considers 
the SMB factor we can see that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
the size loading factor and the investment risk of the firm. 
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5.6.3 Pension Risk and Measures of Finam ial Distress 
Table 5-5 presents an analysis of the relationship between financial distress and pension 
risks. I again extend jin et al (2006) as I consider different components of pension risk. 
From column 1 of table 4 higher levels of financial distress are significanth- related to 
the size of the pension liability relative to the market value of the firm. This is 
consistent with expectations, since a large scheme, regardless of funding, is a significant 
burden on the firm. Firms with a large pension scheme liability tend to have a large 
number of active, retired, and deferred scheme members and this will increase the 
annual service cost. I can therefore reject my null hypothesis that measures of financial 
distress are unrelated to pension scheme risks. 
Table 5-5 Pooled Regressions of Financial Distress against Pension Risk 
Factors 
Table 5-5 presents the results of pooled regressions of financial against pension scheme risks. I estimate financial distress as 
the level of gearing in the firm measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. Lhibility/Nlarkct value is the FRS-17 pension liability 
divided by the balance sheet market value of the firm. Surplus/Market Value is the sum of pension -assets and habibties 
divided by the balance sheet date market value of equity. Liability/Tota-I Assets is the FRS-17 pension liability divided bý 
the total assets of the firm. Surplus/Total Assets is the sum of pension assets and liabilities divided by the Total Assets of 
the firm. I also include controls for firm size and book-to-market. The dependant variable is presented at the head of each 
column and the independent variables are present in the far left hand column. The parameter estimate is presented in the 
top row and the corresponding t-stat is presented directly below, * indicates significance at 99% and "indicates significance 
at 95% and *** indicates significance at 90",,,. 
Debt-to-E quity 
Intercept -0.51 -0.57 -0.3 -0.32 
(-4.10)* (-4.48)* (-2.28)** (-2.42)* 
Liability /Market Value 0.18 
(4.88)* 
Surplus/Market Value -1.11 - 
(-5.41)* 
Liability/Total Assets -0.06 - 
(-0.93) 
Surplus/Total Assets - - - 
0.17 
(0.48) 
Book-to-Market 0.6 0.63 0.62 0.63 
(10.94)* (11.49)* (10.97)* (l D) 1) 
Size 0.09 0.1 0.07 0.07 
(5.87)* (6.22)* (4.68)* (4.69)* 
I then consider the relationship hetween financial distress and pension scheme 
funding. Funding is measured as the pension surplus/ (deficit) scaled hy the market 
capitalisation of the firm. From column 2 of table 4, firms that 
have a bigger pension 
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deficit relative to firm size also have higher levels of financial distress. Again tl-ýs is 
consistent with expectations. Firms with large pension short-falls are likely to require 
additional funding for their pension scheme. As a result, firms have additional pressures 
on their cash flow and therefore experience higher levels of financial distress. Again I 
can reject my second null hypothesis that measures of financial distress do not 
incorporate measures of a firms pension risks. 
Measuring pension liabilities and funding using total assets as the scaling 
instrument causes the regression models to lose power. As a result, the models in 
columns 3 and 4 of table 5.5 are insignificant. Given that the distress \-ariable debt to 
equity is market determined this is not a particularly surprising result. 
5.6.4 Pension Risk and Measures of Operatiq Distress and Default 
Probability 
In panel A of Table 5-6 1 present my analysis of operating distress and pension risk. 
FofloWing jin et al (2006), operating distress is measured as the return on assets. A firm 
with a low return on assets generates inferior amounts of income from its investments 
causing it to have less free cash flow. Under such constraints the firm will be less able 
to finance ongoing projects, undertake new investments and service any debts that the 
company may have. A large pension liability would have a significant impact upon the 
level of operating distress in the firm and, as noted earlier, large pension babibties are 
associated with substantial contributions. This would reduce free cash flow, further 
increasing the level of operating distress in the firm. From the first regression in Panel 
A, there is a significantly negative relation between the return on assets and the size of 
the pension liability. I can therefore reject my null hypothesis 3 that operating distress is 
unrelated to pension risks since increased operating distress is associated with 
large 
pension risk exposures. 
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In looking at the level of funding in the pension scheme, the second regression 
in Panel A shows a significant and positive relationship between the pension 
surplus/deficit and return on assets. Again this is consistent Nvith expectations. If a 
scheme is well funded or even in surplus, the firm will have to contribute less and in 
certain circumstances may even underfund the scheme. Conversely, a scheme in deficit 
will force the firm to provide additional funds thereby reducing cash flow and increasing 
operating distress. Again 1 can reject MN, nuH hypothesis that the operating risk is 
unrelated to pension risks within the firm. 
Panel B of Table 5-6 presents an analysis of pension risks and the probability of 
default. There are a number of reasons to expect that the size of the pension liability 
will contribute to the likelihood of default in the firm. Large pension liabilities represent 
a significant burden to firms. Moreover, pension liabilities are also debt-like in nature, 
and in some respects, could be considered to be an additional form of gearing in the 
firm. My results, from the first regression in panel B, suggest that there is an increased 
likelihood of bankruptcy when the pension scheme is large relative to the firm. I can 
therefore reJect my fourth null hypothesis that the probability of default is unrelated to 
pension risk. 
The second regression in panel B presents results for the probability of default 
and scheme funding. 1nterestingly, there is no significant relationship between funding 
and default. This is contrary to expectations. However, since pension funding could 
be 
classed as a short-term risk, large asset swings or special one-off contributions could 
mitigate the impact of poor funding levels. However, for my other measures of 
distress, 
funding exacerbates these problems. 
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5.6.5 Pension Asset Allocation andA leasures of Firm Distress 
The next part of my analysis considers the relationship between pension portfolio asset 
allocation and measures of firm distress. As with measures of systematic risk, this 
aflows for an assessment of whether risk shifting or risk management is obsen-ed NN-hen 
firms have higher levels of distress. 
Higher levels of financial distress constrain the finances of the firm since debt 
has to be serviced. Management have two choices when faced with increased levels of 
distress in the firm. First, undertake risk shifting through increasing the allocation of 
pension assets to volatile asset classes, namely equity. Alternativel\ý, managers can 
choose to reduce the volatility of pension assets by investing more in bonds. In so 
doing, the firm would incur a more stable pension cost and for managers this option 
would reduce the likelihood of further financial distress. An allocation to riskier assets, 
however, may exacerbate the financial distress of the firm at some point in the future if 
there are adverse equity movements. 
Table 5-7 Pooled Regressions of Pension Portfolio Asset Allocation against 
Financial Distress 
Table 5-7 presents the results of pooled regressions of pension asset allocation against financial distress, measured by the 
debt-to- 
equity ratio of the firm. At the head of each column is pension asset allocation. In the far left column are the explanatory 
variables. We control for firm size log(market value), book-to-market equity value and the probabilitý. of 
default in the firm 
measured by Altman's Z-Score. The parameter estimate is presented in the top ro-,,, and the corresponding t-stat 
is presented 
directly below, * indicates significance at 99',, and "indicates significance at 95"',, and *** indicates significance at 9(. )',,,. 
Equity % Debt % Equity % Debt % 
Intercept 0.75 0.24 0.73 0.23 
(20.59)* (6.85)* (18.17) (5.95)* 
Financial Distress -0.01 0.01 -0.03 
0.04 
(-0.78) (1.31) (-2.20)** (2.48)** 
Firm Size -0.01 0.002 -0.01 
0.00 
(-2,23)** (0.34) (-1.66)*** (0.64) 
Book-to-Market -0.04 0.03 -0.01 
0.02 
(-2.14)** (1.99)** (-0.51) (1.10) 
Z-Score 0.03 -0.05 
(0.41) (0.77) 
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Table 5-7 presents the results. lt is clear that when financial cbstress is higher, 
controlling for the probability of default in the firm, there is a significantly higher 
allocation to safer pension assets. This result is consistent with risk management of 
pension risks. For example, firms that experience a 1% increase in the ratio of debt to 
equity will reduce their allocation of pension assets in equity by 0.03% and increase their 
exposure to bonds by 0.04%. 1 can thus reject m\- nuH hypothesis 6 that pension 
portfolio allocation is unrelated to financial distress within the firm. Economically 
however, the relation between pension asset allocation and financial distress is ven, 
small. If the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm increased by 50% this would only result in 
a 1.5% decrease in the percentage of equity in pension assets. 
Table 5-8 Pooled Regressions of Pension Portfolio Asset Allocation against 
Operating Distress 
Table 5-8 presents the results of pooled regressions of pension asset allocation against operating distress, measured by the return 
on assets. At the head ()f each column is pension asset allocadon. In the far left column are the explanatory variables. The far 
left column is the dependant variables pension equity percentage and pension debt percentage and along the top row are the 
independent variables. I control for firm size log(market value), book-to-market equity value and the capital structure of the firm 
measured by the debt-to-equity ratio. The parameter estimate is presented in the top row and the corresponding t-stat is 
presented directlý- below, * indicates significance at 99% and -indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 
9W111. 
I Intercept Operating Distress Firm Size Book-to-Market Leverage 
0.72 0.40 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 Equity % 
(19.25)* (3.02)* (-2.29)** (-1.55) (0.75) 
0.26 -0.36 0.001 0.02 0.001 Bonds % 
(7.34)* (-2.79)* (0.33) (1.42) (0.15) 
Table 5-8 shows the results of an analysis of pension asset allocation and 
operating distress. Similar to financial distress, operating distress reflects a situation 
where the firm has cash flow constraints. A low return on assets reflects an inabilitý 
within the firm to generate returns on their investments. In such a situation the 
firm 
does not have sufficient scope to pay large amounts of additional finance to a poorlý 
funded pension scheme. Consequently, if pension assets have a higher bond weighting 
they will be more stable, reducing the likelihood of the firm to provide 
large amounts of 
additional finance to the scheme. 
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The regression results show that the firm allocates significantly lower amounts 
of pension assets to equity and significantly higher amounts to bonds when operating 
cEstress is higher. From the regression results, a 10.0 percentage point fall in the return 
on assets would be associated with a 4.0 percentage point decrease in assets allocated to 
equity and a 3.6 percentage point increase in bonds. This is again consistent xvith risk 
management of pension risk, and so I can reject my nufl hypothesis 7 that pension 
portfolio composition is unrelated to operating distress. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter considers two important questions relating to market efficiency and risk 
management. First, I look for risk transparency between measures of sý, stematic risk, 
firm distress and pension risks. My results show that measures of systematic risk, 
namely market, value (HML), and size (SMB) risk, reflect the underlying risk of the 
pension scheme. Moreover, both market and value risks are influenced by the size of 
the pension liability, the investment strategy and the funding of the pension scheme 
relative to firm market capitalisation. This finding is significant because there are many 
reasons to suspect that systematic risk factors would not price these risks. Pension 
accounting is governed by complex and opaque accounting methods and, in many 
respects, can be considered as 'off balance sheet'. However, I find that measures of 
systematic risk reflect these pension risks and so I find evidence of market efficiency. 
My analysis also extends the literature on risk transparency to consider measures 
of operating distress, financial distress and default. Again, firms With higher 
levels of 
operating and financial distress are characterised by having large pension 
liabilities and 
poor levels of funding in their pension scheme 
Mv analysis of default probability 
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shows that only the size of the pension liability relative to the firm is a significant 
determinant of default. 
The second part of the chapter considers pension risk management. I present 
evidence of pension risk management as firm risk and levels of distress increase. 
Managers actiVely allocate pension assets away from risky investments to safer assets. If 
equity is the dominant asset in the pension portfolio then large s-, -,, ings in the stock 
market can have a significant impact upon the funding level of the pension scheme. In 
this situation, firms may have to provide additional contributions to the scheme. 
However, those firms that are the riskiest and most constrained, are least able to do so. 
Mangers therefore choose to manage these risks by aflocating pension assets to safer 
securities, namely bonds. This provides the pension scheme with a more stable 
portfolio and managers With a more predictable pension cost. 
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6 
DO DEFINED BENEFIT 
CONTRIBUTIONS REDUCE 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND 
PROFITABILITY? 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter 1 analyse the relationship between firm capital expenditure, profitability 
and employer contributions to defined benefit pension schemes. For most companies, 
contributions to finance pension obligations are generally equal to the service cost of the 
pension scheme. Contributions therefore equal the increase in the pension liability from 
one year's additional pension benefit accrual by employees. However, for a large 
number of companies, their pension schemes are severely under-funded. Managers of 
these schemes will be pressured by employees and pension scheme trustees to provide 
additional financing so as to ensure sufficient assets in place to proVide for future 
pension benefits to employees. 
Rauh (2006) examines the relationsl-ýp between capital expenditures and 
mandatory contributions to defined benefit pension schemes in a large sample of US 
corporations. He shows that capital expenditures fall in response to increased 
mandatory pension contributions. This relationship is shown to be present after 
controlling for pension scheme funding and the unobsen-ed investment opportunities 
of the firm. For firms that are already financially constrained (low credit ratings), this 
result -, vas shown to be even stronger. 
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Reducing capital expenditure to fund pension contributions is an obvious 
internal strategy for management to exploit. However, there are a number of other 
actions that management could employ, such as reducing diVidends or increasing asset 
disposals. One consequence of reducing capital expenditure is the potential impact on 
the profitability of the firm. Falls in capital expencbture may therefore result in firms 
rejecting profitable projects that would otherwise have been undertaken if the financial 
resources were available to management. Conversely, falls in capital expencliture may 
result in a reduction in over-investment and an increase in asset utihsation. 
I make four contributions to the existing literature on internal capital markets 
and pension plan funding. First, 1 document the relationship between pension 
contributions, the magnitude of the pension liability and pension scheme funding levels. 
This relationship is clear in the US because of complex legally defined funding rules. 
The UK however, is a different regulatory environment, and there is no legally imposed 
trigger point that forces management to proVide additional financing to fund a pension 
scheme deficit. Managers of firms with poorlýl funded schemes may elect to maintain 
this position and not proVide large amounts of finance to the scheme. Conversely, 
management may provide additional financing as a result of pressure from employees 
and trustees or because the funding level of the scheme is seen as a risk to the business. 
Second, 1 anaINIse the relationship between capital expenditure and large 
voluntary pension contributions. Rauh (2006) observes that pension contributions can 
be separated from the firm's investment opportunities and therefore presents a situation 
where the impact of changes in the internal financial resources of the 
firm can be tested. 
The UK environment presents a more direct opportunity on ho-,, - managers choose to 
allocate the resources of the firm, since there is no legal compulsion on managers to 
provide high levels of additional finance to fund their pension scheme. 
In undertaking 
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this analysis I can therefore gain insights into how managers allocate the resources of 
their firm in response to a tangible risk to operations. 
Third, I extend the analysis of Rauh (2006) and test the relationship between 
dividends and pension contributions. There is a wide literature on Nx-hy firms pay 
dividends and how the market responds to changes in the diVidend payout pohcý- of the 
firm. Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) argue that diVidends are used as a 
signalhng method and convey news to the market. Easterhrook (1984) puts forward the 
notion that diVidends reduce agency problems within the firm as they reduce the level of 
free-cash flow available to management. In looking at the internal financial resources of 
the firm, dividends represent a potential source of financing which management can 
access. Consequently, managers may utilise this resource when providing large amounts 
of additional financing to the pension scheme. 
Last, I analyse the impact of large pension contributions on the profitability of 
the firm. If capital expenditure falls in response to large pension contributions, firm 
profitabifity may be reduced as the firm cannot undertake aH of the projects that are 
available since there are not sufficient assets to invest. Conversely, I could observe an 
increase in profitability because there is a reduction in the free cash-flow Within the firm 
and so managers are not able to over-invest. The payment of large contributions may 
therefore increase asset utilisation in the firm and reduce agency problems. In this 
situation, the funding of the pension scheme wifl benefit both employees and 
shareholders as the scheme is better funded, and shareholders are investing in a more 
profitable firm with lower agency risks. 
Mv results are as follows. First I find that the magnitude of pension 
contributions is functionally related to the size of the pension 
liability, the funchng of 
the scheme and composition of pension assets. Higher contributions are paid when the 
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pension liability of the firm is large, since larger schemes will incur higher costs and 
firms therefore have to pay more to the scheme. Higher contributions are paid to 
schemes when the pension scheme deficit is large relative to the size of the firm. 
Managers therefore provide additional financing to pension schemes -where large deficits 
exist and potentially this could be taken from the financial resources available to 
managers from Within the firm. Pension portfolio contributions are lower when equity 
is the dominant asset in the scheme. This suggests that managers undertake a total 
return investment strategy for the pension portfolio. Over long time horizons managers 
befieve that the performance of the equity investment wih be sufficient to meet their 
pension obligation and so therefore do not pay large contributions to the scheme. 
Second, I find that those firms who pay the highest contributions to the pension 
scheme have significantly lower capital expenditure. TI-tis result holds even after 
controfling for the funding of the pension scheme and the unobserved investment 
opportunities of the firm. Capital expenditure is therefore depenclant upon the internal 
financial resources of the firm and is evidence that that managers fund the pension 
scheme from the internal financial resources of the firm. As there is no legal 
compulsion on management to proVide additional financing to the scheme, this result 
indicates that the pension scheme is perceived to be a risk within the firm. 
Third, my analysis shows that the level of contributions paid to the pension 
scheme are unrelated to the level of dividend payments in the firm. If dividends are 
reduced to fund the pension scheme, this could potentially produce a negative signal to 
the market. Although dividends are an available source of financing for management to 
utilise they elect not to do so. Dividend changes are a clearIv observable event and so 
the market x-,, ould be able to observe , N, here the finance for the 
dividend payment had 
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been re-allocated. Capital expenditure, however, varies year-on-year and managers have 
a higher degree of control and discretion over the allocation of this resource. 
Finally, my examination of profitability shows that those firms who pay the 
highest levels of contributions to their pension schemes have higher profitabiEty. This 
finding suggests that high levels of contributions have two effects on the firm. First, 
there is a reduction in free cash-flow within the firm. Consequently, there is a reduction 
in the scope for over-investment in unprofitable projects. 1mplicitly there is a reduction 
in agency problems and empire building. Second, the reduction in over investment and 
higher profitability that I observe is suggestive of better asset utihsation within firms 
that contribute the most to their pension scheme. 
In Section 6.2,1 discuss the funding and structure of UK defined benefit 
pension schemes. Section 6.3 presents the relevant literature and the hypotheses are 
developed in Section 6.4. Data and Methodology is discussed in Section 6.5, results are 
presented in Section 6.6 and I conclude in Section 6.7. 
6.2 Pension Plan Funding in the UK 
Pension plan funding in the UK has been the subject of much debate over the past 
decade. ln 1997 the Nfinimum Funding Requirement (MFR) was introduced as part of 
the Pensions Act 1995. By introducing this legally binding deficit recovery plan it was 
hoped that employees and pension scheme trustees would have greater certainty about 
the funding of pension deficits. However the method of calculating the MFR status of a 
scheme was complex and the resultant contribution schedule imposed an onerous 
burden on firms. Essentially the basic premise of the requirement -, vas that the pension 
scheme must hold a minimum amount of assets to meet the pension 
liability. In 
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circumstances where the asset to liability ratio did not meet the MFR a deficit recovery 
plan was initiated i. e. the company had to provide additional finance to the pension 
scheme. 
In practice many firms did not fuflýý implement these arrangements during the 
transition period between 1997 and 2001. For those companies N-, -ho did many found 
the contribution repayment schedule to be an excessive and costIN- burden. 
Consequently managers negotiated with trustees to put other arrangements in place. 
One such case was Imperial Chemical Industries (10) who in 2000 had an FRS-17 
deficit of (500m. Under the MFR recovery plan the level of contributions and the time 
horizon set out to make good the deficit proved too difficult for the firm to maintain. 
Consequently, the managers of the firm and the scheme trustees negotiated a deal where 
ICI would provide a k250 million guarantee to the pension scheme backed by assets 
placed in a special purpose vehicle. For most other firms, longer time periods o%, er 
which contributions must be paid were negotiated and in many cases firms had to 
provide credit guarantees to reduce concerns over plan sponsor insolvency risks. 
There were also examples of firms being fully funded on an MFR basis but in 
reality there were substantial short-falls in scheme funding. In bankruptcy the MFR 
imposed a pecking order as to what benefits employees received. Current employees 
were at a serious disadvantage as they only received residual benefits once retired 
employees benefits had been bought out in full" 
In the case of Allied Steel and Wire current employees were left With less than 
their fully accrued benefits despite one of the pension schemes of the company 
being 
fully funded on a MFR basis. This mis-match occurred as the NIFR liability calculation 
applied annuity rates that Nvere significantly higher than the current market rates and so 
66 In this case the pension liability was funded through the bulk purchase of annuities. 
FC) OR 
6 
Do DEFINFI) BENEFIT CONTRIBLITIONS REDUCf -I CAPITAL EXPENDITURE kND 
PROFITABILITYý Page 184 
the pension liability was understated. As a result, -,,, -hen the scheme , vas wound up and 
the bulk purchase of annuities for retired employees occurred there -were insufficient 
assets left to meet the liability due to current employees. 
In 2001 however, the government announced that the NIFR would be abolished 
under the recommendations of the Myners Report. The report criticised the one-size- 
fits A MFR as the investments of the pension fund were far more significant in meeting 
the pension obligation as opposed to the current ratio of assets to liabilities. As a result 
the transition period for adoption of the MFR was extended to 31" of December 2005. 
In abolishing the MFR the Myners Report proposed that firms and trustees should 
agree on long-term scheme funding plans and this has subsequently been adopted bý 
newly established Pensions Regulator as of 2005. 
6.3 Relevant Literature 
Finance and economic theory is not clear on the optimal level of pension scheme 
funding. This is in part due to the complexities in funding a pension scheme that result 
from firm specific issues such as asset allocation strate ies and agency issues. One 91 
factor that will influence scheme funding and the level of contributions paid is the 
provision of pension insurance within an economy. In a complete market firms will 
purchase insurance contracts to secure the full benefits of employecs in the event of any 
funding shortfall. This has two benefits where contributions have been insufficient to 
fully fund the scheme. First insurance hedges employees against the loss of pension 
benefits. Second the firm hedges against having to provide additional finance to the 
pension scheme to fund any shortfall in employce benefits. Consequently, pension plan 
funding and contributions are irrelevant (Sharpe (1976)). 
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The decision to fund pension habilities and deficits in the absence of such 
insurance is complex. If the pension scheme of the firm is under-funded, firms are 
faced with a trade-off between liquidation and continuation. In continuing, the firm has 
to fund the pension deficit through contributions from the assets of the firm. This has 
two effects; first, it reduces the value of equity, and second, it increases the risk of long- 
term debt (Webb (2007)). As a consequence, the continuation option is likely to result 
in closure of the scheme to new members and further accrual thereby limiting the cost 
to shareholders and reducing long-term debt holders' risks. 
Pension deficits can however in certain circumstances create lc\, crage for 
management in negotiating with trade unions. The promise to improve the security of 
employee pension benefits can Emit costly wage increases Jppohto (1985)). It may not 
therefore be optimal to fully fund the pension scheme as it proVides management with 
bargaining power. 
Another factor that has a significant bearing on funding and contribution levels 
is the scheme asset composition and investment strategy. There are two main 
91 ýy. In tl-ý s investment strate ies available to managers. The first a total return strateg 
situation equities are the dominant asset in the portfolio. Underlying this decision is the 
expectation that over long time horizons equities will outperform bonds. Consequentlý 
this should be cheaper in the long run. Such a strategy however exposes the pension 
scheme to adverse stock market movements. In circumstances where the stock market 
performs poorly managers may have to proVide significant amounts of additional 
finance in the short-run. 
The second option is to undertake liability driN-en investment. In doing so 
pension assets are mainly invested in long dated bonds. Tl-ýs strategy results in a more 
stable pension cost. Although the annual cost is greater as bonds 
do not offer as high a 
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return as equities, the return is more prechctable. The inclusion of a significant amount 
of long dated bonds in the portfolio also increases the duration of pension assets and so 
there is a reduction in the basis risk exposure of the scheme. 
1n proViding additional finance to fund pension deficits, managers face a trade- 
off between internal and external sources of finance. Under a -Modigliand and NEIler 
(1958) costless finance model the price of internal and external finance is equivalent. If 
costless finance holds, managers faced with having to pay large contributions to the firm 
pension scheme will opt to raise finance in the market to finance any deficit. This 
choice allows investment levels in the firm to remain constant as the internal resources 
of the firm will be unchanged. External finance however is not costless due to agency 
and issuance costs. Consequently, when faced with costly external finance managers 
will exploit the internal resources of the firm to fund pension deficits. The internal 
resources of the firm should therefore be negatively related to large pension 
contributions. 
Williamson (1970) puts forward the notion that internal capital markets are more 
efficient than external markets as there is greater information within the firm as to the 
profitabihty of available projects. However, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and 
Sharfstein and Stein (2000) suggest that internal capital allocation is not efficient in the 
face of divisional rent seeking by managers. As a result the internal capital allocation 
process becomes distorted as managers compete for a greater share of the finite 
resources within the firm. 
The distortion of the internal capital market is a consequence of agency issues 
within the firm as large amounts of internal cash flow provide scope 
for overinvestment 
and empire building. In analysing internal capital markets Blanchard, 
Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Schleifer (1994) shoNv managers retain cash windfalls 
from successful la,, -,, suits and 
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undertake empire building through over-investment. WIAe Lamont (199-) shows firms 
to undertake unprofitable investments in non-core busi 1 inesses and cross-subsidise these 
investments from more profitable core divisions in the firm. 
Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2002) analyse the asset allocation of internal 
capital markets after corporate spin-offs. After the spin-off low Q industries decreased 
investment while high Q industries increased investment. This has m, o implications for 
internal capital markets. First, prior to the spin-off the investment allocation in the firm 
was inefficient. Second the internal capital allocation improved after the spin-off 
occurred. The change in the structure of the firm therefore reduced over/under 
investment and agency problems witl-ýn the firm, and so the efficiency of internal 
resource allocation can be improved. 
Large contributions to fund pension schemes have been found to impact upon 
the internal financial resources of the firm. Rauh (2006) found that capital expenditures 
fall in response to large contributions to fund pension scheme deficits. For those firms 
that were the most constrained through lower credit ratings for example, the result was 
shown to be stronger. 
The internal financial resources that are available to management however are 
not limited to capital expenditure. Another potential source of finance that managers 
may exploit is dividends. Much like capital expenditure dividends afford managers a 
high degree of discretion and for many firms they represent also substantial cash 
resource. 
Bhattacharya (1979) and NEller and Rock (1985) argue that dividends are used as 
a method of conveying news to the market. Firms therefore disclose good ne,, vs to the 
markets through dividend payments and bad news through cuts in 
dividends. If 
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dividends are exploited as a source of finance to fund pension deficits it is hkelv to 
convey negative news to the market as dividends would be reduced. 
The fact that investors and markets react to changes in dividends provides and 
interesting situation. Myers (1984) proposes a pecking order of financing options 
between internal finance, debt and external equity in the presence of costly external 
finance. However within the firm there are a number of internal sources of finance that 
have unIque and different characteristics. Dividends under signalling theory are unllkelý, 
to change in response to large contributions as this signals bad news to the market. 
Capital expencLitures however offer managers more discretion and are therefore more 
likely to be exploited before diVidends. It is possible therefore that a pecking order 
exists across different sources of internal capital in the firm. 
6.4 Motivation and Hypotheses 
Defined benefit pension schemes in the UK represent both a significant liability and risk 
to many of the firms who proVide these benefits. As With aH defined benefit schemes 
the liability due to employees is dependant upon the salary, length of ser"Vice and age of 
the active employees within the scheme plus the liability due to deferred and retired 
participants. The funding of these liabilities is generally through a mixture of emploýlee 
and employer contributions to the pension scheme. These contributions are invested in 
dedicated financial assets that are held in trust for the employees by the trustees of the 
pension scheme. In theory the returns and capital appreciation on these assets should 
be sufficient to provide the agreed benefits to all employees. 
In practice asset and hability mis-matches are common and so the scheme -wiu 
be under-funded. This occurs primarily for t-, vo reasons. First the assets that 
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contributions are invested in may not perform as well as expected and so the long-term 
returns generated are insufficient to meet the liabihty. Second, the experience of the 
scheme differs from the assumptions used to estimate the liabilltv of the scheme and so 
the reality of the economic environment may be radically different from expectations. 
This occurs as the calculation of the pension bability is complex and requires estimates 
of future interest rates, inflation and mortality. 
Although there is a high degree of discretion over how any funding shortfall will 
be addressed, there is an expectation on firms to resolve any funding concerns. As 
noted above, this is generally through negotiation between management and scheme 
trustees. Firms will however have to provide additional finance to the scheme through 
either large one-off contributions or through a period of higher contributions. 
How pension schemes are funded should therefore be a function of the size of 
the pension scheme, the asset allocation and funding level of the scheme. Many firms 
have large pension liability exposures i. e. the liability is large relative to the size of the 
firm. ln this case the contributions that have to be paid by the firm will comprise a 
greater percentage of the assets of the firm by virtue of the size of the pension hablEty. 
HI: Pension contributions are unrelated to the si. Ze of thepension scheme 
Scheme funding levels will also have a significant bearing on the contributions 
that are paid into the pension scheme. For pension schemes in the UK there is a 5% 
cap on any surplus assets that can be held in the pension scheme 
67 
. 
This cap is to 
prevent tax avoidance by the firm through over-funding the pension scheme. At the 
other end of the funding spectrum are those schemes that are severely under-funded. 
In such circumstances there is a regulatory expectation that the firm will fund this 
deficit. 
6- This 5",,, ) cap was introduced as part of the Finance Act 1986 and so the assets 
held in surplus 
cannot be greater than 5"',, of the total pension habil-ity of the firm. 
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However, the legaHy imposed trigger point that exists in the US does not exist in the 
UK. Any additional funding of the scheme is as a result of pressure on the management 
from employees and pension trustees. However, it is difficult to say hwv the firm -, N-111 
choose to pay the contributions to the scheme. ? %lanagers may opt to pay a one-off 
special contribution to the scheme. Alternatively theý- may negotiate a longer time 
horizon and pay a series of increased payments to the scheme. 
H2: Pension contributions are unrelated to scbemejundiq 
Pension contributions are also a function of the investment strategy of the 
pension scheme. There are two broad categories of pension investment strategies, total 
return strategies and liability driven investment strategies. Total return strategies invest 
heavily in equities based on the assumption that over long time horizons equities will 
out perform long dated high quality bonds. As a result managers pay lower 
contributions to the scheme as the performance of the investment should offset the 
lower contributions. Liabihty driven investment strategies invest a larger proportion of 
pension assets in long dated bonds as opposed to equities. This strategy is based on 
duration matching. Changes in asset values and pension liabilities in response to interest 
rate changes are therefore offsetting. Liability driven investment however requires on 
average higher pension contributions as the returns generated from the pension assets C) C, ) 
are lower. The strategy however results in more stable funding ratios Within the scheme 
and a more predictable pension cost. 
H3: Pension contributions are unrelated to pension asset allocations 
Contributions to pension schemes provide a useful environment for anah-sing 
internal capital allocation decisions Nvithin firms. Rauh (2006) for a sample of 
US firms 
sho,, ved that capital expenditures fell in response to large pension contributions. 
The 
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UK environment presents a more direct case to analyse managerial choices as the legal 
funding trigger that exists in the US is not present. I can therefore analyse how 
management choose to exploit the internal resources of the firm. Capital expenditure is 
an obvious resource to consider. Managers have a high degree of control o%-cr the 
capital expenditures of the firm and have been shown to ufflise this resource in 
providing additional finance to the pension scheme. 
pital e, %penditures have no relation to 
_pension 
scheme contý7*blifions H4: Ca 
Firm profitability is related to the level of capital expenditure in the firm. The 
internal capital allocation process Within firms however has been shown to be distorted. 
This is due to inefficient investments occurring and so managers over-invest and 
undertake projects that are not shareholder wealth maximising. This is consistent With 
an agency View of managenal behaviour and empire building taking place. However, in 
the absence of such behaviours there is potential for large pension contributions to 
adversely affect the profitability of the firm. If the firm only undertakes shareholder 
wealth maximising projects any reduction in capital expenditure may lead to current 
investments having to be cut back or new projects being rejected. Consequently, large 
contributions may lead to lower profitability. Conversely, where there are agency risks 
and empire building the payment of large contributions to the pension scheme may 
reduce overinvestment in unprofitable projects and result in a higher profitabllitý. 
H5: Firm profitabilio I'S unrelated topension scbeme contributions 
Dividends for many firms represent a substantial cash outla\,. As such this is a 
potential source of finance that is available to management. If dividends are accessed to 
provide additional funding to the pension scheme the level of 
dividends paid to 
shareholders vJll fall. Cuts in dividends however are associated xvith conveying negative 
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news to the markets. It is unlikely therefore that management Will choose to access this 
finance as it may cause a negative share price reaction. Impli 1 icitly there may be a pecking 
order of the internal financial resources of the firm. 
H6: The level of dividends paid IS unrelated to Pension scheme conftibulions 
Another potential source of funding for financing special contributions to the 
pension scheme is through the disposal of fixed assets. Managers again have a high 
degree of control over the fixed assets of the firm. However, one of the factors that 
contribute to firm size is the quantity of fixed assets the firm has. If managers exhibit 
agency behaviours firm size wiH be a factor that they are sensitive to as compensation 
and bonuses are often related to the size of the firm. Managers may therefore avoid 
fixed asset disposals as a way of generating cash to fund any pension deficit. 
H7. - Fixed Asset sales are unrelated to pension scheme contributions 
6.5 Data and Methodology 
My sample comprises all firms in the FTSE 350 from June 2001 until June 2004. The 
FTSE 350 is the index of the largest 350 corporations in the UK". From this list I 
remove 44 Ested investment trusts, 62 firms that only provide defined contribution 
pension benefits and 2 that do not provide any retirement benefits. My maximum 
sample is 284 firms per year and 1,136 firm years. The final sample however is just 536 
firms. This occurs for two reasons. First a number of companies suspended hsting, 
merged or were taken over. More importantly however, the sample period covers the 
transitional arrangements for FRS-17 and the disclosure of the service costs of the 
scheme and firm contributions data is extremelv low. Although pension 
disclosure 
68 To avold survivorship bias we include all firrns that were fisted in the 
index over the sample 
period. 
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improves over the sample period for pension scheme characteristics the disclosure for 
the financing and cost of schemes remains relatively poor over the whole sample. 
FRS-1 7 is the new fair value accounting standard that covers pension accounting 
in the UK between 2001 and 2004. Under FRS-17 the different asset classes for 
pension asset investments, the pension liability, the return assumptions and the IIab1l1tV 
assumptions are disclosed. Pension contributions paid by the firm and the sen-ice cost 
of the scheme are also disclosed but the level of disclosure is significantly lower. 
From this, I sum the individual asset classes to calculate the total pension assets. 
I calculate the gross surplus/ (deficit) of the pension scheme by summing total pension 
assets and total pension liabilities. To characterise the pension portfolio assets, I 
calculate the percentage of total pension assets composed of equity. The pension 
liability and surplus/ (deficit) variables are scaled by the total assets of the firm as the 
standardised measure more accurately reflects the risk that the scheme poses to the firm. 
For example, although a pension deficit of k50m is a large number, relative to a firm 
with a market capitahsation of klObn, the amount is relatively smal However, if the 
market value of the firm was k100m, the deficit of the pension of the scheme would be 
very large, since it constitutes 50% of the firm's market value. 
Following Rauh (2006) 1 then calculate Tobin's Q, cash flow and non-pension 
cash flow. Tobin's Q is simply the market-to-book ratio of firm assets where, 
Tobin'sQ = 
(Market ValueojEquity + Book ValueofAssets )- (Book ValueqjEq u ity + DefferredTaxes) 
Book ValueofAss ets 
The cash flow variables are based upon specifications derived in Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003). In these stu(: hes cash flow is 
defined as net income plus depreciation and amorfization. Depreciation and 
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amortization are added back as they are in reality non-cash charges and so should not be 
removed from net income when deriving the cash flow of the firm. Rauh (2006) adjusts 
this calculation to incorporate the pension expense (service cost) as this is charged 
against income but does not reflect the true cash charge against income, namely the 
actual contributions. These cash flow variables are then scaled by the total assets of the 
firm. 
Cashflow = NetIncome + Depreciation + Amortization + ServiceCost - Contributions 
NonPensionCashflow = NetIncome + De reciation + Amortization + ServiceCost p 
6.5.1 Descti pfive Statistics 
Table 6-1 presents the pooled descriptive statistics of my sample firms. In looking at 
the magnitude of the pension contributions it is clear that the contributions are on 
average greater than the cost of the scheme. This is shown by the fact that 
contributions to service cost is on average 1.72, firms are therefore paying more to their 
pension schemes than simply the estimated cost of proViding the pension benefits. 
From Figure 6-1 it can also be seen that firms are contributing more to their pension 
schemes over the sample period. 
The magnitude of the contributions relative to the assets of the firm I can see 
that the average contribution only constitutes 1% of total assets. However, in 
considering the size of contributions relative to the cash flow of the 
firm it is clear that 
the contributions are not insignificant as they account for 13% of firm cash on aý-erage. 
From looking at the 90'hpercentile of the pooled sample I can see that this rises to 
29"o 
of cash flow and is therefore a considerable outlay relative to cash 
flow in the firm. 
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Table 6-1 Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics and Pension 
Contributions 
Table 6-1 presents pooled descriptive statistics for my sample companies over the period 2001-2004. The table presents the 
mean, and percentiles. The data items in the table are capital expenditure/ total assets, cash flow/total assets, non-pension cash 
flow/total assuts, contributions/ sem cc cost, contributions /total assets, contributions /cash flow, hability/total assets, pension 
assets/total assets, funding measured by the ratio of pension assets to pension liabilities and Tobin's Q. The final three items 
present the 20`4 of highest contributions scaled bý total assets, cash flow and capital expenditure. 
Percentiles 
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th goth 
Capex/Assetst-1 0.054 0.006 0.022 (). (143 0.011 0.116 
Cash Flow/ Assetst-1 0.082 0.006 0.041 0.087 0.127 0.1-, 71 
Non-Pension Cash Flow/ Assetst-1 0.097 0.009 0,053 0.099 0.140 (). 188 
Tobin's Q 1.498 0.922 1.038 1.279 1.681 2.304 
Contributions/ Assetst-1 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.022 
Contributions/ Cash Flow 0.134 0.003 0.021 (). 057 0.133 0.291 
Liability/ Assetst-I 0.495 0.015 0.079 0.210 0.433 0.777 
Pension Assets/ Assetst-1 0.383 0.012 0.055 0.171 0.344 0.645 
Funding 0.795 0.634 0.696 0.773 0.862 0.951 
Voluntary Contributions/ Assetst-1 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.019 0.042 
Voluntary Contributions/ Cash Flow 0.235 0.007 0.039 0.102 0.259 0.593 
Voluntary Contributions/ C apex 0.037 0.000 0.001 0. ()()3 0.008 0.012 
Figure 6-1 Contributions to Service Cost 
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The level of contributions that I find and the fact that most firms are 
contributing more above the cost of provision is a result of the poor 
levels of funding 
that I observe. From Table 6-1 the average level of funding, measured 
bv the ratio of 
pension assets to pension liabilities, is 79%. However, when I look at the percentiles it 
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can be seen that there is significant variation in the funding With funding for some firms 
being as low as 63%. Figure 6-2 presents scheme funding over time. It is clear that the 
level of funding has deteriorated considerably for most firms. This is predoMinantIN 
due to the declines in the stock market over the sample period. 
Figure 6-2 Pension Scheme Funding Levels 2001-2004 
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In bringing Figure 2-1 and Figure 6-2 together it is clear that as funding has 
decreased across A firms the magnitude of the contributions paid has increased. 
Managers are therefore responding to the decreased funding in the pension schemes 
that they operate. This will in part be due to the clarity with which the pension liabilities 
and funding levels are presented in the annual report. However, there is also a 
regulatory requirement to address poor levels of funding and this is clearly ,,,, 
hat I 
observe. 
Another fact that is N-cry apparent is the size of the pension schemes firm-, hold 
relative to the firm. The average pension liability is almost half the total assets of the 
firm. Again I do observe a positive skew as for certain firms' this ratio is considerably 
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higher. From the 90'h percentile 1 can see that the liability is 77'',. of total assets and so 
this is a significant risk to the firm, even in circumstances where funding is relatively 
high any deficit in such a scheme will he a considerable burden on the firm. 
The final section of Table 6-1 presents the descriptive statistics of those firms 
that pay the highest contributions relative to the cost of the scheme. These firms are 
selected on the magnitude of contributions to service cost. The data was ranked on 
sorted on this metric and I analyse the top 20%. 
Although the average for total assets to contributions is not considerably higher 
at 1.5% of total assets, the 90'h percentile is much higher at 4% of total assets. Further, 
when I consider the ratio of contributions to cash flow I can see that the magnitude of 
the contributions that the top 20% of firms pay is significant. The average contribution 
to cash flow is 23% and the 90'hpercentile is almost 60% of cash flow. 
6.6 Results 
In this section, I test the hypotheses that were developed in section 6.4. Section 6.6.1 
examines the relationship between pension contributions the size of the pension scheme, 
scheme funding and pension asset allocation. Section 6.6.2 discusses the relationship 
between large pension contributions and capital expenditure. The third section 6.6.3 
analyses firm profitabibty and large pension contributions. The final section 
6.6.4 
investigates the impact of large contributions on other potential sources of 
funding 
from within the firm. 
6.6.1 Contributions and Scbeme Garacten'slics 
The first section of my analysis tests the relationship between pension scheme 
characteristics and the level of contributions paid 
by the firm. I would expect that 
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where a pension scheme is large relative to the size of the firm then the contributions 
that have to be paid to the scheme would be large relative to the size of the firm". 
Table 6-2 OLS Analysis of Pension Contributions and Pension 
Liabilities 
Table 6-2 presents OLS regressions of pension contributions scaled by total assets against the lJabilit, ý of 
the firm scaled by total assets, firm size measured by the log of market value and the book to market ratio. 
Columns 1-3 correspond to 2002,2003 and 2004 respectively. I exclude 2001 from the analysis, as only 7 
firms disclose their contributions data. The table presents the regression coefficient and immediately 
below in parenthesis is the corresponding t-statistic. * indicates significance at 99% and '"indicates 
significance at 95'ý,,, and *** indicates significance at 90%. 
Contributions j, /Total. Assetsi,, -, 
2002 2003 2004 
Intercept 0.01 0.01 0.02 
(2.20) (2.19)** (3.58)1 
Liability/Total Assetst-1 0.016 0.018 0.0189 
(11.28)* (12.8 5) (9.08)* 
Size -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0016 
(-1.29) (-0.78) -(2.29)** 
Book-to-Market -0.002 -0.003 -(). 01 
(-2.12)** (-3.24)* (-2.88)* 
From Table 6-2 1 can see that year-on-year contributions are functionally related 
to the size of the pension scheme. ln A years there is a positive and significant 
relationship between contributions and the size of the firm. Further, I can see that the 
coefficients increase over time, this is consistent with broader experience as the 
contributions paid by all firms regardless of size increase over time. I can therefore 
reject my first null hypothesis that pension contributions are unrelated to the size of the 
pension bablbty. 
Next I test the relationship between the funding level of the scheme and the 
contributions paid to the scheme. As with the size of the scheme my expectation would 
be that contributions are related to the funding of the scheme. I use the gross 
surplus/ (deficit) of the scheme scaled by the total assets of the 
firm to proxy for 
69 We only analYse 2002-2004 as the disclosure in 2001 was limited with only 
7 firms disclosing 
their contribution information. Consequently it is not possible to perform regression analysis 
for 2001. 
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funding as the more widely reported ratio of pension assets to pension liabilities does 
not account for the size of the scheme relative to the firm. 
Further, there is no legal trigger point in the UK , vhere firms must make 
mandatory contributions to fund pension deficits, unlike in the US. HoNvever, there is a 
regulatory expectation that firms must provide appropriate funding for their pension 
schemes and this includes deficit recovery contributions. In addition to this a legal cap 
is placed on the level of contributions that can be paid to a scheme in surplus to prevent 
tax avoidance through over funding. I would therefore expect a linear relationship 
between funding and contributions. 
Table 6-3 OLS Analysis of Pension Contributions and Pension 
Funding 
Table 6-3 presents OLS regressions of pension contributions scaled by total assets against the gToss pension 
surplus/ (deficit) of the firm scaled by total assets, firm size measured by the log of market value and the book 
to market ratio. Columns 1-3 correspond to 2002,2003 and 2004 respectively. I exclude 2001 from the 
analysis as only 7 firmý disclose their contributions data. The table presents the regression coefficient and 
immediately below in parenthesis is the corresponding t-statistic. * indicates significance at 99% and 
**indicates significance at 95 and *** indicates significance at 90%. 
Contributions j, /Total Assetsi,, _1 
2002 2003 2004 
Intercept 0.01 0.004 0.02 
(3.24)'ý (1.01) (2.5 6) *ý 
Surplus/Total Assets, _1 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 
(-4.06)* (-8.55)* (-7.24) 
Size -0.0001 -0.00 -0.001 
(-1.83)*** (-0.01) (-1.34) 
Book-to-Market -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
(-2.62)** (-0.33) (-1.80)*** 
From Table 6-3 it is clear that lower levels of funding are associated with higher 
levels of contributions. In all years there is a significant and negative relationship 
between the level of funding and the contributions paid to the scheme. Again I can see 
that over time as the funding levels of schemes deteriorate the level of contributions 
paid increases. This is again consistent Nvith broader experience. I can therefore reject 
my second null hypothesis that contributions are unrelated to the 
funding level of the 
scheme. 
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Finally I consider the relationship between the level of contributions paid to the 
scheme and the investment strategy of the pension scheme. As noted above there arc 
broadly two types of investment strategy that are implemented, total return strategies 
and liability driven investment strate ies. Total return strate ies are typified by large 91 91 
allocations to equity. I therefore test the relationship between contributions and the 
percentage of equity investment in the pension portfoho. 
Table 6-4 OLS Analysis of Pension Contributions and Pension 
Asset Allocation 
Table 6-4 presents (AS regressions of pension contributions scaled by total assets against the 
composition of the pension portfolio measured by the percentage of equity, firm size measured by the 
log of rnark(: t value and the book to market ratio. Columns 1-3 correspond to 2002,2003 and 2004 
respectively. 1 exclude 2001 from the analysis as only 7 firms disclose their contributions data. The table 
presents the rcPTcssion coefficient and immediately below in parenthesis is the corresponding t-statistic. 
indicates significance at 99 and **indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 90%. 
Contributionsit/Total Assetsi, t-l 
2002 2003 2004 
Intercept 0.03 0.03 0.05 
(5.46)* (5.51)* (5.6 8) 
Equity Percentage -0.011 -0.014 -0.009 
(-2.35)** (2.63)** (-1.26) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
(-2.92)* (-3.08)* -(4.19)* 
Book-to-Market -0.007 -0.004 -0.01 
(-4.16)* (-2.49)"-* (-2.9 9) 
Table 6-4 presents the results of this analysis. 1 can see that for both 2002 and 
2003 there is a significant and negative relationship between pension contributions and 
the percentage of pension assets invested in equity. For the final year (2004) the 
direction of the relationship remains the same as in the earlier years, howeý-er, the 
relationship is no longer significant and the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly 
smaller. I can still therefore reject my null hypothesis in 2 out of 3 cases. 
This finding is 
interesting howex-er, as the funding pattern I observe over time shows that afl 
firms 
increase the levels of contributions to their scheme regardless of 
funding and this may 
provide an explanation as to , vhy the significance of the relationship changes over time. 
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6.6.2 Conttibutions and Firm Ca pilal E\pen(litures 
The next part of my analysis considers the relationship between the capital expenditurcs 
of the firm and contributions. Rauh (2006) documented that large mandatory 
contributions are related to falls in capital expenditures in the US. Based on the 
methodology employed by Rauh (2006) 1 analyse this relationship for the L'K. 
Table 6-5 presents the relationships between contributions, cash flow and capital 
expenditure. Regression 1 (a) is a standard analysis of capital expenditures, cash flo-w 
and the unobserved investment opportunities of the firm (measured by Tobin's 
Consistent With expectations I can see that capital expenditures are positively related to 
both the level of cash within the firm and the investment opportuni6es of the firm. 
Regression 1 (b) introduces the Rauh (2006) non-pension cash flow variable. Again 
consistent with expectations I find that higher levels of capital expenditure are 
associated with increased levels of non-pension cash flow. 
Regression 1 (c) includes my interactive dummy variable that captures the top 
quintile of contributions paid by firms. Consistent with Rauh (2006) 1 find that these 
firms have significantly lower capital expenditures. Based upon the point estimate of 
the coefficient for a kl increase in contributions to the pension scheme there is a 
concomitant ý0.31 decrease in capital expenditures. This finding is therefore not only 
statistically significant but economically significant also. 
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Regressions 2(a)-2(d) introduce a control for the funding level of the pension 
scheme measured by the ratio of pension assets to pension liabilities. The results show 
that even after controlling for the unobserved investment opportunities of the firm and 
the level of funding in the pension scheme 1-iigher levels of non-pension cash flow are 
associated with increased capital expenditures in the firm. The regression coefficient is 
broadly similar under all specifications and so for everv ki increase in non-pension cash 
flow capital expenditures increase by CO. 15. 
From regression 2(d) I can see that after controlling for the le%-el of funding in 
the scheme that the effect of large contributions to the scheme on capital e-, penditures 
is even stronger. Based upon the regression coefficients 1 find that for cx-ery kl paid to 
the pension scheme in large voluntary contributions capital expenditures fall by around 
kO. 61. Based upon this analysis I can therefore reject of nun that capital expenditures 
are unrelated to the contributions paid to the pension scheme. 
6.6.3 Contributions and Firm Profilabilio 
I extend the analysis of Rauh (2006) by considering the relationship between 
large 
contributions and the profitability of the firm. There are a number of reasons 
for 
considering this relationship. One of the key drivers of firm profitability is the 
level of 
capital expenditure within the firm. If managers only make shareholder wealth 
maximising investments then large contributions to the pension scheme will reduce 
capital expenditure. In such circumstances this would be 
detrimental to shareholder 
wealth as potentially profitable projects are forgone. However, the internal capital 
allocation process has been shown to be distorted as a result of 
divisional rent seeking 
by managers. Consequently, as a result of agencý, costs and over investment through 
empire building the process of resource allocation and investment -, vithin the 
firm may 
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be inefficient. The payment of large contributions mav therefore reduce the level of 
free cash flow and reduce the level of empire building. 
Table 6-6 presents the results of my analysis of large contributions and firm 
profitability. My main finding is that those firms that make large contributions to their 
pension scheme have higher profitability. I measure firm profitability as the ratio of 
cash flow to sales. From the results presented in Table 6-6 1 can also see that higher 
levels of non-pension cash flow are associated with higher profitability. This, ho\%ýever, 
may be due in part to the cash flow component of my dependent variable. If I look at 
the contributions to total assets and voluntary contributions I find that there is a 
significant and negative effect between cash flow to sales and contributions to total 
assets. However, for those firms making the highest contributions to the pension 
scheme there is a significant and positive relationship. I can therefore reject my null 
that firm profitability is unrelated to pension contributions. 
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In bringing the results of Table 6-5 together with Table 6-6 those firms that 
make the highest contributions to the pension scheme have lower capital expenditure 
and increased profitabihty. This finding is consistent with the agency theory of internal 
capital allocation. The large contnbutions to the pension scheme may therefore be 
reducing overinvestment and empire building in the firm through the reduction of free 
cash flow. 
6.6.4 Contributions and Other Sources of Financiiig 
The final part of my analysis considers other potential sources of internal financing that 
the managers of the firm may choose to utihse when paying large contributions to the 
pension scheme. Although the main focus of the research thus far has been on capital 
expenditures, there are a number of other sources of internal cash flow that 
management may be able to exploit when having to paý large contributions to the 
pension scheme. 
Table 6-7 Pooled Regressions of Dividends against Pension and 
Non-Pension Cash Flows 
Table 6-7 presents regression results from my pooled regressions of total dividends scaled by the total assets 
of the firm. The explanatory variables are Presented in the far left column of the table. Contributions are the 
cash contributions paid to the pension by the firm. Non-pension cash flow is the Rauh (2006) non-pension 
cash flow. Voluntary Contributions is in an interactive dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
contributions of the firm scaled by total assets is in the top quintile of pension contributions relative to the 
size of the firm. Q is Tobin's Q and funding is the ratio of pension assets to pension liabilities. 
* indicates 
significance at 99% and **indicates significance at 95'ý,, and *** indicates significance at 
90%. 
Dividends /Ass etst-1 
Intercept -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
(-0.81) (-0.87) (-0.72) (-0.82) 
Contributions /Assetst-, 0.080 0.060 
(1.60) (0.98) 
Non-pension Cash Flow/ Assetst-1 0.060 0.066 0.068 0.066 
(7.89)* (7.29)* (7.8 2) * (7.27) 
Voluntary Contributions /Assets, -, 
0.080 0.029 
(1.31) (0.36) 
Qi"-1 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.017 
(16.64) (15.96) (15.7 9) * (15.82)* 
Funding 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.09) (0.02) (-0.04) (-O. ()Il) 
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Table 6-7 presents my analvsis of dividends and contributions. I consider 
dividends in detail as they represent a large cash resource within the firm that managers 
have a high degree of discretion over. My results show that there is no relationship 
between diVidends and large pension contributions. This result is unsurprising as 
dividends have been shown to be a signaffing device (Miller and Rock (1985), 
Battacharya (1979)). If dividends were lower as a result of paying large contributions to 
the pension scheme it is conceivable that this could be interpreted as a very nega6vc 
signal and so it is unsurprising that no relationship was found. The table also shows 
that dividends are significantly higher where there are higher levels of non-pension cash 
flow and levels of Q. The funding of the pension scheme was also found to be 
unrelated to the dividends in the firm. I cannot therefore reject my null that there is no 
relation between contributions and diVidends. 
Table 6-8 Pooled Regressions of Disposals against Pension and Non- 
Pension Cash Flows 
Table 6-8 presents regression results from my pooled regressions of asset disposals scaled by the cash flow of the 
firm. The explanatory variables are presented in the far left column of the table. Contributions are the cash 
contributions paid to the pension by the firm. Non-pension cash flow is the Rauh (2006) non-pension cash flow. 
VoluntarN- Contributions is in an interactive dummNý variable that takes the %-, Aue of 1 if the contributions of the 
firm scaled by total assets is in the top quintile of pension contributions relative to the size of the firm. Q is 
Tobin's Q and funding is the ratio of pension assets to pension liabilities. * indicates significance at 99% and 
**indicates significance at 95% and *** indicates significance at 90%. 
Disposals/Cash Flow 
Intercept 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.72 
(1.79)**' (1.79)*** (1.78)*** (1.79)*** 
Contributions /Assetst-, -0.96 -1.94 
(-0.06) (-0.09) 
Non-pension Cash Flow/ Assetst-, -2.83 -3.58 -3.62 -3.56 
(-1.14) (-1.23) (-1.26) (-1.21) 
Voluntary Contributions /Assetst-, 0.19 1.71 
(0.01) (0.06) 
-0.53 -0.50 -0.49 -0.50 
(-1,61) (-1.47) (-1.46) (-1.46) 
Funding -1.15 -1.12 -1.13 -1.13 
(-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.65) 
Table 6-8 presents my analysis of asset disposals 
exercise a high level of control over the 
disposal of assets 
As -,, -Ith dividends managers 
It is feasible that managers 
F)OOR 
6 
DO DEFINED BENEFIT CONTRIBUTIONS REDUCE CAPITAL EXPENDITUIREAND 
PROFITABILITYý Ru-, c 21 
may dispose of assets to create income to fund the pension scheme. However, as with 
diVidends I find no relationsl-ýp between asset disposals and the magnitude of the 
pension contributions. I cannot therefore reject my null hypothesis that asset disposals 
are unrelated to large contributions to the pension scheme. 
For completeness I also consider a range of other factors that , vere analysed in 
Rauh (2006). 1 test R&D, changes in the level of debt in the firm, trade credit and 
working capital. Table 6-9 presents the results of this final analysis. On the whole these 
other factors are unrelated to large pension contributions. Consistent With expectations 
however, firms With large levels of non-pension cash flow have lower R&D, lower 
changes in the level of debt in the firm and higher levels of working capital. 
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6.7 Summary 
This chapter analyses the relationship between pension contributions, capital 
expenditure and firm profitability. I show that where firms make large contributions to 
their pension scheme capital expenditures are lower. Nly results suggest that after 
controlling for the level of funding in the scheme a k1.00 increase in contributions 
lowers capital expenditures bý, approximately CO. 22. The economic impact of these 
contributions on firm capital expenditure is significant. Hoxvever, 1 also find that these 
firms have higher levels of profitability. This suggests that where large contributions 
are paid to fund the pension scheme there is a reduction in over-investment and empire 
building within the firm. 
Pension contributions are also shown to be functionally related to the size of the 
pension scheme, scheme funding and the asset aflocation strategy of the scheme. 
Interestingly I find that for the final year of my sample the sigruficance of the asset 
allocation strategy disappears. Over the sample period 1 also find that there is an 
increase in the level of contributions paid to schemes. 
I also consider other sources of internal finance that are available to managers to 
finance the contributions to the scheme. In particular I consider diVidends and asset 
disposals. For dividends I find that there is no relationship between dividends and the 
level of contributions paid to the scheme. Again for asset disposals I find that there is 
no relationship with pension contributions. 
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7 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
7.1 Introduction 
How incomes are provided in retirement and the associated costs and risks of doing so 
is one of the most important challenges facing both the government and corporations in 
the UK. Further, it is the objective of the government to increase the level of provision 
Page "II 
by the private sector and thereby corporations. Consequently, the impact and cost of 
provision on firms is of interest not only to academics but also regulators and 
practitioners. Utilising newly available data on pension accounting disclosures this study 
has attempted to analyse how defined benefit pension proVision relates to the firm. 
This chapter will present a summary and overview of the main findings of the 
empirical analysis that was undertaken in the preceding chapters. In addition the 
chapter will discuss the strengths and weaknesses in the existing study as well as 
suggesting areas for future research. It should also be noted that this thesis does not 
have a stand alone literature review, this occurs for two reasons. First, the literature on 
pensions specifically does not sit well within this analysis as it is concerned with, 
behavioural finance, choice in retirement, stochastic mortality, annuities etc. Second, 
I 
analyse three very distinct aspects of the problem and so to include the relevant 
literatures for each topic in one chapter would have been disjointed. The rest of the 
chapter is organised as foBows. Section 7.2 restates the motivations and the context of 
f5c)Ga 
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the research. Section 7.3 presents and discusses the findings of the analysis. Section 7.4 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the current research and also proposes a 
number of areas for future research. 
7.2 Research Background and Objectives 
As noted above the provision of retirement incomes for citizens is one of the biggest 
economic chaflenges in the 21" century. A mixture of improved standards of Eving and 
rapid increases in medical technology has dramatically increased the life expectancy of 
individuals. Consequently, the cost and uncertainty associated with providing pensions 
has increased dramatically over the past 50 years and in particular over the past decade. 
In tandem with this the move to shift the burden of provision aý, vay from the state 
towards the private sector increasingly places these risks on corporations. This thesis 
contributes to the extant literature on pensions through analysing three key areas, 
namely pension accounting; pension risk and firm risk; and pension plan funding and 
firm investment. 
Page 212 
How firms account for their pensions is extremely important. From a regulatory 
point of View the objective of accounting standards is that firms should present a 'true 
and fair' view of the corporation in financial reports. However, this is an important goal 
for users of financial accounts, as it allows investors to assess the risks of the 
firm both 
cross-sectionally and through time. The clear and consistent application of the 
accounting standards is also important for employees and trustees of the scheme as theý- 
can analyse the securltý, of the benefits that they have been promised. 
This study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to anaIN-se the \vay in v. -hich 
managers have adopted the new fair value accounting standard for pension accounting, 
i0clq 
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FRS-17.1 consider a number of different facets that aRow for a comprehensive analysis 
of UK pension accounting. The study considers the cross-sectional vanation across 
firms, auditors and actuaries. Further, I test the determinants of the assumptions and 
finally, the value relevance of the accounting disclosures to assess , N-hether the 
accounting amounts are incorporated into stock prices. 
1 also put forward a methodological refinement for analysing pension 
accounting through the construction of more appropriate estimators of pension 
accounting manipulations. Prior studies such as Bergstresser el al (2006) only consider 
absolute assumptions e. g. the expected return on plan assets. However, these do not 
capture the full effect of any marupulation. I attempt to create better proxies for 
manipulation through the apphcation of spread variables as they reflect the 'true' 
manipulation. 
The second part of my analý, sis considers risk and market efficiency. In an 
efficient market measures of systematic risk will reflect the underlying risk of the 
pension scheme. However, there are a number of reasons that this maý, not be the case. 
First, pensions in many respects are considered to be off-balance sheet and so maý- 
therefore be 'unobservable' in the market. Second as rioted by jin et al (2005) pension 
Page 2' 13 
accounting is opaque and so the market may not be able to see through the veil of 
pension accounting. 
Further how management address these risks is of considerable interest. Faced 
with large risks management have two options. First, they can undertake risk 
management. Second, they can engage in asset substitution through investing in riskier 
projects in the hope that, the risky pro' t, if successful will result in a much 
larger paN jec 1 
off. 
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1 therefore analyse if the market prices the different components of pension 
risk. My analysis looks at the relationship between systematic risk factors and the 
different types of pension risk. In an extension of jin et al (2006) 1 also consider the 
Fama-French (1993) size and value risk factors. I also examine measures of operational 
and financial risk within the firm and whether I obsen-e risk shifting or risk 
management of pension risks within the firm. 
My final research area is on the cost of pension provision and the internal capital 
allocadon process within the firm. The cost of funding and providing benefits is 
significant. 1n addition to this the firm has limited financial resources with which to 
fund any shortfalls in the scheme. Consequently, if the funding of large shortfalls 
results in lower firm wide investment then the profitability of the firm may be reduced. 
This study therefore analyses the relationship between contributions to fund 
pension deficits and internal capital markets. In an extension of Rauh (2006) 1 consider 
a range of internal sources of finance that management may utilise to fund the scheme. 
Further I also consider the impact on firm profitability as changes in the internal capital 
resources of the firm may result in changes to corporate investment strategies and 
thereby profitablEty. 
7.3 Summary of Main Findings 
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In undertaking an in depth analysis of the impact of pensions on firms 7 
different 
chapters are included in this thesis. The first chapter introduced the topic 
highlighting 
why pensions research is important and also identified the thrcc main research areas that 
the subsequent analysis covered. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the evolution of pension 
accounting in the UK. The Chapter also provides an overvie-w of the many 
MOR 
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complexities that are faced when accounting for pensions. Chapter 3 presents and 
summarised the data that would be used in the proceeding empirical chapters. In 
addition the chapter also discusses some of the issues associated with the collection and 
creation of the variables that are used in the subsequent empirical analysis. The next 
three chapters present rnýl empirical analysis of pension accounting, risk and investment. 
The proceeding sections of this chapter highlight the key findings from each of these 
chapters. 
7.3.1 Pension Accountiq 
In the first empirical chapter I analyse how the nev- Accounting Standard for pension 
accounting, FRS-1 7, has been implemented. In particular I document the firm level 
cross-sectional variation in the different assumptions that are being applied. Second I 
consider the role of both the auditor and the actuary in the choice of assumption. Third 
I then analyse the determinants of the choice of assumption across firms. Finak, I test 
whether the accounting amounts that are presented in the financial reports are value 
relevant. 
My findings can be summarised as foUows. I find that the observed cross- 
Page 2' 15 
sectional variation in assumptions across firms cannot be explained by the identity of 
either the auditor or actuary of the firm. Further, I find that the assumptions that are 
disclosed are on the whole significantly different from expectations. I present evidence 
that the choice of assumption is a function of the asset composition of the pension 
portfolio and funding of the pension scheme. Last I show that the accounting amounts 
that are presented in the annual reports are N-alue relevant and so the introduction of 
fair 
value accounting has resulted in accounting amounts that are impounded into share 
prices. However, the variation in assumptions that is observed shwxs that management 
flo GR 
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utilise the discretion afforded to them under the standard preventing a consistent 
picture of the pension. 
17.3.2 Pensions Risk andAlarkel Lffuielicy 
In the second empirical chapter I analyse the relationship between measures of firm risk 
and the underlYing pension scheme. First I analyse whether measures of svstematic risk 
reflect the underlying risks of the pension scheme. Second I analý-sed the relationship 
between pension risk, operational and financial risk within the firm and the probability 
of default. Finally, I tested whether I observe risk management or risk shifting in 
response to pension risk. 
My results can be summarised as follows. First, measures of systematic risk 
reflect the size of the pension liability, the level of funding in the scheme and the asset 
allocation. Further, I find that the size and value loading factors from the Farna-French 
(1993) 3 factor model also reflect the risks of the pension scheme. 
In looking at operating risk, financial risk and probability of default I find that 
higher measures of risk are associated with larger pension liabilities and poor levels of 
scheme funding. For my analysis of risk shifting and risk management 1 find evidence 
of risk management by firms that have higher levels of operating risk and financial risk. 
However, 1 find no evidence of risk management or risk shifting in response to 
increased default risk. 
7.3.3 Pension Conttibutions, Internal CapitalAlarkets and Firm 
Profitabilio 
The final part of my empirical analysis in Chapter 6 considers the relationship 
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between pension contributions, firm investment and profitabil-ity. I firstly analyse the 
relationship between capital expenditures and large pension contributions. 
Second I 
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examine other potential sources of finance that managers mav utilise, namelv dividends 
and asset disposals. Third I analyse the impact of contributions on profitability. Last I 
examine a range of other potential sources of internal capital that may be used by 
management to fund large contributions to the pension scheme of the firm. 
My results can be summarised as follows. First, I show that the contributions 
paid to the scheme are a function of the size of the pension scheme, the level of funding 
and the asset allocation of the scheme. Further, consistent , vith Rauh (2006), capital 
expenditures fall in response to large pension contributions. In addition to this I find 
that the level of dividends paid and asset turnover within the firm are unaffected by 
large contributions to the pension scheme. Finally, I find that the profitablEty of those I 
firms that pay the largest contributions is higher. This is consistent With a reduction in 
agency costs within the firm as there is a more efficient use of firm assets and a 
reduction in over investment within the firm. 
7.4 Constraints of the Current Study and Further Research 
Directions 
Utilising the newly available FRS-17 disclosures of the largest corporations in the LIK 
this study has contributed to the existing understanding of how the provision of 
employee pension schemes relate to the firm. The findings of the thesis contribute 
towards the extant research in pensions, accounting, market efficiencý, and risk and 
corporate finance and investment. In addition the thesis presents a different perspective 
on all of these relationships, as the majority of research in tl-ýs area is 
dominated by US 
research. 
Page 21 - 
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Although there are a number of strengths in the research contained in the thesis 
there are also a number of weaknesses that must be considered , vhen assessing the 
results of the current analysis. 
First, the analysis is constrained by a small sample. The data only spans four 
years and even in the largest firms the level of disclosure is inconsistent. In particular 
the contributions data is particularly poor and this potentially could have some bearing 
on my findings. 
Second manv of the relationships that I discuss are complex and the immediate 
intuition of the results is not always self evident. There are a wide range of factors that 
may influence my findings that 1 cannot control for or take account of such as 
stochastic mortality and scheme specific experience. Further, I also cannot observe how 
many of the complex accounting variables have been arrived at such as the pension 
liability. 
Underpinning the preceding analysis a number of assumptions have been made. 
The first is that 1 have assumed that markets are both imperfect and incomplete. In 
doing so this means that the pension and A the associated risks, costs and benefits are 
relevant to management. Implicitly management must address the risks of the pension 
such as a deficit in funding as there is no insurance contract that can be purchased to 
hedge pension risks. In assuming imperfect markets management must fund the 
Page 22 18 
scheme from firm assets, as external and internal finance are not equiValent as a result of 
informational asymmetries, taxes and issuance costs. 
Again, another assumption is that management are morivated to address these 
risks either because they are in the scheme, although Nve cannot 
distinguish where this is 
the case, or because of labour market implications and employee relations. 
Management 
may use the pension scheme as a recruitment and retention tool. One example where 
FOGR 
7 
CONCLL'SIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTI'R['- RESEARCH 
this is actually the case in practice is in accountancy, Baker Tiflv, a large UK accounting 
firm, are the only big accountancy firm to provide an open defined benefits scheme, all 
other firms, including the Big Four, only offer defined contributions. Baker Tilly utilise 
these generous benefits as part of their recruitment strategy. 
Two other considerations are funding requirements and tax. Funding and 
deficit recoverý, over my sample period was essentially through negotiation bem-een 
trustees and management. However, OPRA, the regulator monitored this situation to 
ensure that firms were meeting their pension obligations and addressing any substantial 
shortfalls. This is very distinct to the US system where there is a legal trigger point, and 
if funding falls below this level the US regulator ensures that firms provide deficit 
recovery. 
Finally, tax is a complex issue and throughout my analysis I have assumed that 
the competing tax incentives of underfunding and overfunding the pension scheme are 
secondary to issues With respect to managerial decision making. The preceding analysis 
assumes that factors such as the costs of providing the scheme, asset allocation, nsk 
management and corporate strategy have a stronger impact on managerial decision 
making. Although the tax issue is of considerable interest it is out With the scope of this 
thesis, however, it is an area that merits further research in the future. 
In undertaking the analysis it is also clear that there are a number of future 
research topics in this area. First in pension accounting I imply a relationship between 
Page 219 
other financial income, asset return assumptions and the composition of the pension 
portfolio. I do not however explicitly test this relationship. This is in part due to a 
lack 
of data as the persistence of this relationship would be of considerable interest. 
Further, 
to relate the manipulation of the pension scheme to xvider accounting manipulations 
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within the firm would be a significant extension of the research I have already carried 
out. 
Further, recent accounting disclosure under International Accounting Standard 
19 JAS-19) has provided some limited data on the mortality assumptions underlying the 
calculation of the pension liability. An analysis of this disclosure would be of great 
interest to both academics and practitioners. 
More widely there is a growing desire to create derivatives that can hedge 
stochastic mortality. Research in this area is vety limited and has to date focused on 
catastrophe bonds and mortality swaps. To consider a wider range of mortality 
derivatives is an interesting direction for future research in pensions. 
While there are a wide range of insights that can be gained from future research 
Page 22(1 
in the areas noted above, it is believed that the analysis and findings in this study 
provide a number of valuable insights and contributions to the extant literature. With 
the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards across a large part of 
Europe it is hoped that a wider cross-country analysis will be undertaken in the future to 
provide greater understanding and context to the findings presented in this thesis. 
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